The Response to the Iron Baron Oil Spill

Part E - Environment

Issue E1 Wildlife

Discussion

263. The wildlife treatment and rehabilitation centre was established at the Low Head Pilot Station on 11 July 1995. Over time, to deal with the increasing numbers of affected wildlife, it developed into an extensive complex. The centre remained operational until 29 August 1995.

264. Approximately 2 050 oiled penguins were treated at Low Head. They were washed, dried, and rehabilitated at the site. To help spread the load, 280 of the birds were translocated to Phillip Island in Victoria for rehabilitation there. The deaths of about 100 oiled penguins have been recorded. Only twenty of these died during rehabilitation at Low Head. The remainder were either dead on arrival at Low Head or were euthanased by the veterinary surgeons. In the early stages, to provide time for the Low Head and Ninth Island rookeries to be cleaned, birds were released either at Bicheno or at Fortescue Bay in the south east of Tasmania. The threat of further oil spills was removed when the ship was towed away to be dumped.

265. Comments were made on the problems and disquiet caused by the late notification of the incident to wildlife officers. Notwithstanding, local parks and wildlife officers were on the scene by 1000 hours in the morning after the grounding, and a wildlife cleaning station was in operation at Low Head by the afternoon after the grounding.

266. Beside the grounding of the ship and the news that an oil spill was occurring, the rescue, rehabilitation and protection of affected wildlife rated highly as a public issue. The emotion surrounding the care and protection of wildlife was probably the biggest single factor in the numbers of volunteers who came forward to offer assistance.

267. The initial large numbers and differing expertise of wildlife volunteers resulted in some difficulties in the management of these groups.

268. There is no Tasmanian or National wildlife response plan. Some other States also do not have wildlife response plans.

269. AMSA have advised that approaches have been made to the Australian Nature Conservation Agency (ANCA) to participate in the preparation of a National Wildlife Response Plan.

270. There was a lack of detail in the Coastal Resource Atlas (CRA) with regard to wildlife habitats and resources.

271. Submissions noted the importance of immediate involvement of a wildlife officer on the Response Planning Committee. This did not occur until one week into the incident but the delay caused some problems, as did the relay of information from the Response Planning Committee to wildlife teams. Some submissions commented that it would have been better if the wildlife representative had maintained an unbroken representation on the Committee rather than dividing time with the rehabilitation centre. This would have ensured that changes in the dynamics of the total operation were quickly appreciated and acted upon.

272. The Incident Control System (ICS) employed by the Tasmanian National Parks and Wildlife Service (P&WS) for other disasters (such as fire and whale strandings) works well and was applied in this instance. However, in the initial stages of the response there were insufficient wildlife officers trained in ICS to cope with the magnitude of the event. It was some days before a fully operational ICS response was put in place. More trained staff are obviously needed if an effective response is to be immediate.

273. A number of submissions and comments stated that the resources of the P&WS need to be boosted in the wildlife area in the event of an oil spill, possibly through the secondment of staff.

274. Many submissions reported very favourably on the successful wildlife rehabilitation program and on the early availability of interstate and overseas technical expertise.

Findings

275. The wildlife response was hampered by not having a senior wildlife officer working full-time with the Response Planning Committee.

276. However, the early establishment and equipping of the wildlife treatment and recovery centre assisted considerably in the capacity to respond to what became a major wildlife incident.

277. There is a need to ensure full integration of wildlife rescue and rehabilitation plans into wider oil spill Contingency Plans, including identification of access to wildlife response equipment stockpiles.

278. The lack of a wildlife response plan meant pertinent information was not available to the planning group. It also exacerbated the problems experienced by wildlife officers in setting up the initial rescue and treatment procedures. Wildlife response plans would benefit from the support of a Geographic Information System of environmental and wildlife distribution data. Such plans would also ensure that organisation, logistics, planning, volunteer and media management are in place from the start of a response.

279. AMSA's proposal to develop a National Wildlife Response Plan is appropriate. It should form part of the National Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea by Oil.

280. The wildlife branch of the P&WS does not have the personnel numbers to cope with even a medium size incident. A Wildlife Response Plan should to cater for appropriate back-up and training of reserve staff in ICS procedures.

Recommendation 28

A Senior Wildlife Manager with clearly identified roles and responsibilities should, from the outset, be included on the Response Planning Committee for all future oil spill incidents in Australia, and be identified as a key functional position within Contingency Plans.

Recommendation 29

The Tasmanian National Parks and Wildlife Service should prepare a Wildlife Response Plan.

Recommendation 30

A National Wildlife Response Plan should be pursued as a matter of priority and included as part of the National Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea by Oil.

Recommendation 31

The Tasmanian Parks and Wildlife Service should widen its training in Incident Control System procedures to include all officers that may be required to respond to an oil spill incident.

Issue E2 Aquaculture/Fisheries

Discussion

281. Concern was expressed at the public hearing held at Port Sorell, 15 August 1995, about the unknown impact of an oil spill on the local marine life generally. It was pointed out to the Review Group that the inlet and the tidal reaches of the Rubicon River are a nursery for a number of fish species and molluscs, notably school shark, flounder, scallops and oysters. The same concerns were later raised at Low Head at an informal meeting with locals, but with specific reference to abalone and finfish which are popularly fished for in that area.

282. On 16 and 17 July 1995 there was some threat to a commercial oyster lease at Port Sorell. The Planning Group did take considerable account of this aquaculture operation in the Rubicon River Estuary and barrier material was placed around the oyster beds. No apparent contamination eventuated.

283. In a written submission received from the Marine Environment Branch of the Tasmanian Department of Primary Industry and Fisheries (DPIF) it was highlighted that both commercial and recreational fisheries are always likely to be seriously affected by an oil spill. These are major industries, particularly for Tasmania, and DPIF suggested a fisheries adviser be part of the on-scene planning team from the start of any future incident. This is probably not warranted given the presence of a Scientific Support Coordinator on that team.

284. DPIF further suggested that a protocol should be established to deal with the public health impact of an oil spill on commercial and recreational fisheries. This issue is complicated by such matters as allocation of responsibility and compensation in the event of closure of certain waters to fishing.

Findings

285. There is a natural concern by the public about the short and long-term impact of an oil spill on the commercial and recreational fisheries of the affected locality. This concern could be alleviated by pertinent information being made available early.

286. There is uncertainty as to responsibility for any required closure of waters to aquaculture and fishing. There needs to be clarification of the roles of DPIF and public health authorities in relation to this issue.

287. Present planning arrangements could be improved by the addition of protocols to deal with the dissemination of information about the impact of an oil spill on public health.

288. The Review Group notes that the proposed monitoring program (see issue E3 - Post Spill Assessment) will include aquaculture/fisheries issues.

Recommendation 32

The communication guidelines in Regional and State Plans should be amended to clearly identify :

i) the appropriate public health/fisheries spokesperson and

ii) the need for effective dissemination of information about the impact of an oil spill on fisheries/aquaculture, and thus on public health.

Issue E3 Post Spill Assessment

Discussion

289. On 19 July 1995 the Impact Assessment Group of the Tasmanian State Marine Pollution Committee (SMPC), after preliminary assessment and monitoring work, commissioned a team of experts to prepare an environmental assessment program for the short, medium and long term for those areas affected by the spilled oil. Current State and Commonwealth Legislation does not provide for post-spill impact assessment programs.

290. By the end of August a draft program was produced for the Iron Baron oil spill. It had four principal objectives:

i) To assess the fate of oil spilled from the Iron Baron in the marine environment

ii) To determine the persistence of oil in the marine environment

iii) To determine the impact of the spilled oil on the environment and

iv) To determine when the affected areas have recovered to pre-spill levels.

It is anticipated that the work will be completed by August 1997.

291. The Impact Assessment Group are assessing and refining the draft program while work progresses. BHP have undertaken to provide funding for the ongoing impact assessment program.

Findings

292. The SMPC and its Impact Assessment Group acted effectively and efficiently in setting up procedures and in determining a program for the short, medium and long term assessment of the impact of the spilled oil.

293. BHP have facilitated assessment processes and quickly undertaken to provide funding for an impact assessment program.

294. The cost of any post-spill impact assessment program be considered as part of the overall spill response operation and be recoverable from the polluter.

Recommendation 33

Post spill impact assessment should continue along lines determined by the Impact Assessment Group of the State Marine Pollution Committee, and include the provision for amending the program in light of results obtained from the ongoing work. Results of this assessment program should be publicly available.


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