The Response to the Iron Baron Oil Spill

Appendix 1 Iron Baron Review Group Members

Tim Muir (Chair) Navigation and Environmental Services Manager Port of Melbourne Authority	David Baird Area Manager Ship and Personnel Safety Services Australian Maritime Safety Authority
Max Laughlin Retired Former Director of the Tasmanian National Parks and Wildlife Services	Richard Purkiss Executive Marine Consultant Maritime Division Western Australian Department of Transport
Diane Tarte National Coordinator The Marine and Coastal Community Network	Davydd Shaw Administrative Support to Review Group

Appendix 2 Terms of Reference

National Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea by Oil Review of the NATIONAL PLAN Response to the Iron Baron Pollution Incident

Aim

To undertake a comprehensive assessment of the response to the Iron Baron incident which occurred following the grounding of the vessel on Hebe Reef, in the approaches to the Tamar River, northern Tasmania on Monday 10 July 1995.

Review Group Membership

The review group is to comprise persons with expertise in response to ship-sourced marine pollution incidents and related matters, but who had no role in the Iron Baron incident. Members of the review group are:

Mr Tim Muir, Navigation and Environmental Services Manager, Port of Melbourne Authority;
Mr Richard Purkiss, Executive Marine Consultant, Maritime Division, Western Australian Department of Transport;
Mr David Baird, Area Manager, Ship and Personnel Safety Services, AMSA, Melbourne
Ms Diane Tarte, National Coordinator, Marine and Coastal Community Network.
Mr Max Laughlin (retired), former Tasmanian Director of the National Parks and Wildlife Service.

Terms of Reference

Review the circumstances of the incident from the oil pollution response perspective including the cause of the release of oil following the grounding and the vessel refloating and assess any deficiencies in the NATPLAN arrangements or in the actual response to the Iron Baron incident. In this context:

1. Assess the response by the Operations Control Committee with particular reference to:

(i) the call out procedures used and the effectiveness of the initial and subsequent response
(ii) the suitability and accessibility of NATPLAN equipment and response capability generally
(iii) availability and timeliness of response of technical support personnel
(iv) the decisions made in respect of calls for equipment and personnel in regard effectiveness and timeliness
(v) the adequacy and effectiveness of the wildlife rescue and rehabilitation response
(vi) the adequacy and effectiveness of plans made for responding to the incident and their implementation
(vii) the adequacy of the management of Occupational Health and Safety issues
(viii) the adequacy of the administrative support, environmental advice and support, and other related activities
(ix) the interaction with the media and other interested parties.

2. Assess the involvement of AMSA, the Tasmanian State Committee and other parties from the viewpoint of appropriateness, timeliness and adequacy. In this regard, particular attention should be given to the inter-relationship between the three tiers of government involved in the incident response and the role of the spill commander.

3. Appraise the related actions taken by BHP Transport Group and the Launceston Port Authority.

4. Within the context of this incident, review the National, Tasmanian State and local contingency plans and report on the adequacy of each. In this regard the working group should also address such issues as:

(i) safe haven issues and implications
(ii) involvement of Environmental Agencies
(iii) the role of volunteers and
(iv) BHP, salvor and government interaction in relation to the response to the incident and the final decision to scuttle the vessel.

5. Provide recommendations for improvements and initiatives based on the lessons learned from the incident.

As far as is practicable, the review group or member(s) thereof are to attend the various debriefing sessions to be carried out by relevant agencies and bodies involved in the incident and consider the written reports of the various entities in the response (eg, AMSA, the Tasmanian State Committee, Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre (AMOSC), BHP etc). Public comment regarding the response will also be taken at a hearing to be held in the George Town Council Chambers on 17 and 18 August in conjunction with the inquiry into the grounding to be conducted by the Commonwealth Department of Transport's Inspector of Marine Accidents.

A draft written report, in a format suitable for presentation to the Commonwealth and Tasmanian Ministers, on the findings and recommendations of the Review Group in respect of Terms of Reference 1, 2 and 3 is to be prepared by 14 September and submitted to the 27/28 September 1995 meeting of the National Plan Advisory Committee. Comment from this meeting is to be provided to the review group by 30 September to enable the report to be finalised by 13 October 1995.

The review group is required to report on Terms of Reference 4 and 5 by the end of 1995.

AMSA, July 1995

Amended reporting times were subsequently agreed upon between the Review Group and AMSA.

Appendix 3 Agencies responsible for Recommended Actions

State/NT Governments

Review their future needs to exercise powers of intervention, either through State legislation or by seeking delegation from the Commonwealth Minister for Transport under Commonwealth legislation. (Recommendation 1)

State Committees should ensure that potential regional operations centres are identified in Contingency Plans. (Recommendation 12)

Port/regional Contingency Plans should identify senior local government engineers, who should receive appropriate training, to be shoreline clean-up team leaders. (Recommendation 18)

Regional and Port Contingency Plans should be reviewed and up-dated to reflect current preferred practices on the identification and implementation of disposal methods for oily waste and liquid oil. (Recommendation 20)

Establish a suitable strategy and systems for coping with the personnel aspects of a major oil spill, including the identification of a pool of people to fulfil the functions of administrative support, training and familiarisation. (Recommendation 23)

As part of any Contingency Plans, proper provision should be made for:

i) catering for and supporting the involvement of volunteers, including adequate briefings and provision and control of equipment, clothing and support facilities and

ii) assessment of suitable accommodation options, with the likely demand and shortfalls being addressed through options such as billeting. (Recommendation 24)

Contingency Plans should make specific reference to Occupational Health and Safety policy and strategy, with a designated person responsible for those issues. (Recommendation 25)

The communication guidelines in Regional and State Plans should be amended to clearly identify :

i) the appropriate public health/fisheries spokesperson and

ii) the need for effective dissemination of information about the impact of an oil spill on fisheries, and thus on public health. (Recommendation 32)

Future State and Regional Plans should have regard to cultural and heritage issues, including:

i) procedures for liaison and consultation with Aboriginal communities

ii) procedures to identify Aboriginal and European cultural and heritage sites which might be affected by an oil spill

iii) identification of the impacts of any oil spill on traditional practices and

iv) any existing legislative requirements. (Recommendation 36)

State Marine Pollution Committees

Examine the appropriateness of identifying the government departments with statutory responsibility for wildlife as a 'primary agency' within the State's Contingency Plan. (Recommendation 5)

Tasmanian Government

Review pollution legislation with a view to removing the requirement for the Minister to approve an individual incident response plan and the requirement for the State Committee to appoint an On Scene Coordinator. (Recommendation 2)

The Tasmanian State Contingency Plan and regional/port plans should be reviewed and aligned with National Plan Contingency Plan Guidelines. The present draft National Contingency Plan should be finalised. Each port Contingency Plan should identify the roles and responsibilities of local government agencies in shoreline clean-up. (Recommendation 4)

The Tasmanian Coastal Resource Atlas should be redeveloped as a high priority, with input from relevant government and non-government organisations. (Recommendation 7)

Relevant Tasmanian officials should review the current arrangements that identifies the position of Oil Spill Commander with the Commissioner of Police. (Recommendation 14)

Tasmania should establish a regular program of training in the operation of oil spill response equipment for port, lands/wildlife, local government and emergency personnel. (Recommendation 27)

Tasmanian Marine Boards

Examine appropriate delegations/authorisations of navigation powers beyond port limits to allow immediate direction to be given in the event of an emergency (Recommendation 3)

Tasmanian State Marine Pollution Committee

Consider appointing an Executive Officer to relieve the current State Oil Pollution Control Officer/Scientific Support Coordinator of administrative responsibility to the Committee, and review the availability of direct scientific support to the Committee. This could be done by the establishment of regional environmental experts for each port Contingency Plan. (Recommendation 6)

The Tasmanian Marine Pollution Committee should review its equipment stockpile and identify shortfalls, taking into account:

i) types of oil (that is, the predominance of heavy bunker fuel oils)

ii) exposure to prevailing weather/water temperatures and

iii) the logistics of equipment transport (Recommendation 15).

Post spill impact assessments should continue along lines determined by the Impact Assessment Group of the State Marine Pollution Committee, and include the provision for amending the program in light of results obtained from the ongoing work. Results of this assessment program should be publicly available (Recommendation 33).

Tasmanian Parks & Wildlife Service

Prepare a Wildlife Response Plan (Recommendation 29)

Widen its training in Incident Control System procedures to include all officers that may be required to respond to an oil spill incident (Recommendation 31)

Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) / National Plan Advisory Committee (NPAC)

Given the present limited capability of the On Scene Spill Model, great emphasis should be placed on regularly ground-truthing predictions. (Recommendation 8)

National Plan funding to continue development of an improved Oil Spill Trajectory Modelling system, incorporating up-to-date and detailed base-line data, should be made available. (Recommendation 9)

National Plan information should explain the limitations of predictive modelling. (Recommendation 10)

The Australian Maritime Safety Authority's proposal to establish a National Response Team should be pursued as a matter of priority. (Recommendation 13)

Appropriate wildlife rescue and rehabilitation kits should be included in any pool of response material and be made available, under the National Plan, at key locations around the country. (Recommendation 17)

During an incident, independent salvage advice may need to be provided to the On Scene Coordinator, State Marine Pollution Committee and AMSA. AMSA/National Plan should explore the availability of resources to provide independent salvage advice, and make arrangements to ensure that this independent opinion is available during an incident involving any severely damaged vessel. (Recommendation 22)

National Plan agencies in each State should prepare a series of relevant hand-out materials (on matters including, wildlife handling, shoreline clean-up and handling of dispersants) for all newcomers to the site, particularly volunteers and untrained/inexperienced personnel. This material would supplement on-the-job training.

There should be an effort to educate across the spectrum of disciplines involved in an oil spill response, so that a better understanding of relative priorities, concerns and responses exists (Recommendation 26)

A Senior Wildlife Manager with clearly identified roles and responsibilities should, from the outset, be included on the Response Planning Committee for all future oil spill incidents in Australia, and be identified as a key functional officer within Contingency Plans. (Recommendation 28)

A National Wildlife Response Plan should be pursued as a matter of priority and included as part of the National Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea by Oil. (Recommendation 30)

Training in working with the media should be incorporated into any overall training program for personnel from the proposed National Response Team and key State agencies. (Recommendation 34)

Consultation with and involvement of the local community should be specifically targeted throughout the entire incident and beyond. This should be an ongoing priority for the planning group. (Recommendation 35)

National Plan Advisory Committee

Develop an agreed protocol to handle the testing of new products with the assistance and support of the Scientific Support Coordinators, (Recommendation 11)

Give high priority to the establishment of a dispersant/temperature/oil type matrix as a matter of urgency, using contract services if necessary. This matrix should be kept up-dated and incorporated in all State and Regional Plans. (Recommendation 19)

During an incident where casualties being salvaged have caused or are likely to cause oil pollution, the lead agency should appoint a very senior representative, who remains on board, with the objective of providing best available information on a continuing basis to the On Scene Coordinator and others. This will have the advantage that the Salvage Master will have to brief only one representative. The duties of this position should be fully considered and developed when the National Response Team is formed. This is a key position and consideration needs to be given to the training and experience of the personnel likely to be filling the role. (Recommendation 21)

Appendix 4 Submissions received by the Review Group

Written Submissions

Cape Barren Islanders Community	Mr Ralph Cooper
Department of Primary Industry and Fisheries	Environment Protection Authority
George Town Council	Mr David Lane - Port Sorell Landcare
Rubicon Coast and Landcare Inc	Save Our Coast Inc - Port Sorell
Tasmanian Conservation Trust	Tasmanian Greens (Mrs C Milne MHA)
United Salvage Pty Ltd	West Tamar Council
Mr David Wilson

Presentations at Public Hearings:

Port Sorell - 15 August 1995

Mr Peter Emmerton	Ms Victoria Emmerton
Mr David Lane	Mr Alistair Ross
Mr Greg Stokes	Mr Ian Strachan
Mr David Wilson	Ms Anna Wind

George Town - 17 & 18 August 1995

Mr Lawrence Archer	Dr Bob Brown
Mr John Bryan	Dr Sally Bryant
Mr Barry Clark	Mr Paul Clark
Mr Curt Clumpner	Ms Michelle Foale
Dr Simon Goldsworthy	Mrs Christine Milne MHA
Mr Frank Ver Beek	Mr Simon Wearne

Informal discussions were also conducted with field staff from the National Parks and Wildlife Service, and reports received from key organisations involved with the response.

Appendix 5 Agencies providing resources to the Response

Port of Launceston Authority (PLA)
Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA)
BHP
TEMCO
COMALCO
United Salvage Pty Ltd
Tasmanian Department of Environment & Land Management (DELM)
Tasmanian State Marine Pollution Committee (SMPC)
Tasmanian National Parks & Wildlife Service (PW&S)
Australian Marine Oil Spills Centre (AMOSC)
State Emergency Service
Port of Devonport Authority
Queensland Department of Transport
Port of Brisbane Corporation
Sydney Ports Corporation
Newcastle Ports Corporation
Port Kembla Ports Corporation
Port of Melbourne Authority
Port of Hastings
South Australian Ports Corporation
Adelaide Ports
Western Australia Department of Transport
George Town Council
West Tamar Council
Victorian Institute of Marine Science
Taronga Park Zoo
Melbourne Zoo
Phillip Island Penguin Reserve
International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Ltd London
Salvation Army
St Johns Ambulance
Queenland Department of Environment and Heritage
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority
Supplementary workforce sourced from the CES
Volunteers from the general public

Appendix 6 Chronology of Key events

Monday 10 July 1995

At 1930 hours EST (7.30pm) the bulk carrier, Iron Baron, ran aground on Hebe Reef, at the entrance to the Tamar River in northern Tasmania. The vessel, which was on charter to BHP, was carrying 24 000 tonnes of manganese ore from Groote Eylandt, via Port Kembla, NSW.

Nine minutes after grounding the Master notified the Port of Launceston Authority (PLA). Within an hour of the grounding, Harbourmaster Charles Black, who was later appointed On Scene Coordinator for the incident, put into action the National Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea by Oil.

Throughout the incident, the PLA took primary responsibility for the response, with the State Marine Pollution Committee providing an advisory role. Additional advice and resources were supplied by The Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) the managing agency of the National Plan, the Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre (AMOSC), BHP, the Tasmanian Department of Environment and Land Management (DELM), the International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (representing the vessel insurers), industry, private companies and volunteers.

The initial implementation of the National Plan involved preparing equipment held in other Tasmanian ports for transport to Low Head at the mouth of the Tamar River, arranging for personnel to proceed to Bell Bay and deploying booms to protect the Tamar River. Weather conditions prevented booms being placed around the Iron Baron itself.

At 2100 hours the PLA was advised that oil was leaking from the Iron Baron and notified the State Oil Pollution Control Officer, who informed the State Marine Pollution Committee. Ten minutes later the Minister for Environment and Land Management (Tasmania) received the first of many briefings on the situation. AMSA was advised by BHP of the situation at 2135 hours.

At 2145 hours BHP requested assistance of United Salvage, and salvage attempts commenced soon after (some of United Salvage personnel were in Lauceston at the time). Meanwhile AMSA had prepared an On Scene Spill Model prediction and provided it to the Port of Launceston Authority. The model provided estimates of how and where the oil slick may move.

By 2324 hours, in heavy seas, non-essential personnel were evacuated from the Iron Baron.

Tuesday 11 July 1995

At 0001 hours , AMOSC had been notified of the spill and requested to provide a range of oil spill response equipment and personnel to be sent to the incident.

At 0130 hours, the State Oil Pollution Control Officer declared a Tier Two oil spill. Four hours later BHP's Rapid Deployment Team arrived at Bell Bay, followed at 1030 hours by BHP's Oil Spill Response Group.

During the early hours, equipment and personnel needed for the response began to arrive from interstate.

As weather conditions deteriorated, heavy fuel oil began to beach in the vicinity of Low head and the Tamar River. Spraying of oil dispersants on to the slick was commenced however, due to the conditions and the type of oil was discontinued later that day.

There was significant impact on wildlife and a wildlife centre was established at Low Head Pilot Station, and treatment and rehabilitation of affected wildlife (notably little 'fairy' penguins) began.

At 1120 hours the Minister for Environment and Land Management signed the declared plan to deal with the oil spill from the Iron Baron.

By 1300 hours, clean-up of the foreshores by local council employees had commenced.

Saturday 12 July 1995

AMOSC's oiled fauna kit arrived at 0900 hours. Shipping containers were also brought in by BHP to house the affected and recovering birds. Over the period of the incident, around 2 050 penguins were treated at Low Head.

Salvage crews continued to assess the situation and fate of the Iron Baron.

Over the next three days more equipment and personnel from around Australia arrived in Launceston and the processes of deploying, retrieving, cleaning and re-deploying booms, monitoring oil movement and weather conditions, and oil recovery continued. (Overall, more than 500 people were involved in the response to the grounding).

Sunday 16 July 1995

At 1337 on 16 July 1995, the Iron Baron was refloated and moved to an anchorage some two miles offshore. In the process, further heavy fuel oil estimated to be 25 tonnes, escaped from the vessel.

A detailed examination over a period of days found extensive underwater hull damage to the Iron Baron.

Monday 24 July 1995

As a result, on 24 July, the PLA advised BHP that the vessel that for structural and potential pollution reasons the Iron Baron would not be allowed to enter the Port of Launceston

Wednesday 26 July 1995

In response to this advice, BHP, on 26 July, asked the Commonwealth Environment Protection Agency (EPA) for a permit to dispose of the Iron Baron, in accordance with the Environment Protection (Sea Dumping) Act 1981. A disposal site 53 nautical miles north east of Flinders Island was approved by the EPA.

The salvage agreement between BHP and United Salvage was terminated and replaced with a contract to tow the Iron Baron to the disposal site and for the vessel to be sunk.

Thursday 27 July 1995

Towing of the vessel to the approved site commenced on 27 July.

Sunday 30 July 1995

The Iron Baron reached the disposal site at 1300 hours on 30 July and sank at 1945 hours.

The clean-up of foreshores and rehabilitation of wildlife continued until early October 1995.


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