Outcomes & Recommendations

Exercise "Barossa" - Adelaide
11 June 1998

In any oil spill response, whether it is for real or an exercise, there are always many lessons learnt and none of the following comments are to be taken in any way as personal criticism of anyone or their organisation. They are made as a way of ensuring that the National/State/Territory oil spill contingency plans can be continuously improved thereby allowing all involved to constantly hone and improve their response skills.

Outcome Command and Control Structure

From the outset of the exercise there was not a clear command and control structure. The senior roles were at times all performed by the one person. There was also no Command structure promulgated until some four hours after commencement of the exercise. When the command structure was eventually displayed it was confusing as two differing structures were displayed side by side.

The On Scene Co-ordinator (OSC) was not given the opportunity to perform his duties. Both the Oil Spill Commander and his deputy were directing the tactical response and effectively taking the OSC out of the operation. The OSC was based in an area very close to the incident control room and this no doubt affected the situation. In a genuine spill response it is unlikely that the Incident Control Centre and the office of the OSC would ever be located so closely together.

Recommendation 1

The roles of the Oil Spill Commander, State Chairman and On Scene Co-ordinator should be clearly delineated and at the start of a response those appointed should be named and clearly identifiable. A suitable notice should be posted in the Incident Control Centre identifying the persons carrying out the relevant tasks and a copy forwarded to AMSA Canberra.

Outcome Role of National Response Team (NRT)

There was some initial confusion about the roles and functions of the NRT by South Australian response agencies. Two umpires considered that members of the NRT tended to take over areas of the operational response. However, others considered the action taken by the NRT was appropriate.

Integration of the NRT members into the response team, and the subsequent interface and co-operation was excellent. This proved to be a key component of the response as prior to the NRTs arrival the response had lacked direction. The NRT was able to prompt and advise on strategic, tactical, operational and environmental matters, which improved the cohesiveness of the response.

The South Australian Oil Spill Commander considered that overall the NRT involvement was supportive of the local response team, appropriate, well managed and reflected the professionalism of the various individuals involved.

Recommendation 2

Response Agencies should be familiar with the role and function of the NRT as spelt out in the National Plan Management Manual (1996), which states:

Members of the National Response Team (NRT) are available to provide support across all response disciplines to the Commonwealth and the States/Northern Territory and Lead Agencies in the event of a major pollution incident.

These provisions should be included in Oil Spill Contingency Plans.

Outcome - Briefings, Situation Reports and Information Status Boards

The first briefing was not held until some two hours into the exercise and from then on briefings tended to be haphazard and not scheduled. Only one situation report was sent and the status boards in the Incident Control Centre were not updated regularly. The initial spill information was still on the status boards at the next days debriefing.

Recommendation 3

The initial briefing should occur as soon as possible and then be followed by regular updates to keep everyone advised of the situation. Written situation reports should be promulgated at regular intervals and the status boards should be regularly updated.

Outcome - State Plan

It was noted that the current South Australian Oil Spill Contingency Plan has been in "draft" form for the past eighteen months and that it needs bringing into line with the current National Plan Advisory Committee (NPAC) format. It does not have a Safe Havens Policy, which is an outstanding recommendation from previous exercises.

Recommendation 4

The South Australian Oil Spill Contingency Plan should be finalised in the NPAC endorsed format and a Safe Havens Policy developed in line with previous recommendations.

Outcome Response Strategy

There was an opportunity to pay more attention to the important areas of spill response planning and strategic development, particularly in the initial stages of the response.

As early as the initial briefing at 0440 hrs (CST) the response team had vital information available, which would have allowed them to develop a Response Action Plan.

Information on the physical characteristics of the spilled oil, currents, tides and weather could have been used to make a more thorough assessment using spill modelling and oil weathering prediction tools.

The assessment could then have been measured against the contingency plan and the available response options in order to develop a strategy and a set of response objectives. These objectives could then have become a focus for the response team and they could have measured their subsequent achievements against the objectives.

Key decisions made along the way need to be documented to provide a clear paper trail to support the response strategy, objectives and operational decisions. More importantly it allows the response team to move out of the early reactive stage and into a proactive response mode earlier than was achieved during the exercise.

Recommendation 5

A procedure for the development of incident specific response action plans should be incorporated into Oil Spill Contingency Plans.

Outcome Administration/Logistics Support

Resources for key functional areas within the Incident Control Centre e.g. planning, logistics, administrative support, financial and media support were inadequate for the scale of the response mounted during the exercise. This led to personnel being unable to perform their tasks properly due to the unrealistic workload.

Management meetings tended to remove most of the key response personnel from the Incident Control Centre, which fuelled the problem of under resourcing.

Failure to provide these resources quickly led to a dysfunctional unit that was unable to provide the support needed.

Recommendation 6

Adequate resources to operate an administration and logistics support group need to be pre-identified.

Outcome Financial Control and Record Keeping

Financial controls and tracking, documentation and record keeping were inadequate during the exercise and this area should be urgently addressed. A system that can support the response team with real time information and provide documentation to support expenditure and key response decisions is essential. Failure to do so could result in being unable to substantiate costs when the time comes to settle any resulting claims.

Recommendation 7

A financial system for control and tracking of costs incurred in an oil spill should be developed and incorporated into Oil Spill Contingency Plans.

Outcome Media

There were no dedicated facilities for media conferences with the provision of status boards, seating and other amenities. No phone, fax or printer was available, at least in the early stages. The media office was undermanned and inadequate for such an exercise and the media manager had little or no support. There appeared to be no system in place, nor any plan or brief as to how to handle the media in an emergency situation.

The media can in these circumstances be turned into an ally if properly handled. Getting accurate information out to the general public is important and this can be done by supplying the media with visual aids, such as maps of the areas affected, details of the ship and illustrations of the damage to the vessel so that it can be easily understood. AMSA's Canberra media unit could have been called in to assist.

In future exercises, there should be a greater number of professional media participants. It was difficult for the one media representative to properly simulate the situation as the hours passed. Working alone he was forced to restrict calls to individuals to a much lesser extent than they would have been exposed to in a real incident. While there were a few others on the exercise occasionally simulating media input, it was clear that this is an area that needs bolstering in future exercises if it is to really test the system. There was a notable lack of enquiry from media, environmentalists and the public during the exercise.

Recommendation 8

Response agencies should have adequate resources to deal with the media, and briefing of the media should take place in an appropriate area away from the Incident Control Centre.

Outcome - Dispersant Application

The opportunity for the use of dispersants did not receive the attention it should have done. The lack of strategic and operational planning again let this area of the response down.

The Light Arabian Crude used for the scenario presented a limited window of opportunity for dispersant application and this should have been recognised earlier through the use of response tools such as the oil weathering prediction program.

There was a lack of site specific planning and co-ordination, which resulted in spraying runs over shallow water close to bird habitats.

Recommendation 9

Strategic and operational planning for the use of dispersant should be treated with priority during the initial stages of any spill to gain the maximum use of any window of opportunity for utilising dispersants.

Outcome Occupational Health and Safety (OH&S)

There was no OH&S Plan developed to address the following:

Appointment of an overall safety co-ordinator.
Utilisation of safe practices in the Incident Control Centre and in the field.
Development of emergency procedures covering safety zones, safety for all team members and identification of first aid personnel.
Responsibilities for and commitment to legislated responsibilities.

An OH&S plan for the response operations had not been developed by the time the exercise was completed. Heavy equipment was being handled and waterborne operations underway at a very early stage of the response with there being significant risk of personal injury. There was no detailed plan in place for preventative measures, or for that matter, treating casualties. There was insufficient time given to the process of identification of hazards, reporting breaches of safety and rectifying problems.

Recommendation 10

Site specific OH&S plans should be developed early for each operational component of the response.

Outcome - Shoreline Assessment and Cleanup

The recognition of the need for shoreline assessment and cleanup came later than was desirable and reflected the lack of strategic and operational planning early in the response.

Problems identified in regard to shoreline assessment in previous incidents and exercises were evident in this exercise. There did not appear to be a clear understanding of who should be responsible for undertaking assessments of oiled shorelines.

Recommendation 11

Clear strategic and operational planning and the identification of equipment and personnel requirements for any shoreline assessment and cleanup should receive priority attention.

Outcome Environmental and Scientific Co-ordinator (ESC) Issues

The ESC attempted to do too much of the work himself instead of delegating key tasks to others. He should have used his time to ensure smooth communication of outcomes to the OSC/Incident Control Centre, and the rest of the response team, facilitating his teams and ensuring that the teams were effectively covering all the tasks required.

The evaluation of oiling of foreshores was completely overlooked until late in the exercise. Even then there was confusion between the ESC and individuals within the command group about who was able to take control of the foreshore evaluation. Once that confusion was resolved and the responsibility delegated, the foreshore evaluation occurred quickly and efficiently.

Recommendation 12

The role of the ESC requires clarification to enable this person to take more of an environmental and scientific facilitation role.

Outcome Wildlife Response

There was a well-executed Wildlife Response, however this was mainly due to the skilled people involved at all levels. An International Umpire reported the bird rescue equipment as being the best he had seen. Many of the excellent actions were initiated more by the various officers experience than by adherence to the South Australian Oil Spill Contingency Plan. However, there was no integration with the overall management of the oil spill response.

Recommendation 13

State Oil Spill Contingency Plans should fully integrate wildlife requirements.

Outcome Coastal Resource Atlas

South Australia does not have an effective Coastal Resource Atlas in that the hard copy maps available were of such a small scale as to be virtually useless. The response team paid little attention to the maps and relied entirely on personal knowledge.

Recommendation 14

The South Australian Coastal Resource Atlas needs further development to produce a more useful spill management tool.

Outcome - Liaison with scientific and environmental agencies and stakeholders

This was particularly poorly done. Most input from the Exercise Controllers was actively ignored. This is not in the spirit of an exercise and a sure recipe for disaster in an actual spill.

Recommendation 15

Procedures should be developed to enable response agencies to deal effectively with concerned stakeholders e.g. community groups, general public and affected industries.


Contact Us - Site Help - Payments (Levies and Fees) - Media - Publications - Forms