Umpires and Observers Comments

Exercise "Barossa" - Adelaide 11 June 1998

Three International and thirteen National Umpires representing Government and Industry Agencies were appointed to report on a range of activities, including strategic, operational and environmental planning issues. Five Observers also submitted reports.

Comments from both Umpires and Observers are summarised below.

5.1 Command and Control Structure

From the outset of the exercise there was not a clear command and control structure. The roles of the State Oil Spill Commander and those of the State Chairman and also the On Scene Co-ordinator were at times all performed by the one person. There was also no Command structure promulgated until some four hours after commencement of the exercise. When the command structure was eventually displayed it was somewhat confusing as two differing structures were displayed side by side.

In addition to the senior roles there was no clear structure showing the positions of other key personnel neither did these staff have a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities within the structure.

5.2 On Scene Co-ordinator (OSC)

The On Scene Co-ordinator was unclear of his duties or simply was not given the opportunity to be allowed to perform those duties.

Both the Oil Spill Commander and his deputy were directing the tactical response and effectively taking the OSC out of the operation. He was based in an area very close to the Incident Control Centre and this no doubt affected the situation. In a real spill response it is highly unlikely the incident control centre and the office of the OSC would ever be located so closely together.

5.3 National Response Team (NRT)

Integration of the NRT members into the response team, and the subsequent interface and cooperation was excellent. This proved to be a key component of the response asprior to the NRT’s arrival the response had lacked direction. The NRT were able to prompt on strategic planning matters, which improved the cohesiveness of the response.

Two umpires considered members of the NRT had tended to take over areas of the operational exercise and that there was no clear understanding by others of their functions and what their role was. However, on the whole it was considered the process was supportive of the local response team, appropriate, well managed and reflected the professionalism of the various individuals involved.

5.4 Communications

The first briefing was not held until some two hours into the exercise and from then on briefings tended to be haphazard and not scheduled. Only one situation report was sent out and the status boards in the Incident Control Centre were not updated regularly. The initial spill information was still on the status boards at the next day’s briefing.

5.5 South Australian Oil Spill Contingency Plan

It was noted that the current South Australian Oil Spill Contingency Plan has been in "draft" form for the past eighteen months and that it needs bringing into line with the current NPAC format. It does not have a Safe Havens Policy, which is an outstanding recommendation from previous exercises.

The plan contains a number of checklists and there did not appear to be any evidence of these being used with the exception of the Communications Plan. These checklists can be particularly useful in the heat of the moment because it is very easy to overlook a specific action or activity and suffer the consequences later on.

5.6 Response Strategy

There was an opportunity to pay more attention to the important areas of spill response planning and strategic development, particularly early in the response.

As early as the initial briefing at 0440 hrs (CST) the response team had vital information available, which would have allowed them to develop a Response Action Plan. Information on the physical characteristics of the spilled oil, currents, tides and weather could have been used to make a more thorough assessment using spill modelling and oil weathering prediction tools.

The assessment could then have been measured against the contingency plan and the available response options in order to develop a strategy and a set of response objectives. These objectives could then have become a focus for the response team and they could have measured their subsequent achievements against the objectives.

The development of operational plans linked to the response objectives could then have been used to define resourcing, equipment, logistics and personnel needs.

Key decisions made along the way need to be documented to provide a clear paper trail to support the response strategy, objectives and operational decisions. More importantly it allows the response team to move out of the early reactive stage and into a proactive response mode earlier than was achieved during the exercise.

5.7 Administration/Logistics Support

Resources for key functional areas within the incident control centre e.g. planning, logistics, administrative support, financial and media support were inadequate for the scale of the response mounted during the exercise. This led to personnel being unable to perform their tasks properly due to the unrealistic workload. Management meetings tended to remove most of the key response personnel from the control centre, which fuelled the problem of under resourcing.

Adequate resources to operate an administration and logistics support group need to be quickly identified and deployed to provide adequate support to the response team.

Failure to provide these resources quickly led to a dysfunctional unit that was not able to provide the support needed.

5.8 Financial Control and Record Keeping

Financial controls and tracking, documentation and record keeping were inadequate during the exercise and this area should be urgently addressed.

It is imperative to provide a system that can support the response team with real time information and provide documentation to support expenditure and key response decisions. Failure to do so could result in being unable to substantiate costs when the time comes to settle any resulting claims.

5.9 Media

5.9.1 Press Office

This was undermanned and inadequate for such an exercise; the media manager appeared to be working solo with little or no support. There appeared to be no system in place, nor any plan or brief as to how to handle the media in an emergency situation.

The media office appeared to be thrown together with no phone, fax or printer available, at least in the early stages. There should be dedicated facilities for such emergencies available at all times.

The State organisation needs to examine this area very carefully and consider more closely co-ordinating the Department's media unit with that of the Ports Corporation, AMSA and possibly the oil companies Santos and Mobil, who have direct training in these areas as well as a more detailed knowledge of the industry/safety aspects.

5.9.2 Media Briefings

It should be remembered that the media can in these circumstances be turned into an ally if properly handled. Getting accurate information out to the general public is important and this can be done by supplying the media with visual aids, such as maps of the areas affected, details of the ship and illustrations of the damage to the vessel so that it can be easily understood. AMSA's Canberra media unit could have been called in to assist.

5.9.3 Press Releases

Press releases should have been issued hourly between the conferences. At noon, a distorted press release was broadcast and it took the media office more than two hours to respond with a release debunking it, during which time the story would have been spread far and wide. It should have been addressed immediately to minimise damage.

5.9.4 Media Participants

In future exercises, there should be a greater number of professional media participants. It was difficult for the one media representative to properly simulate the situation as the hours passed. Working alone he was forced to restrict calls to individuals to a much lesser extent than they would have been exposed to in a real incident. While there were a few others on the exercise occasionally simulating media input, it was clear that this is an area that needs bolstering in future exercises if it is to really test the system. There was a notable lack of enquiry from media, environmentalists and the public during the exercise.

5.9.5 Media Conferences

These were handled quite well, but there were several flaws. Firstly, they should have been held at a location away from the Incident Control Centre and such conferences should be held indoors in a well-lit location, with spokespersons sitting at a table close to an exit door. There should be name tabs on the table clearly identifying the name and position of the spokespersons. The media should be seated so as to clearly separate them from the participants with TV cameras placed at least five metres from the table.

Both press conferences gave all the appearance of being hastily arranged. All participants were forced to stand and there was no clear indication given as to the shape and timeframe of the conference. Proper control is required and were there more media available for the exercise, this flaw would have been exposed.

The spokesmen equipped themselves very well in both instances. However, the shortage of professional media meant the line of questioning was restricted.

There was an impression given in the second conference that the spokesmen felt the incident was over and everyone could go home. In reality, they would have faced at least one more conference by the end of the day and probably more the following day.

As to the timing of the press conferences, the first at 0830 hrs (CST) was too soon after the incident, 1000 or 1100 hrs (CST) would have been more appropriate and would have satisfied the media. The second conference only occurred because the media insisted upon it happening. At the end of the first conference, the media should have been told when and where the next conference would be held.

5.9.6 Participants Dealing with the Media

There were some very positive findings here. In particular the performance of Harbour Control was very impressive in the early hours of the morning. Despite vigorous questioning, they responded with a "straight bat" saying nothing beyond directing enquires to the On Scene Co-ordinator. The Oil Spill Commander and his deputy were excellent, possibly overgenerous with their time in dealing with media enquires and should have passedpeople on to the media office.

Nevertheless, both handled questioning with the necessary balance of authority and courtesy.

5.9.7 Incident Control Centre

It would perhaps have helped the news stories that were issued every hour had they been posted on a board in the Incident Control Centre to give people there an idea of what message the general public was receiving.

5.10 Occupational Health and Safety (OH&S)

Health and safety issues were addressed by both the On Scene Co-ordinator and Team Leaders but this was not followed through to the response teams in the field in a consistent manner. The team leaders should have addressed key health and safety issues up front with issues relating to the specific activities being reinforced either from a prepared checklist or from personal knowledge.

The printed OH&S cards would have been more useful if key aspects were explained to the team members rather than just having them available. The danger in giving out such cards is that they will not be read in the heat of the moment.

There were inconsistent standards in the use of personal protective equipment amongst members of different agencies working alongside one another. An example of this was when unloading heavy equipment from transport onto vessels, some personnel were fully kitted out including the wearing of hard hats and alongside them were others with just overalls on.

A comprehensive health and safety plan and site specific OH&S plan for the response operations had not been developed by the time the exercise was completed.

Heavy equipment was being handled and waterborne operations underway at a very early stage of the response with there being significant risk of personal injury with no detailed plan in place for preventative measures, or for that matter, treating casualties. There is an opportunity for a health and safety professional to be added to the core team.

No actual incidents or accidents occurred during the exercise.

5.11 Wildlife Response

The Environment and Science Co-ordinator (ESC) requested the acting Wildlife Welfare Co-ordinator (WWC) to develop a Wildlife Plan. Thiswas competently undertaken and handed over to the WWC on his arrival.The acting WWC was well aware of his role, responsibilities and limitations under the Plan. After requesting the development of a Wildlife Plan the ESC did not request any other input of the WWC on matters of prioritisation, or dispersant application. However the Umpires may have just missed these requests in the earlier stages of the response.

5.11.1 Prioritisation Of Sensitive Areas

This was undertaken by the ESC early in the response. These priorities were verbally disseminated via command meetings, however these priorities were not logged on the command status boards and did not appear to be updated throughout the course of the exercise. The lack of priority information on the status boards made it difficult for the incoming WWC to ascertain what work had already been done and what wildlife aspects had been considered. There was no clear indication that rareor endangered wildlife status had been used in prioritisation. No rare or endangered species were actually identified throughout the exercise.

There was no consultation with the WWC prior to the application of dispersant. In the early stage of the exercise the WWC and his team were working in isolation from the ESC. The ESC did not regularly request information of the Wildlife Group and the Wildlife group tended to contact the ESC to find out what was happening rather than being briefed or have the information provided through some other means, for example status boards. Time was wasted in information exchange and the Plan did not appear to reference the appropriate format for exchange between the ESC and WWC.

Time was also wasted by the Plan not detailing the interaction between Wildlife and Logistical/Operational support. The Wildlife group had significant logistical requirements with no guidelines of how to obtain such requirements within the response system.

5.11.2 Equipment Deployment

The deployment of the Wildlife Response trailer was well timed, appropriately located and well set up in the context of an exercise. The RSPCA officers and volunteers involved in trailer deployment and set up were well trained and aware of the requirements under the Plan. They were also aware and equipped for safety.

The contents of the Wildlife Response Kit received favourable comment by a number of Umpires and Observers. The Plan did not mention the availability of the AMOSC Wildlife Kit.

The effective deployment of the Wildlife Response Kit appears to be a product of the increased involvement of the RSPCA in the Plan. The RSPCA provided an excellent resource of trained officers who all combined well with the Parks and Wildlife requirements. A similar relationship should be considered inother States.

5.11.3 Bird Rescue Equipment

The bird rescue equipment was reported as being the best he had seen by an International Umpire. It was functional with most equipment able to be readily replaced or sourced locally.

5.11.4 Wildlife Recovery

Weather conditions did not permit water reconnaissance. The provision of rubber ducks by the exercise organisers was an effective test of search and rescue methods. The activity was also promoted by the enthusiasm of the RSPCA officers. The rubber duck rescue demonstrated the difficulties of field work, the logistics of retrieval and highlighted the need fortemporary tagging and exercised record keeping.

5.11.5 Dispersant Application

The WWC was not consulted by theESC prior to the application of dispersant. In particular, there was no consultation prior to application in shallowwaterareas adjacent to the bird roosting areas until the WWC saw what the situation was. There was no documentation on the decision and there was no information on the status boards that allowed the WWC to follow the decision process.

5.11.6 Administration/Logistics support

Administration in the Incident Control Centre was not clearly defined. All information was not put on the status boards and kept up to date. Co-ordinators were not passing messages and communications were ineffectively recorded.

The interaction between Wildlife and Logistics is not clearly defined in the South Australian Oil Spill Contingency Plan and the appropriate use of logistical support should lead to better record keeping and financial control.

5.11.7 Spill and Site Safety

Members of the wildlife response team were individually aware of safety risks and professional in the use of their equipment. However, there was no formal safety briefing or task analysis prior to commencing fieldwork.

5.12 Environmental Issues

5.12.1 Coastal Resource Atlas

South Australia does not have an effective Coastal Resource Atlas in that the hard copy maps available were of such a small scale as to be virtually useless. The response team paid little attention to the maps and relied entirely on personal knowledge. This can be effective where the response team has the knowledge but is disastrous in cases where local knowledge is non-existent. The lack of any depiction of resources means that very few can understand the issues involved and the spatial arrangement of sensitive areas. This can be a great drawback in briefing sessions or where there is a need to explain decisions.

5.12.2 Determining Protection Priorities

The Environment and Science Co-ordinator (ESC) quickly determined protection priorities and conveyed those verbally to the response team. However, these were not summarised and displayed for future reference. The initial priorities were not reassessed later in the exercise.

5.12.3 Waste Disposal

Waste disposal was not discussed until about 7 hours into the exercise, and then only in response to enquires from the foreshore team. The Environmental Protection Authority was contacted regarding disposal options but a representative was not brought to the Incident Control Centre nor kept up to date with developments. Consequently this part of the response was not followed through.

5.12.4 Advice to On Scene Co-ordinator on Response Options

The Environment and Science Co-ordinator advised the control group of response options, however this advice was not recorded so that all could know the current directions.

The response priorities were appropriate, however they deviated from National Plan priorities and no justification for this deviation was provided.

Application of dispersants was advised, but in a manner which contravened State guidelines. This is not necessarily a problem but there was no written justification nor clear maps/charts/instructions showing the nominated areas to use dispersant.

Observations of the aerial applications and recollection of the somewhat vague verbal descriptions of where dispersant could be used seemed to conflict. Dispersant was being applied to essentially inter-tidal flats within metres of a bird rookery.

Poor internal co-ordination led to potential conflict at one stage when a member of the wildlife team was wandering around trying to find out who had authorised the use of dispersant and complaining that he was not consulted. This type of conflict can have serious repercussions.

5.12.5 Liaison with Scientific and Environmental Agencies and Groups

This was particularly poorly done. Most input from the Exercise Controllers was actively ignored. This is not in the spirit of an exercise and a sure recipe for disaster in an actual spill.

5.12.6 Provide Observation/Monitoring Groups at the Spill Site

The deputy ESC flew regular flights and made some boat trips to observe the oil spill but no maps or other written information for other parts of the response seemed to be forthcoming from those excursions.

The evaluation of oiling of foreshores was completely overlooked until nearly 1100 hrs (CST). Even at that stage there was confusion between the ESC and individuals within the command group about who was able to take control of the foreshore evaluation.

Once that confusion was resolved and the responsibility delegated the foreshore evaluation occurred quickly and efficiently.

In the absence of any guidance from the ESC and response team, the staff acquired the AMOSC course notes and assessed the oiling using the Foreshore Forms provided. They were instructed to assume that all stranded sea grass was oiled. This allowed the team to estimate the amount of oil stranded and to determine clean-up priorities and assistance required achieving the task. This information was then presented to the OSC. Questions posed by the foreshore team about disposal and logistics for clean up prompted some much needed action in those areas albeit about seven hours too late.

5.12.7 Co-ordinate Post Spill Monitoring

The need for this was not formally addressed during the exercise. There was, however, mention of a plan to request aerial photographs of mangroves to provide some "before" information.

5.12.8 Arranging Relief ESC Personnel

This is difficult in an exercise, but the ESC did seek clearance to request the assistance of ESC's from other states.

5.12.9 Wildlife Welfare Co-ordinator

The State Wildlife plan nominates a Wildlife Welfare Co-ordinator (WWC) and pathways for action. The ESC activated this plan and it functioned well under it's delegated co-ordinator. However, the ESC did not keep in touch with what was happening in the wildlife area and the WWC was unsure about the need for feedback and who to approach for logistic assistance.

The ESC attempted to contact the Department of Fisheries but there appeared to be no planning put into place to keep commercial and recreational fishers advised of progress.

5.13 Heritage and Cultural Issues

Cultural issues do not appear in the South Australian Oil Spill Contingency Plan. The ESC advised verbally that there were no significant native cultural sites, though local groups or other agencies did not confirm this.


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