The Response to the Iron Baron Oil Spill

Part B - Planning

Issue B1 Contingency Plans

Discussion

56. National Plan arrangements require each State to have an oil spill Contingency Plan to deal with responses to oil spills within the State jurisdiction. Regional and port plans are subordinate to each State Plan and provide finer detail on, amongst other issues, how regional/local responses are to be run.

57. The following plans were implemented in response to the Iron Baron oil spill:

i) The National Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea by Oil - Operations and
Procedures Manual (1991)

ii) The Tasmanian Supplement to the National Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea by Oil (6/12/93) (State Plan)

iii) Oil Spill Contingency Plan for the Port of Launceston (3/12/93)

iv) Oil Spill Contingency Plan for the Port of Devonport (3/12/93) and

v) BHP Emergency Management and Oil Spill Response Plans.

58. There is no Tasmanian wildlife or regional wildlife plan for oil pollution incidents.

59. The State Plan indicates that each coastal municipality has, or is producing, an emergency plan which details their responsibilities under an oil spill, and which identifies the role of Deputy On Scene Coordinator Foreshore as a response position fulfilled by a local government municipal engineer. The PLA Plan makes no mention of the role and responsibility of local government.

60. Guidelines and an agreed format for Contingency Plans have been developed under National Plan arrangements. The guidelines include the need to identify primary agencies. These are agencies with statutory responsibility for areas where an oil spill occurs - generally water and foreshore.

61. The National Plan Operations and Procedures Manual was being re-written at the time of the Iron Baron spill, and is currently available in draft form as the National Contingency Plan.

Findings

62. Regional port plans appear to lack the local input that is necessary to ensure coverage of relevant regional issues.

63. The present draft National Contingency Plan needs to be finalised.

64. Roles and responsibilities of municipal agencies should be included in port specific plans.

65. Regional port plans appear to lack local input that is necessary to ensure coverage of relevant regional issues

66. Wildlife treatment and rehabilitation will often play a major part in, and be a high cost element of, an oil spill response. However, the statutory 'ownership' of wildlife is not formally identified. Acknowledgment of this ownership within a Contingency Plan would place a clear onus on the statutory agency to recognise its specific obligations in preparation for and during an incident.

Recommendation 4

The Tasmanian State Contingency Plan and regional/port plans should be reviewed and aligned with National Plan Contingency Plan Guidelines.

Each port Contingency Plan should identify the roles and responsibilities of local government agencies in shoreline clean-up.

Recommendation 5

State Pollution Committees should examine the appropriateness of identifying the government department with statutory responsibility for wildlife as a 'primary agency' within the State's Contingency Plan.

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Issue B2 Role of the State Committee - links between the State Committee and the Response Planning Committee

Discussion

67. The Chairman of the State Marine Pollution Committee (SMPC) was first notified of the Iron Baron incident by the State Oil Pollution Control Officer (SOPCO) at approximately 2100 on 10 July 1995. SMPC Chairman immediately advised the responsible Minister. The Minister was further briefed around 2230 on the significance of the incident and advised of the mobilisation of the response at approximately 0200 on 11 July 1995.

68. A meeting of the SMPC was convened at 0900 on 11 July 1995 and a comprehensive briefing was provided by the On Scene Coordinator (OSC) and others at 1100. As a result of this briefing and of advice from the OSC's Response Planning Committee, the SMPC adopted the Port of Launceston Contingency Plan as the operational plan for the incident and for a number of additional matters that needed to be addressed. That plan was presented to the State Minister for Environment and Land Management for approval.

69. In the first few days of the incident, communication between the SMPC and the Response Planning Committee was principally by telephone. The OSC had difficulty in providing written situation reports (SITREPS) to the SMPC because of the level of demands on him. This was subsequently rectified.

70. The SMPC met as required throughout the incident (virtually on a daily basis) until the dumping of the ship on 30 July 1995. The SMPC met at DELM in Hobart. A comprehensive operations room was not established, although the conference room used was equipped with all the necessary maps and charts.

71. The SMPC remained almost exclusively in Hobart throughout the incident. This was because the operational responsibility for the response rested with the Response Planning Committee at Bell Bay, while the role of the SMPC was to monitor, coordinate support and advise Government in the light of briefings received from the Response Planning Committee.

72. At the end of the first week, the SMPC was concerned about the lack of information available regarding oil remaining on the vessel and travelled to the Port of Launceston in an endeavour to secure that information. The SMPC met at the George Town Council Chambers, determining that a venue separated from the operations area and the activities of the Response Planning Committee was more appropriate and, again, to ensure that full operational control rested, and was seen to rest, with the OSC and the Response Planning Committee. The visit of the SMPC to the PLA did not bring to light any better information and the SMPC returned to Hobart.

73. The SMPC co-opted to its membership, the Senior Wildlife Officer, who was Acting Director of Resources Wildlife and Heritage in the Parks and Wildlife Service, and the Director of Environmental Management, to provide additional expertise in the consideration of the issues.

74. The routine work of the SMPC is ordinarily supported by the SOPCO who is also a member of the SMPC. In this case the SOPCO was part of the Response Planning Committee at Bell Bay. He was also there in his capacity of SSC. This resulted in the SMPC not having regular administrative support available to it.

Findings

75. The clear separation of support and operational responsibilities that was established between the SMPC and the Response Planning Committee and maintained throughout the duration of the incident, contributed significantly to the success of operations. The good working relationship between these Committees was a credit to their leadership and those involved. A clear understanding of roles and responsibilities contributed positively towards the effectiveness of the response.

76. The multiple roles of the SOPCO caused administrative problems due to the high demands of this incident. This left the SMPC short of informed administrative support.

Recommendation 6

The State Marine Pollution Committee should consider appointing an Executive Officer to relieve the current State Oil Pollution Control Officer/Scientific Support Coordinator of administrative responsibility to the Committee, and review the availability of direct scientific support to the Committee. This support could be achieved by the establishment of regional environmental experts for each port Contingency Plan.

Issue B3 Coastal Resource Atlas

Discussion

77. The Coastal Resource Atlas (CRA) is a source of information (hardcopy and/or computer digitised) about the coastal and near-shore environment. It is intended to contain data on coastal wildlife and marine resources, habitats, coastal geography and infrastructure details, marine navigation aids and navigation channels, key cultural/heritage areas or sites and jurisdictional boundaries for administering bodies.

78. A properly compiled and detailed CRA is a valuable aid in the management of a response to an oil spill.

79. The Tasmanian CRA for the area which was available to the On Scene Coordinator (OSC) contained insufficient information to be of particular value. Comments received were that some information, such as significant cultural (Aboriginal) sites or heritage sites, had not been included as it was deemed inappropriate; maps were too broad-brush with inappropriate scales; and key wildlife habitat details were not listed.

80. Most States are reviewing their CRAs. Due to the high cost involved and the sheer scope and volume of the task, these reviews are usually on a programmed region-by-region basis. The Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) has provided funds to States and the Northern Territory to assist with these projects.

Findings

81. A properly compiled CRA would have been a valuable tool in assisting the Response Planning Committee in the management of the response.

82. The Tasmanian CRA as annexed to the PLA Contingency Plan was inadequate and did not provide a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of key sites and significant habitats nor of important 'natural' cyclic events, such as bird nesting seasons.

83. Prioritisation of shoreline clean-up was hampered due to a lack of appropriate information held by the CRA.

84. Ongoing National Plan funding into development of CRAs is appropriate and demonstrates the importance of the CRA as a tool for an effective response.

Recommendation 7

The Tasmanian Coastal Resource Atlas should be redeveloped as a high priority, with input from relevant government and non-government organisations.

Issue B4 On Scene Spill Model

Discussion

85. The On Scene Spill Model (OSSM) is a computer trajectory modelling program used to predict the movement of an oil spill.

86. OSSM was activated by AMSA in Canberra early in the incident. However, AMSA has expressed concerns that the Victorian Institute of Marine Science (VIMS) also ran the model later in the incident. VIMS had been requested by the Scientific Support Coordinator (SSC) to run OSSM using real time data.

87. Concerns were expressed by wildlife personnel and some community groups as to why OSSM predictions were not passed on to wildlife coordinators, and why the movement of oil into certain areas was not predicted. AMSA is currently reviewing the national requirements for oil spill modelling.

88. AMSA is currently reviewing the national requirements for oil spill modelling.

Findings

89. OSSM should not be seen as an alternative to air surveillance. Predictions need to be continually ground-truthed by site checks and air surveillance.

90. Concerns regarding availability of OSSM predictions were partly addressed by including from week two, a wildlife officer on the Response Planning Committee.

91. The predictive limitations of OSSM were not generally understood by many members of the response team or the community.

92. Weather, particularly wind predictions mean that the reliability of OSSM predictions drop away after an eight hour time period. For some areas, results can be crude due to insufficient base-line data such as poor bathymetry and tidal physics details. It is more helpful for an experienced OSSM operator to be on site where ground-truthing is easier and local knowledge, on such things as unusual localised wind conditions or water currents, is available . Using correct protocols, OSSM can be a useful aid to the On Scene Coordinator (OSC). Back modelling or hindcasting from confirmed sightings can also help identify the origins of oil.

Recommendation 8

Given the present limited capability of the On Scene Spill Model, great emphasis should be placed on regularly ground-truthing predictions.

Recommendation 9

National Plan funding to continue development of an improved Oil Spill Trajectory Modelling system, incorporating up-to-date and detailed base-line data, should be made available.

Recommendation 10

National Plan information should explain the limitations of predictive modelling.

Issue B5 Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre

Discussion

93. The Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre (AMOSC) was established at Geelong in 1991. The Centre is financed by eleven Australian Institute of Petroleum oil companies. It provides a 24-hour 'rapid response facility' for equipment and personnel around the Australian coastline, as well as an extensive training facility.

94. AMOSC was initially advised of the grounding by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA), after some difficulties were experienced with the AMOSC call-out system. After contacting BHP, AMOSC received immediate advice from BHP to mobilise.

95. Four AMOSC staff and 26 personnel seconded from ESSO, Shell, Mobil, Ampol, Caltex and BHP worked in the response on behalf of AMOSC. They filled up to nine supervisory positions in the shore-line clean-up activity. The AMOSC Manager worked as Industry Adviser to the On Scene Coordinator (OSC).

96. A number of positive comments were received during the Review regarding the value of having properly trained operators from AMOSC on hand to take charge of work groups or train other personnel.

97. Within 18 hours of receiving advice to mobilise, twenty-three tonnes of AMOSC equipment was mobilised, mainly by air, from Geelong to Bell Bay. The equipment consisted of booms, skimmers, recovered oil tanks, oiled fauna kit and communications equipment.

98. Particular reference to the suitability and contribution made by the AMOSC oiled fauna kit was made by a number of people involved in wildlife rehabilitation efforts. Some vets, while acknowledging their good value, believed there is a need to review the contents of the kit.

99. AMOSC has advised that they are modifying their replacement procedures to ensure the continued availability of the fauna kit.

100. AMOSC recognises the need to have the fauna kit on the first load out.

Findings

101. Involvement of AMOSC made a positive contribution to the response. Delivery time for equipment met the AMOSC response target, with some equipment in the water by 1500 hours on Tuesday 11 July (approximately twenty hours after the grounding) and the remainder on site by 1700 hours that day.

Issue B6 Safe Havens

Discussion

102. A safe haven is a sheltered location (maybe a port) where a ship which has broken down or been damaged, can seek refuge to effect repairs or obtain assistance. Depending on the type of casualty involved, most ports have the potential to be safe havens. Whilst the PLA has powers to permit or prohibit entry of ships to a port within the jurisdiction of the PLA, the Chairman SMPC, under the provisions of the Tasmania Pollution of Waters by Oil and Noxious Substances Act 1987, has the authority to refuse entry on environmental grounds.

103. On deciding whether or not the Iron Baron would be allowed to enter the Port of Launceston to seek a safe haven, PLA considered primarily the risk of further pollution, and, secondarily, the risk that the ship would break up and create a navigational hazard, and possibly block the Port.

104. Initially, a suitable indemnity protecting the interests of both the State and the PLA in the event that the Iron Baron was permitted to enter port, was drafted. This became a non-issue after the refloat of the ship and her condition assessed.

105. On 24 July 1995, BHP was advised by PLA not to bring the ship into the port on the basis of her structural condition and the consequent pollution threat.

106. The SMPC considered an option for a safe haven location off the east (protected) coast of Flinders Island for the purposes of temporary repairs. However, this was rejected.

107. Queensland has guidelines for appraising requests for safe havens. These have been circulated to States through the National Plan Advisory Committee (NPAC) as a possible model to be used by State/NT governments.

Findings

108. The safe haven issue is an extremely important one, requiring a thorough understanding by all parties likely to influence or be affected by a decision about whether or not to provide refuge.

109. In some circumstances, failure to provide a safe haven may ultimately result in far greater environmental damage than would the provision of shelter.

110. The most appropriate forum for the decision on whether or not a ship should be provided a safe haven is the responsible port or marine authority. Those organisations have the benefit of local knowledge and conditions. They are also staffed by personnel with a marine background who will have an understanding of the circumstances of the vessel and an ability to best assess any potential threat.

111. Consideration of a request for a safe haven is likely to be influenced by a number of external interests, particularly environmental and political ones. It is therefore essential that relevant government and environmental agencies are well briefed on the issues as part of contingency planning. Any decision-making process needs to include consultation with government environment agencies.

112. The Review Group supports the development of State/NT National Plan Guidelines for appraising requests for safe havens.

Issue B7 New Product Trial Management

Discussion

113. Oil spills can be replicated in controlled laboratory environments. Response products do not necessarily require testing in an incident. The effectiveness of techniques and approved products used in oil spill clean-up needs to be thoroughly tested and familiar to response agencies before being used in a response.

114. It is common practice for new product developers to seek to utilise an oil spill incident to trial and promote their products.

115. During the incident, a number of individuals and organisations made direct approaches to have their products trialed. Some organisations which did not get satisfaction from the Response Planning Committee made higher level approaches and raised the matter with the media.

116. A number of products were tested in the area of secondary clean-up/shoreline polishing. The Scientific Support Coordinator (SSC) believed that product developers' claims were over optimistic. For example, a degreaser used on Ninth Island resulted in additional work to remove residuals.

117. The SSC believes an agreed protocol should be established to handle these approaches for product trials.

Findings

118. Approaches for product testing/trialing impinged unnecessarily on the Response Planning Committee.

Recommendation 11

The National Plan Advisory Committee, with the assistance and support of Scientific Support Coordinators, should develop an agreed protocol to handle the testing of new products.


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