The Response to the Iron Baron Oil Spill

Part D - Personnel

Issue D1 Workforce

Discussion

232. The response at its peak involved a team of over 500 people, drawn from Commonwealth, State, Local Government, industry (in particular BHP), local private companies and businesses, the oil industry and the general public.

233. Due to limited Tasmanian personnel resources there was a dependence on external assistance. BHP, the salvors and Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) brought in interstate and overseas expertise.

234. Tasmanian agencies and staff experienced problems associated with their ongoing responsibilities. Port of Launceston Authority (PLA) staff were expected to ensure continuity of normal port operations during the incident. Normal routine duties of the small Wildlife Division within the Department of Environment and Land Management (DELM) mounted up while staff were fully occupied with this incident. PLA's boat crews did an excellent job in relation to removing personnel from the casualty. However, there were some criticisms regarding their availability in later stages. This was attributed to their normal work requirements and rosters of the port.

235. Salvors made use of the National Plan expertise and some equipment to assist the oil pollution aspects of the salvage operation. It was subsequently agreed this will not happen in future incidents.

236. Casual labour brought in to assist with shoreline clean-up was paid $18/hour. This flowed onto volunteers. Payment of Wildlife 'volunteers' created a greatly increased administrative workload, particularly with the large numbers of volunteers involved. It also adversely changed the culture of the response. Payment levels for volunteers and CES employees created inequities between workers and supervisors.

237. One of the major calls on specialist human resources was associated with the Administrative Support functions of the Response Planning Committee. These functions included acquisition of equipment and personnel, transport planning and logistics, welfare, health and safety, travel, accommodation and aircraft management. In this incident, these functions were substantially fulfilled by BHP expertise and staff.

Findings

238. Due to the limited numbers of suitably experienced people, continuing work on identifying a National Response Team is appropriate. Team members from the Commonwealth, States and Northern Territory and the oil industry, selected on the basis of proven skills and abilities, would be likely to fill key co-ordination roles. In regard to administrative support, the States and Territories need to establish an administrative and financial response strategy, including the identification of people within their own relevant organisations to fulfil the necessary administrative roles.

239. The level of payment to the supplementary workforce created inequities between workers and supervisors. It is preferable that any supplementary workforce be appropriately selected and paid at realistic rates. In this incident, some volunteers realised the inequity in the system and requested equal consideration.

240. The incident reinforced the importance of the provision of administrative support to a successful response. In a similar incident, but without the availability of the organisational support of the likes of BHP, this function would fall directly to a government agency. States need to address this issue.

Recommendation 23

States need to establish a strategy and systems including the identification of a pool of people to fulfil the functions of administrative support and put in place appropriate training and familiarisation.

Issue D2 Welfare/Health & Safety

Discussion

241. The response involved a very large team of highly motivated people. Long hours were worked, often in difficult situations. The incident required a field response during daylight hours, followed by intensive debriefings and forward planning sessions during the evening. This meant that personnel frequently worked many days of 18+ hours under extremely stressful circumstances. This situation was aggravated by the extended nature (six weeks during the intensive phase) of the incident.

242. At times the weather conditions were extreme (both cold and windy) and some clean-up areas were extremely remote. Quite hazardous equipment and materials, ranging from helicopters to chemical dispersants, were used by large numbers of people, many of whom were inadequately trained. Some reports referred to people handling concentrated dispersants with no protective clothing.

243. Some field teams were located on remote islands with no radio communication or medical kit for up to three days, and with extremely limited or poorly coordinated food supplies. These teams generally included people with previous experience working in remote areas.

244. During the first week of the response, catering supplies and other amenities were often quite limited. The influx of government and industry personnel placed a severe strain on the accommodation available in the immediate area of George Town.

245. An occupational health and safety (OH&S) Officer was appointed to the planning team. During the response to the incident, few injuries were reported.

Findings

246. The general welfare and occupational health and safety of all response personnel, including volunteers, need to be considered throughout the duration of any response. Many people involved in the response were required to share accommodation, often in crowded situations.

247. On occasions during the response, some personnel were exposed to unnecessary risk as a result of inadequate training/briefing, limited planning, or poor implementation of plans. However, it was generally felt that, given the realities of an emergency type response operation spread over a number of sites, the OH&S issues were adequately handled. There was an awareness of the issue and the responsibilities it entailed.

248. In similar incidents, where appropriate, stress counselling by qualified personnel should be readily available.

Recommendations 24

As part of any Contingency Plans, proper provision should be made for:

i) catering for and supporting the involvement of volunteers, including adequate briefings and provision and control of equipment, clothing and support facilities; and

ii) assessment of suitable accommodation options, with the likely demand and shortfalls being addressed through options such as billeting.

Recommendation 25

Contingency Plans should make specific reference to Occupational Health & Safety policy and strategy, with a designated person responsible for those issues.

Issue D3 Training/Briefings

Discussion

249. The core team members of the Response Team consisted of personnel who were well trained and operationally experienced in their particular jobs. However, the majority of support personnel were either trained but inexperienced, or were part of the considerable volunteer and supplementary workforce who were largely untrained and inexperienced.

250. There was a lack of training in a number of areas including Incident Control System (ICS) management, media presentations, use of equipment, shoreline clean-up techniques and use of chemicals. These deficiencies were met generally by 'on-the-job' training.

251. Several submissions from personnel involved in the response and from volunteers assisting referred to problems with work programs attributed to rapid staff turn-over (some personnel only staying for 3-4 days); minimal handover time for various replacement personnel; limited briefings and training for volunteers; and limited information material for volunteers.

252. A number of respondents suggested that there was a need for better on-site identification of personnel and the role they were fulfilling.

Findings

253. The overall effectiveness of the response was due primarily to the availability of a team of operationally experienced and trained personnel drawn from a variety of government and private sector agencies.

254. The initial phases (days 1-5) of the wildlife response were hampered by the lack of ICS training for wildlife personnel.

255. Change-over of personnel was a problem. Operational response plans should include provisions for adequate briefing of personnel at times of change-over, and that sequencing of personnel change be geared to maintaining an effective response. Each 7-10 day cycle should provide for an appropriate overlap which should not be less than 3 days in the early stages of an incident.

Recommendation 26

National Plan agencies in each State should prepare a series of relevant hand-out materials (on matters including, wildlife handling, shoreline clean-up and handling of dispersants which would be immediately available ) for all newcomers to the site, particularly volunteers and untrained/inexperienced personnel. This material would supplement on-the-job training.

There should be an effort to educate across the spectrum of disciplines involved in an oil spill response, so that a better understanding of relative priorities, concerns and responses exists.

Recommendation 27

Tasmania should establish a regular program of training in the operation of oil spill response equipment for port, lands/wildlife, local government and emergency personnel.

Issue D4 Personnel Communications

Discussion

256. The On Scene Coordinator (OSC) had put in place a process for regular briefings/debriefings. Although the Response Planning Committee provided the focus for this information flow, adequate communications across all facets of the response team did not occur at all times. Various comments were received about communication problems.

257. The stressful work situation aggravated any communication problems.

258. Tensions occurred when information disseminated seemed to contradict other observers' experiences. This may have been due to misunderstandings about terminology used. (The use of the term 'sheen' was an example where a technical term was used which was differently perceived by observers who were unfamiliar with oil pollution terminology or inexperienced with the surveillance of oil on water.) In some instances advice was sought and then not implemented, and in other instances parts of the response team did not understand the need for particular items required by other areas of the team. At times the operation of the response was hampered by poor communication between key members of the response team.

259. In the first few days a lack of situation/pollution reports (SITREPS/POLREPS) from the Response Planning Committee to the State Marine Pollution Committee (SMPC) caused problems in the State Committee's understanding of certain issues and in keeping them adequately briefed. This was soon corrected.

Findings

260. Viewed overall, communication was good and this was reflected in the success of the operation. This was due in no small measure to the willingness and professionalism of the people involved.

261. The stressful circumstances under which many key response personnel operated is likely to have contributed to difficulties in communications.

262. Implementation of recommendations and findings relating to training, debriefings and operations of the Response Planning Committee should alleviate most personnel communication problems.


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