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The Response to the Iron Baron Oil Spill
Part C - Operations
Oil Spill Response Team
Offshore Clean Up Team
Onshore Clean-up Team
Scientific Support Group
Administrative Support Team
Issue C1 The Response Planning Committee
Discussion
119. In this incident, direction and planning was managed by a Response Planning Committee working under the overall control of the On Scene Coordinator (OSC).
120. The Response Planning Committee set up its operation centre in the board room of the Port of Launceston Authority (PLA) at Bell Bay, overlooking the Tamar River in the port area. It remained the operation centre from the day following the grounding to the completion of the majority of clean-up operations.
121. The operations centre had ready access to other PLA rooms and resources. A mobile support 'village' was established in the grounds of the PLA. This relieved the demand on PLA resources.
122. The OSC for the majority of the response was Captain Charles Black, Harbour Master, Port of Launceston. Working under and reporting to the OSC were a number of leaders managing the following functions :
- Offshore Clean-up
- Onshore Clean-up
- Scientific Support and
- Administrative Support.
123. At the peak of the response over 500 personnel were in the field servicing all the functional areas.
124. BHP officers with appropriate experience and training were functional leaders for administrative support and onshore clean-up during most of the response. They were, in effect, working for the OSC, but were seconded from and paid for by BHP. BHP also supported the response with personnel and resources in all functional areas.
125. The OSC was directly advised by officers of: Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) (for the majority of the time Mr Ray Lipscombe); the Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre (AMOSC), (Mr Don Blackmore); the ship owner's P & I club representative (Dr Brian Dicks); United Salvage; and BHP. BHP was supported by a ship incident management team.
126. During the first week, the Wildlife Rescue and Recovery Coordinator reported to the OSC through the Scientific Support Coordinator (SSC). A wildlife representative was subsequently appointed but, because of on-site demands at the Low Head rehabilitation centre, was largely not present at the operations centre other than for briefings/debriefings.
127. The Tasmanian SSC, Mr Richard Hammond, is also the State Oil Pollution Control Officer (SOPCO), a Statutory appointment within the State Marine Pollution Committee (SMPC). During the first week of the response the SSC was also responsible for wildlife issues.
128. Briefing and review sessions of the Response Planning Committee and key team leaders were held at the commencement and end of each day. Following the evening review, the next day's work was planned.
129. In Tasmania there were insufficient numbers of personnel with appropriate oil spill response technical skills to manage and respond to a major incident such as this.
130. To deal with the current situation, where each State has limited skilled resources to respond to a protracted oil spill incident, AMSA believes it appropriate for a composite State/Commonwealth/industry National Response Team to be established to assist in a major incident anywhere in Australia. AMSA has already taken action to establish such a group.
131. The Commissioner for Police, who is identified as the State Oil Spill Commander, was not required for the incident.
132. During this Review, concern was expressed that some aspects of the administrative support did not handle all the needs of additional staff brought in from interstate, particularly in regard to briefings and familiarisation procedures.
Findings
133. The composition of the Response Planning Committee was representative of the skills needed for the incident and was enhanced by the subsequent addition of a Senior Wildlife Adviser. Under the control of the OSC it was very effective and maintained good management over operations.
134. The availability of the PLA Building was useful for the set-up of the Response Planning Committee. However, in the longer term this proved a hindrance to the ongoing conduct of port business.
135. A major pollution incident affecting the coastline and wildlife requires large numbers of experienced personnel that are not readily available in any one State in Australia. For Australia to have the capacity to respond to a major pollution incident, there is a need to combine trained and experienced personnel from AMSA, each State and the oil industry to advise and provide the functional leadership and technical expertise needed to support an individual State's response.
136. Had the spill required a higher level of response, current arrangements in Tasmania would have placed the Commissioner of Police in control of response operations, while the management of the actual clean-up would have rested with the responsible lead agency. In a major incident it would be appear to be appropriate that any person fulfilling the role of State Spill Commander be a member of the SMPC and be trained and knowledgeable in all aspects of pollution response.
Recommendation 12
State Committees should ensure that potential regional operations centres
are identified in Contingency Plans.
Recommendation 13
The Australian Maritime Safety Authority's proposal to establish a
National Response Team should be pursued as a matter of priority.
Recommendation 14
Relevant Tasmanian officials should review the current arrangement
that identifies the position of Oil Spill Commander with the Commissioner
of Police.
Issue C2 Equipment
Discussion
137. Only a limited quantity of port-based equipment was available in Tasmania, and some of that equipment lacked components when delivered on site. There were no locally-based heavy booms or Marco oil recovery type skimmers. This deficiency was soon overcome by the rapid supply of equipment resources from the National Plan and AMOSC. The oiled fauna kit supplied by AMOSC proved invaluable and received high praise.
138. Bad weather affected deployment of equipment and demonstrated the limitations of oil spill equipment in adverse conditions.
139. Problems identified by the offshore coordinator in regard to equipment were:
i) There were limitations with the AMOSC Roulunds Bay boom for single J configuration sweep due to its construction in 200 m continuous lengths. (It is considered 50m lengths which would enable greater flexibility with shape of deployment would be better for this application.)
ii) The need to increase to 150mm the discharge hose for Desmi Systems to allow efficient pumping of high viscosity oil against high back pressures
iii) Temporary storage limitations particularly in the area of removal from the casualty. The Transpac containers fulfilled this to an extent however their capacity was limited
iv) The lack of any realistic offshore recovery capability in the National Plan stockpile, in particular a large Vessel Skimmer System."
140. The OSC identified a deficiency with the early series Marco oil recovery vessel's capacity to discharge certain types of recovered oil. That problem had previously been identified with this equipment.
141. There were general comments at AMSA debriefings that concerns were held over the levels of maintenance of the equipment held in Tasmanian and other ports. However there were no reports of inoperable or poorly maintained equipment during this incident.
142. Mobile phones were used extensively during the operation. A number of problems with this mode of communications were identified.
i) It was found that media were scanning the analogue mobile frequencies which inhibited their use in some cases. This was overcome to some extent by the introduction of digital phones
ii) The local area is renowned for the number of 'dead' spots where mobile phones are ineffective.
143. Marine VHF communications were used extensively for offshore communications and communications with aircraft. PLA maintained two radio operators in its port control signal station, as there was a need to maintain normal port traffic as well as incident traffic. A number of boat operators commented on the difficulty in monitoring the radio and suggested the fitting and use of head sets.
144. A substantial amount of communications equipment was provided by BHP, AMOSC and AMSA.
145. Communications with some of the islands was reported as being unreliable. It appeared that in a number instances emergency communications from outlying islands was not considered or provided.
Findings
146. The Iron Baron casualty once again demonstrated that, in rough seas, existing technology is ineffective and the fate of oil is uncontrollable. In such conditions, an oil slick will invariably break up at sea or end up on shore.
147. The most likely source of major oil pollution from ships in Tasmanian ports is fuel oil. At room temperature this oil has the consistency of treacle, and, before use in ships' engines, it must be heated. At lower temperatures heavy fuel oil is semi-solid. There is a need for Tasmanian Contingency Plans and equipment inventories to reflect this.
148. The immediate availability of wildlife rescue and rehabilitation kits is essential.
149. Had previously identified deficiencies in transferring oil from the Marco oil recovery vessel been rectified, slightly better recovery rates of oil from the water would have been achieved. AMSA have stated that to rectify the problem would be expensive and not cost-effective.
150. Communications equipment was generally found to be satisfactory. There were no reports of serious operational difficulties reported due to faulty communications equipment. General access to mobile phones was of great assistance in the response.
151. The reliance on mobile phones could have caused problems, and Emergency Response Division operations personnel need to be constantly aware of the shortcomings of the mobile phone network.
152. Contingency Plans need to recognise the requirements for on-site equipment management, including a centralised base under an appropriate manager/storeperson. Appropriate equipment records are also required.
153. The National Plan Equipment Working Group, when examining State equipment bids, needs to recognise the high cost associated with offshore equipment compared with its limited effectiveness in open water under most weather conditions.
Recommendation 15
The Tasmanian Marine Pollution Committee should review its equipment
stockpile and identify shortfalls, taking into account :
i) types of oil (that is, the predominance of heavy bunker fuel oils)
ii) exposure to prevailing weather/water temperatures and
iii) the logistics of equipment transport.
Recommendation 16
Given the shortcomings of some existing equipment, more human and financial
resources should be allocated to the research and development of response
equipment, with particular emphasis on equipment that has been identified
as needing modification.
Recommendation 17
Appropriate wildlife rescue and rehabilitation kits should be included
in any pool of response material and be made available, under the National
Plan, at key locations around the country.
Issue C3 Transportation of Personnel and Equipment
Discussion
154. Emergency Management Australia (EMA) provided the transport logistics role for much of the National Plan equipment. This was the result of a recently established contractual arrangement. The Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre (AMOSC) organised its own equipment transportation.
155. Some problems were experienced with EMA's new phone system, but these have now been rectified. This could have caused delays in equipment delivery.
156. There was a two hour delay in Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) being notified of the Iron Baron grounding. This may have delayed activation of equipment and personnel for pollution response.
157. Submissions to the Review stated concerns regarding deficiencies in materials stock control. The need was identified by some submissions for an on-site equipment store/logistics person to control equipment delivery, servicing, relocation and return.
Findings
158. A potentially hazardous incident arose when a mobile crane of marginal capacity was used to launch a Marco oil recovery vessel at Rubicon River Bridge. Despite the best intentions of local advice, submissions considered that the decision to launch by this method and at this location was inappropriate given the equipment used and the resultant stranding of the skimmer.
159. Transportation of both equipment and personnel was both timely and generally problem-free.
160. Delays in initial notification of the grounding to AMSA did not influence the effectiveness of the response.
161. There is a need to ensure that Contingency Plans properly address the issues of equipment control, and its delivery, servicing, relocation and return.
162. Adherence to existing procedures will ensure that AMSA is alerted of any incident as soon as possible and thereby able to facilitate both a prepared response by other organisations and deployment of equipment and personnel.
Issue C4 Use of Aircraft - On Scene
Discussion
163. Aircraft, in particular helicopters, are an essential spill response tool for surveillance, application of dispersants and transportation of personnel and equipment. During the Iron Baron incident, helicopters proved an invaluable resource, particularly for access to offshore islands. Three helicopters under the control of the On Scene Coordinator (OSC) were dedicated to tasks throughout the incident.
164. There was occasional use of fixed wing aircraft for surveillance. However, these craft have their limitations for accurate observation purposes. Some problems were experienced with pilots inexperienced in oil pollution surveillance techniques.
165. There was recognition that costs of aircraft hire are very high. An aviation coordinator, supported by an aircraft ground assistant, was appointed under the Administrative Support Unit of the Response Planning Committee.
166. Tensions arose because of the competing demands for access to aircraft for the purposes of, for example, observations/surveillance, transportation, salvage and wildlife rehabilitation. There appeared to be an underestimation of the requirements of the wildlife people particularly regarding transport.
167. These tensions may have been assuaged by allocation of a fourth helicopter but at an obvious extra cost.
168. The wildlife representative on the Response Planning Committee was not present at all times, due to time demands at the rehabilitation centre. However aircraft allocation was discussed each evening by the planning group, which included a representative from the Parks and Wildlife Service.
169. Some criticism was directed at the establishment of exclusion zones for aircraft around the ship and some islands. Some direct overflights by surveillance aircraft occurred over sensitive fauna areas.
170. Reference was made to problems with communications on board the Iron Baron as the result of aircraft overflying or hovering over the ship. This created problems when personnel were undertaking tasks requiring constant communication between supervisors and fellow personnel.
171. Some occupational health and safety (OH&S) issues were identified with aircraft usage where there were a few near-miss incidents in relation to transport of personnel by helicopter.
Findings
172. Aircraft, particularly helicopters, proved an invaluable tool for transportation of personnel and equipment to remote locations and to the stranded ship.
173. The creation of an exclusion zone around the ship and some islands was not done to prevent media access. It is a normal precautionary operating procedure in such circumstances and, in this incident, it was determined as necessary to reduce noise that could affect operations or disturb local wildlife.
174. The number of reported OH&S incidents regarding aircraft use indicates the need for adequate and compulsory briefings of aircraft passengers in order to minimise the risks.
Issue C5 Offshore Response
Discussion
175. The offshore response relates to water-based activities, including the deployment of booms, application of dispersants and recovery of oil by skimmers and absorbents. It requires personnel with operational seamanship and boat handling skills.
176. The initial call-out and response of the PLA personnel was effective and timely.
177. Weather conditions prevailing at Hebe Reef at the time of grounding precluded 'booming off' the Iron Baron. High tidal stream conditions and the reef itself would have made boom deployment dangerous and ineffective.
178. The offshore response was managed by the Deputy On Scene Coordinator (offshore), a functional leader on the Response Planning Committee.
179. The accessibility of equipment was good. Booms were of limited value in containing the oil under adverse weather and strong tidal conditions. Booms were, however, deployed for deflection purposes. Oil passes under booms when currents exceed 3/4 knot.
180. There were limited suitably powerful craft to support extensive deployment of booms. Only vessels from the PLA and the Australian Maritime College were used offshore, with the exception of two Marco oil recovery skimmers. These skimmers were on-site during the refloating and immediately deployed to recover oil. Of the 25 tonnes released, 7.5 tonnes was recovered.
181. Submissions questioned the adequacy of the response during and immediately following the refloating of the vessel under favourable weather conditions in particular with regard to non-booming of the vessel..
Findings
182. The offshore response planning for refloating included 'booming' of the Iron Baron. However, due to the strong tidal stream, proximity to the reef and lack of suitable craft to handle the boom (tugs and workboats were involved in the refloating operation), the decision was made not to boom the ship. Under the circumstances this was an appropriate decision.
183. Booms were only of limited value offshore because of weather and tidal conditions. In the river they had extremely limited value due to the high tidal stream speeds. Investigation by the AMSAinto appropriate equipment and techniques using international best practice in dealing with oil spills particularly of heavy oil, needs to continue.
Issue C6 Shoreline Clean-up
Discussion
184. In most cases of near-shore ship-sourced spills, oil ends up stranded on shore. The majority of response effort will be directed towards shoreline clean-up.
185. A formal call out for foreshore clean-up was made eighteen hours after the grounding and work commenced soon after. Some activity commenced before formal guidelines were imposed. Because of the methods used, this, to a small degree, affected later operations
186. A representative of BHP was appointed by the On Scene Coordinator (OSC) to lead the foreshore clean-up function. However, there was a perception in the community that BHP was 'in charge' of the shoreline clean-up.
187. Local government provided most of the initial strike force, with additional equipment either being purchased or hired to meet needs. Equipment continued to be supplemented as those needs and the requirements of workers became apparent. The shoreline clean-up was a labour-intensive exercise. The equipment and protective clothing issued was largely effective.
Findings
188. There was an enthusiastic response to the shoreline clean-up call-out but, as could be expected, there were limitations early in the incident because of insufficient trained or experienced personnel. Despite the concern by some respondents as to the shortcomings of the response, it is considered that a comprehensive and thorough job was done. Only time and monitoring will determine the ultimate effectiveness of the operation, but those involved deserve high commendation.
189. Local government is the best initial resource for shoreline clean-up equipment, but in the case of a major spill, supplementary equipment and personnel would be required. A perception in the community that BHP was 'in charge' of the foreshore clean-up caused concern with some respondents. A more appropriate response would have been to have a local government representative on the Response Planning Committee leading the shoreline clean-up function.
190. Relevant Contingency Plans should contain broad priorities/plans for shoreline clean-up, with provision for daily priorities to be established at the time.
Recommendation 18
Port/regional Contingency Plans should identify senior local government
engineers, who should receive appropriate training, to be shoreline clean-up
team leaders.
Issue C7 Dispersant Use
Discussion
191. The Port of Launceston Authority (PLA) Oil Spill Contingency Plan of December 1993 states, "The Director of Environmental Control (State Committee Chairman) will have the ultimate responsibility of deciding where, when, and under what circumstances dispersant may be used in any oil spill situation".
192. Dispersant use was approved and applied from PLA craft in the vicinity of Low Head from early morning on Tuesday 11 July 1995 until the tide changed at 1030 hours. At 1100 hours dispersant use was approved for " offshore - not in the estuary ". Other dispersant use offshore occurred on Saturday 15, when dispersants were trialed on a slick emanating from the ship. The trial proved the dispersant to be ineffective, so its use was not continued.
193. Dispersants were later approved for direct application to rocks for cleaning in the Low Head area and at Ninth Island. The Onshore Coordinator felt that earlier use of dispersants would have assisted the clean-up in the long term. The Tasmanian State Plan does not contain any specific information on the use of dispersants.
194. Only AMSA/National Plan approved dispersants were used. A total of 30 drums of dispersants were used from a stock on hand of 266 drums.
195. One respondent to the Review claimed widespread use of dispersants. Another was disappointed at the limited trials and use of dispersants. Others made reference to the lack of cooperation with salesmen who were looking for trials of 'cure all' products.
196. A number of OH&S issues relating to the use of dispersants in some locations were raised. These were mainly associated with dispersants being in drums that did not have the correct dispersant labelling.
Findings
197. With the exception of minor incidents, dispersants were used in accordance with approved procedures. Only approved dispersants were used.
198. The quantity of dispersants used for both oil type and terrain was not excessive and was entirely appropriate for the conditions prevailing. The decision not to trial 'new', non-approved products was correct.
199. The decision-making process for the use of dispersants would have been assisted by the provision of an appropriate dispersant-use matrix tuned for local conditions and included in the Contingency Plan. The identification of pre-designated areas where dispersant application was possible would also have been useful. States should pursue pre-approval planning for use of dispersants.
Recommendation 19
The National Plan Advisory Committee should give high priority to the establishment
of a dispersant/temperature/oil type matrix as a matter of urgency, using
contract services if necessary. This matrix should be kept up-dated and
incorporated in all State and Regional Plans.
Issue C8 Disposal of Waste
Discussion
200. Management of oil-contaminated waste and recovered oil is a response issue for any oil spill, and is primarily a State responsibility. The Port of Launceston Authority (PLA) Oil Spill Contingency Plan has regard to disposal sites and strategies, but does not reflect current preferred practices.
201. Waste disposal was the responsibility of the Scientific Support Group which included a Solid Waste Supervisor who provided technical and scientific advice on waste disposal methods and options following clean-up.
202. The strategy adopted aimed at minimising the use of land-fill operations. This was done by separating waste according to identified characteristics, with the intention of recycling some types of waste material. Circumstances, however, and the nature of the collected waste, dictated that land-fill disposal was the most appropriate option for the 3 500 tonnes of oil-contaminated material. This was eventually disposed of to land-fill in the George Town area.
203. Unusual waste, such as the liquid generated from bird cleaning operations, was transported to TEMCO fume treatment dams and will eventually be treated through the George Town Water Treatment Plant under a trade waste agreement.
Findings
204. Disposal of waste, on the advice of the Solid Waste Supervisor acting under the oversight of the Scientific Support Group, appears to have been adequate.
205. Given the existence of a wide network of experts in this field, it would be desirable that a protocol for management of oil-contaminated waste be developed at national level and incorporated into State plans.
Recommendation 20
Regional and Port Contingency Plans should be reviewed and updated to reflect
current preferred practices on the identification and implementation of
disposal methods for oily waste and liquid oil.
Issue C9 Salvage - Operations
Discussion
206. Salvage operations under LOF95 (see issue A5 - Salvage) commenced some five hours after the grounding and continued until the LOF95 was terminated at 1455 hours on 26 July 1995. From this time the operational focus changed from 'salvage' to preparation for 'towing and dumping'.
207. The salvage operation was in two phases:
i) refloat the vessel from Hebe Reef and
ii) prepare the vessel to meet the necessary conditions for port entry.
208. The On Scene Coordinator (OSC) appointed an on scene casualty coordinator on board whose actions received favourable comment from a number of sources. A number of submissions said that the brief for the OSC's onboard representative was not clearly set out and he tended to confine his attention to anti-pollution measures.
209. The Iron Baron was successfully refloated six days after the grounding and removed to a Port of Launceston Authority (PLA) designated anchorage, where it was to undergo extensive inspection and preparation for port entry. The opportunity for underwater inspections was hampered by the strong currents prevailing at the anchorage.
210. A number of respondents, including the State Marine Pollution Control (SMPC), OSC, OSC representative on the vessel, Australian Marine Safety Authority (AMSA), BHP and others, commented on the difficulty of obtaining accurate information from the salvors as to the condition of the vessel and, in particular, on the amount of oil remaining on board. Oil on the vessel created a number of difficulties, some (50 - 70 tonnes) was transferred to secure tanks, some (25 tonnes) was removed ashore. The quantity of oil remaining on board and the accuracy of the information being provided in this regard was of major concern to everyone involved.
211. United Salvage stated that:
i) A total of eleven written detailed situation reports (SITREPS) were provided by the Salvage Master to the effective owners (BHP) during the course of the operation, which is normal salvage practice. In addition, other SITREPS were provided covering the Refloating Plan and the estimate of oil remaining
ii) Every effort was made to provide information as it became available. The estimation of the oil remaining in the breached tanks could only be made by divers who were limited in operating time. At the same time, owners, underwriters and United Salvage required information as to the extent of the damage to the hull, which also required the services of the divers
iii) Under the circumstances it was impossible to meet the somewhat unrealistic expectations of persons unfamiliar with the difficulties involved
iv) Salvage is concerned with practicalities and does not perform to imposed timetables.
212. Following the refloating of the vessel, and whilst it was at anchor, the PLA determined that port entry was not an option and ultimately directed the owners to remove the vessel from their jurisdiction.
213. There was a conflict of opinion regarding the action required to minimise pollution of the environment, with the options being to transfer oil to secure tanks on board or to remove oil from the ship. United Salvage stated that the appropriate action is dependent upon the circumstances of each casualty. This is determined by the Salvage Master in consultation with attending surveyors at the time. In this case, the 'pumpability' (or lack thereof) of the thick heavy fuel oil was the determining factor.
Findings
214. United Salvage successfully refloated the vessel and removed her from Hebe Reef with great skill under difficult circumstances, and are to be complimented for their endeavour.
215. The OSC's representative on board the casualty had a role, status and authority that was not clearly defined. However, under the circumstances he did a very good job and earned the respect of everyone on board the vessel.
216. Uncertainty about the volume of oil still on board complicated the planning for the wildlife response and caused questions to be asked by some members of the community.
Recommendation 21
During an incident where casualties being salvaged have caused or are likely
to cause oil pollution, the lead agency should appoint a very senior representative,
who remains on board, with the objective of providing best available information
on a continuing basis to the On Scene Coordinator and others. This will
have the advantage that the Salvage Master will have to brief only one representative.
The duties of this position should be fully considered and developed when
the National Response Team is formed. This is a key position and consideration
needs to be given to the training and experience of the personnel likely
to be filling the role.
Recommendation 22
During an incident, independent salvage advice may need to be provided to
the On Scene Coordinator, State Marine Pollution Committee and Australian
Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA). AMSA/National Plan should explore the
availability of resources to provide independent salvage advice, and make
arrangements to ensure that this independent opinion is available during
an incident involving any severely damaged vessel.
Issue C10 Towage and Dumping
Discussion
217. After the decision had been made to dump the Iron Baron a contract was agreed between BHP and United Salvage to tow the vessel to the dumping area.
218. The vessel Blue Fin followed the tow of the casualty. The Blue Fin carried dispersant, spraying equipment and breaker boards, and was on standby to combat any further spills during the towing operation. Although no major spillage from the Iron Baron occurred, a light sheen was observed during the voyage. However, it was considered to be of such insignificance as not to warrant treatment.
219. The Cape Barren Island aboriginal community was concerned about the effects of dumping and the possible future pollution from residual oil still on board the ship.
220. Some public concern was expressed about the possibility that whales may be injured during the dumping. In addition, it was claimed that explosives were used to hasten the dumping process.
Findings
221. The towage and dumping operation was carried out with skill and precision and reflected the professionalism of United Salvage and BHP.
222. Whilst planning for the tow and sinking of the ship centred around mitigating any environmental issues that may have developed, more detailed information should have been released to minimise any disquiet the public may have had regarding the matter.
223. Explosives were not used in the dumping. However, water pressure build-up in parts of the ship during the sinking process may have created the perception of explosions.
224. The minor sheen resulting from the towage operation is considered to have been inevitable under the circumstances and the decision to take no further action to disperse was appropriate.
Issue C11 BHP
Discussion
225. The shipowner (BHP) acted promptly by activating its Crisis Management Plan. BHP supported the Tasmanian State Marine Pollution Committee (SMPC) and On Scene Coordinator (OSC).
226. BHP provided significant financial, personnel and technical resources from local, interstate and overseas locations to assist the clean-up operations. It thereby brought to the task a whole range of administrative and logistical support. Local personnel were also available but did not have the same level of expertise. However, this was developed during the incident. BHP appointed an oil spill response expert to support the OSC and provided teams for cleaning up the affected areas around the Tamar River and adjoining coastline.
227. Although BHP stated and clearly accepted responsibility for cleaning up the oil pollution and associated problems, and also provided a significant number of the personnel and financial resources, control and coordination remained with the OSC, Captain Charles Black, and the SMPC.
228. BHP has put in place a long-term management plan should any further oil be brought to the surface during the coming months. BHP has given additional commitments to cooperate with the Tasmanian Department of Environment and Land Management (DELM), to fund an appropriate long-term sampling and assessment program of the environment following clean-up and restoration, and to fully support further clean-up efforts if required.
Findings
229. BHP acted effectively and professionally throughout the incident. It accepted responsibilities for the spill and made commitments to meeting clean-up costs.
230. The intense workload and associated stress that occurs with any oil spill and clean-up operations would have been greatly exacerbated had BHP's resources not been made available.
231. BHP's actions demonstrated that its crisis management team can act quickly and effectively and that they have the resources to respond to an emergency of this nature. BHP should be congratulated on its response and on the actions of the crisis response teams. The lessons that BHP learned from this incident should be made available to the National Plan and other industry organisations likely to be faced with a similar emergency.