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The Response to the Iron Baron Oil Spill
Executive Summary
The 37 500 dwt BHP-chartered bulk carrier Iron Baron grounded on Hebe Reef in the approaches to the Tamar River in northern Tasmania at 7.30 pm on Monday 10 July 1995. The vessel lost in the region of 325 tonnes of heavy fuel oil, much of which affected foreshores along the Tamar River estuary and some beaches to the east of Hebe Reef. Oil also affected shorelines to the west as far as Port Sorell and the Rubicon River estuary. In addition, this incident had a significant impact on wildlife, particularly on the species Eudyptula minor, or little (fairy) penguins.
The response to the oil spill was one of the largest ever mounted under Australia's National Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea by Oil (National Plan), and the first major test since a comprehensive review of the National Plan was completed in 1993. The majority of recommendations of the 1993 review had been implemented prior to the Iron Baron spill.
One of the initiatives included in the revised National Plan was the requirement in any future major incident to review the spill response, to enable lessons to be learned and improvements to be made where necessary. This Report relates to the review of the response to the oil spill which followed the grounding of the Iron Baron. On the basis of the review, the Review Group has concluded that the Iron Baron oil spill response was generally well planned, managed and sustained. Equipment and personnel resources were used effectively, and planning of the response in an operational priority sense was well managed. The On Scene Coordinator, the Port of Launceston Harbour Master, Captain Charles Black, and his team deserve special recognition. There was dedicated support from the State Marine Pollution Committee and other Tasmanian Government departments and agencies; the Australian Maritime Safety Authority; the Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre; private companies and businesses; and a large workforce who volunteered their assistance.
Worth particular notice was the high level of integration and collaboration between Commonwealth, State and industry agencies and resources.
Every marine oil pollution incident is different. The details will be unique but there will be many facets of a particular response which are applicable to all. The ability to effectively respond requires a regular review and reassessment of Contingency Plans (including Coastal Resource Atlases); preparedness of equipment; the identification and appropriate training of personnel; and the sourcing of additional personnel, equipment and resources.
This incident confirmed the previously held view that most oil pollution response equipment has its limitations, especially in waters affected by rough weather, or in areas of high current or tidal streams.
The recommendations made in this Report are essentially operational in nature, and will not require major changes to the existing National Plan structure. The recommendations are, however, important and will need to be implemented as soon as possible. The impact of oil spills on wildlife is the focus of several of the recommendations of this Report. Responding to the needs of wildlife should be recognised as part of contingency planning (Recommendations 30, 31 and 32), equipment needs (Recommendations 15 and 16), Occupational Health and Safety issues (Recommendations 25, 26 and 27) and Training (Recommendations 28 and 29).
Specific legislation giving State governments powers to intervene in major ship-sourced pollution incidents is available in some States, but not in Tasmania. In terms of legislation, one of the major recommendations is for the Tasmanian Government and other States and the Northern Territory to review their future need to exercise powers of intervention (Recommendation 1).
Salvage was another important issue during the Iron Baron response. Better communication between the Salvage Master and the On Scene Coordinator would have been desirable (Recommendation 21). The incident also demonstrated a need for governments to have access to independent salvage advice (Recommendation 22).
Other recommendations include provision of information on the use of oil spill dispersants; improved consultation with and involvement of the local community; upgrading of the Coastal Resource Atlas; and improved administrative support capability.