The Response to the Iron Baron Oil Spill

Part F - Public Interest

Issue F1 Media

Discussion

295. Media matters were coordinated by Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA), initially from Canberra and subsequently, in conjunction with BHP, from Bell Bay.

296. Media focus was initially on the ship casualty and oil pollution and then switched to the affected wildlife. The media focus on wildlife caused considerable disruption to the work at the rehabilitation centre operating at Low Head until the Department of Environment and Land Management (DELM) established a media protocol for the centre. Depending on the nature of a particular incident, some aspects attract greater media attention, particularly if they provide good photo opportunities or human interest aspects.

297. Some media perceived they were only briefed on the 'good news' aspects of the response. This perception was also held by some members of the community. In debriefings the On Scene Coordinator (OSC) and other key personnel were adamant that an accurate description of events was given to the media at all times.

298. Comments by the salvors relating to the amount of oil remaining on the ship and the proposal to tow the ship into Bass Strait for flushing out the oil contributed to a level of scepticism on the accuracy of information presented to the media.

299. Port of Launceston Authority (PLA) believes that the lack of media control by some agencies is indicated by the number of media spokesperson from key organisations who appeared on Tasmanian media outlets between 11 and 31 July 1995. Spokespersons numbered:

AMSA - 5
BHP - 8
Parks & Wildlife Service - 13
PLA - 3
United Salvage - 1
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Findings

300. Initially, media briefings relating to the impact on wildlife were poorly managed. This hampered the early operations at the Low Head rehabilitation centre.

301. For the general public and most special interest groups, national and local media coverage is the primary source of information about any incident. However, most media reports are unlikely to contain adequate detail of ongoing planning and response work during an incident. There will obviously be a variety of reports gathered by the media that cannot be 'controlled'. However, responding agencies need to adopt a responsible and coordinated approach to the media.

302. The initial media contact by AMSA and BHP was professional. However, from the time of refloating there was some scepticism within the community and the wildlife area as to the accuracy of the information disseminated.

303. Statements made by some Parks and Wildlife personnel caused considerable disquiet and paved the way for scepticism and mistrust of the operation. This highlights the need for accurate reporting of the facts by suitably qualified people.

304. The Response Planning Committee requires a core media group, with relevant experienced personnel covering all aspects of the response. Media interest in response activities away from the operation centre also needs to be managed so as not to disrupt ongoing response work.

Recommendation 34

Training in working with the media should be incorporated into any overall training program for personnel from the proposed National Response Team and key State agencies.

Issue F2 Community Issues

Discussion

305. The response by the Tasmanian community in general, and by those in the immediate locality in particular, to oil clean-up and to wildlife rescue and rehabilitation was overwhelming.

306. This in itself caused problems. For example, it became difficult to manage the large numbers of volunteers, their deployment and their health and safety.

307. Many of those who made submissions to the Review Group raised these issues in one form or another. The underlying theme, however, was that, rather than taking on large numbers of people, the clean-up operators would have been better served by selective acceptance of offers of help.

308. The public meeting at Port Sorell expressed the general view that the local community should have been given preference in volunteer work. Such a policy may have facilitated a better selection process than did the broad acceptance of large numbers from the Commonwealth Employment Service (CES).

309. Problems with the volunteer workforce were exacerbated by the decision of BHP to pay the CES-sourced clean-up workforce, at the rate of $18 per hour. Submissions indicated that this was well above local award rates for comparable work and introduced payment inequities. The payment of $18 per hour was also extended to the wildlife 'volunteers'. It is understood that some volunteers did not accept payment, while others donated it towards ongoing maintenance of the Low Head penguin rookery and local wildlife causes.

310. With respect to news releases and briefings, it was evident from some community submissions that there was a general feeling that only 'public relations' good news was being released even though the community was supportive and needed to know what was happening. To a degree this view was supported by some personnel in the wildlife area, but tempered by the acceptance that the situation was changing rapidly and the knowledge that source information often conflicted within minutes as events progressed.

Findings

311. Despite extensive communications aimed at informing the public, some community concerns still existed about the veracity of the information supplied. A Telephone Information Centre would assist and should be developed for each incident. There is a need for those responding to oil spill to identify and address community issues within Contingency Plans.

312. Control procedures and good supervision were not immediately in place for the very large numbers of volunteers from the general community.

313. The introduction of payment for 'volunteers' caused some ill-feeling and complicated the administration of volunteers. It also changed the nature of the 'ethic of volunteers' to 'working for reward'.

314. Not all volunteers and CES-sourced employees had an aptitude for the work expected of them. Selection procedures need to be implemented to ensure that volunteers (and employees) are chosen, if possible, on the basis of aptitude rather than raw enthusiasm.

Recommendation 35

Consultation with and involvement of the local community should be specifically targeted throughout the entire incident and beyond. This should be an ongoing priority for the planning group.

Issue F3 Cultural and Heritage Issues

Discussion

315. The cultural issues for the Low Head area were identified early in the incident. There appeared to be no heritage sites (for example, shipwreck sites) affected.

316. Discussions were held with local Aboriginal representatives regarding sacred sites in areas where shoreline clean-up was undertaken. When the sites were identified a cooperative approach was adopted, to ensure cleaning could continue without a deleterious impact on Aboriginal culture.

317. The Cape Barren Islanders Community Incorporated made a written submission to the Review Team. The submission highlighted the importance of clean water to the livelihood and culture of the Community. Great concerns were expressed about the oil spill, the impact of towing the vessel through Banks Strait and the possibility of pollution from the eventual dumping site.

318. The Aboriginal residents of Cape Barren and Flinders Islands place significant reliance on the sea for their recreation/sustenance. Annual events, such as the mutton bird (short tailed shearwater) harvest, are an important part of the communities' incomes. The impact of a major oil spill can be gauged from this traditional cultural practice alone. Mutton birds nest on almost all the outlying islands and feed at sea. Babel Island, for example, contains one of the larger rookeries and the Aboriginal community estimates it contains approximately 2.5 million birds. The fears of the local communities are legitimate given the possibilities of an oil spill occurring during the time mutton birds are in the southern hemisphere.

319. Another factor highlighted by this incident is the importance to the Aboriginal community of the large number of cultural heritage sites around the coast of Tasmania. Current policy requires the National Parks and Wildlife Service, the Aboriginal community and the Tasmanian Aboriginal Land Council to be informed of any possible interference to a site.

Findings

320. Plans for the tow and dumping of the ship centred around mitigating environmental issues. While some of the matters that were addressed would have alleviated Aboriginal concerns, this was not effectively communicated to that community.

321. Consciousness of Aboriginal cultural heritage sites needs to be heightened, particularly for shore-based clean-up operations involving heavy machinery.

322. Future response planning should have regard to legislative requirements relating to cultural heritage sites.

Recommendation 36

Future State and Regional Plans should have regard to cultural and heritage issues, including:

i) procedures for liaison and consultation with Aboriginal communities

ii) procedures to identify Aboriginal and European cultural and heritage sites which might be affected by an oil spill

iii) identification of the impacts of any oil spill on traditional practices and

iv) any existing legislative requirements.


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