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On Tour analyses of the work and rest patterns of Great Barrier Reef pilots: implications for fatigue management

Rationale for Recommendations

Evidence of the high potential for fatigue associated with the work practices of GBR pilots was found in our retrospective analysis of the work schedules of the pilots and from log book entries concerned with the duration, nature and impact of work at sea and time ashore on measures of alertness. The retrospective analysis included work and rest times associated with 4310 assignments reported by the pilots over an 18 month period. The more detailed analysis of the log book information was based on 176 assignments and associated rest periods. General aspects of the work practices that were conducive to fatigue included the time on and off the ship, specific aspects of bridge work, and the characteristics of sleep at sea, and sleep ashore during breaks. Other factors identified from the various phases of the analysis which have been shown to impact on fatigue included:

irregular timing of work and rest periods across the 24 hour cycle, which displaced work and sleep from usual circadian patterns;
increased workload due to work-related travel;
instances where considerably greater workloads and shorter rest breaks were experienced by pilots, compared with average company figures;
significant increases in work availability during particular time periods (July - Dec);
significant company differences in workload levels;
significant shipping route differences in assignment difficulty;
long bridge periods;
a considerable percentage of bridge periods at night and during critical early morning hours associated with increased accident risk;
short and fragmented sleep at sea with a considerable percentage outside optimal sleeping hours;
the daily sleep debt at sea being more problematic on the longer shipping route;
a considerable percentage of sleep ashore outside optimal sleeping hours; and
the presence of acute fatigue identified by alertness ratings during bridge periods indicating sleepiness, and sleep periods with short sleep latencies suggestive of considerable tiredness.

Fatigue is associated with performance impairment (Dinges,1992; Dinges & Kribbs,1991; Rosekind et al.,1996) and contributes to a significant number of marine incidents (Japan Maritime Research Institute,1993; McCallum et al.,1996; Sanquist et al.,1996; Filor, 1998). It is therefore, essential that careful consideration be given to strategies for preventing the development of fatigue in a safety-based industry.

At present, monitoring of fatigue in GBR pilots is primarily achieved by reviewing compliance with minimum rest break guidelines and subjectively assessing prior workloads across a tour of duty. However, the presence of a range of factors identified in the various phases of this research that potentiate or predispose pilots to fatigue indicates the inadequacy of these guidelines. Moreover, statistical modelling indicated that the prediction of fatigue, stress and alertness on the bridge could be enhanced by considering data on total work assignment and break duration, the total duration of bridge periods and bridge time during critical hours and work-related travel.

In consideration of the development of additional fatigue management strategies it is important to consider:

the need for adequate recovery following specific work assignments; and
the need to improve fatigue monitoring practices.

Optimal recovery time ashore is particularly important given that pilotage work at sea is intense with extended periods of work on the bridge and a significant proportion of this work undertaken during night and early morning hours. Additionally, the reduced duration and quality of sleep at sea particularly on the Inner Route suggested sleep patterns at sea likely magnified the impact of bridge work. These conditions coupled with the requirement to sustain vigilance over long periods in a relatively monotonous environment are conducive to fatigue. Research findings have shown that following a period of restricted sleep, at least two nights of recovery sleep (taken during normal physiological sleeping times) are required before complete recovery is achieved (Dinges et al.,1997; Morris & Miller,1996; Transportation Safety Board of Canada,1997; Wittersheim et al.,1992). Furthermore, there were a number of instances identified from the log book and work schedule analysis when rest breaks failed to meet current regulations, thereby further limiting the opportunity for recovery and increasing the risk of fatigue development and accident.

The current investigation revealed that a considerable percentage of sleep ashore was displaced from normal sleeping hours due to the starting time and duration of the break. Studies have shown that sleep outside optimal sleeping hours tends to be of reduced duration and of inferior recuperative value (Akerstedt, 1995; Folkard, 1996; Kecklund et al., 1997; Transportation Safety Board of Canada, 1997). As a consequence of both these factors (circadian dissociation and displaced sleep), a sub-optimal psychophysiological state may be induced (de Vries-Griever & Meijman, 1997). This, in turn may result in increased fatigue, mood deterioration and performance decrements (Condon et al., 1988; Luna, 1997; Monk, 1989; Monk & Folkard, 1992: Rosekind et al., 1996). Hence, it is vital that the timing of work and rest is considered when addressing fatigue.

The present analysis also showed an even distribution of rest breaks and work periods across all time periods of the 24 hour cycle; thereby indicating rest breaks and work periods are likely to start at any point within a 24 hour day. Current rest break regulations fail to take into consideration the timing of work and rest across the 24 hour cycle and the impact of this on recovery periods ashore.

Irregular work hours place additional strain on workers, as in such situations, people oppose the normal diurnal nature of the human body by attempting to maintain high levels of alertness when their body is anticipating sleep, and by trying to sleep when alertness and arousal are naturally increasing. This, in turn creates disharmony between a person’s circadian rhythms and the normal social and environmental time cues, thereby leading to circadian dissociation (Griffiths, 1993; Luna, 1997; Rosekind et al., 1996; Scott & Ladou, 1990). While pilots may argue that after long years of general maritime and pilotage service they have adapted to irregular work and sleep, the literature indicates there is little, if any, circadian adaptation to work schedules involving frequent changes of work times (Colquhoun, 1985; Costa, 1993; Luna, 1997; Monk & Folkard, 1992).

Moreover, increasing age, poor health and physical fitness reduce tolerance for irregular work (Folkard, 1996; Harma, 1993; Monk & Folkard, 1992). The relatively older average age of the present pilot group (52.6 years) and the evidence of compromised health as well as lifestyle habits (Parker et al., 1997; Parker et al., Report No 4, 1998) indicate these factors need to be considered when assessing the impact of irregular work and appropriate recovery periods.

The present findings suggest the need to modify existing reporting systems to include additional information related to fatigue and to provide a monitoring system which is more proactive. The current system of reporting includes information limited to work and break times and provides little opportunity for intervention should a situation of potential acute or chronic fatigue arise.

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Recommendations

Given that marine pilotage work is dependent on shipping demands and that the maritime industry operates on a 24 hour basis, some of the potential fatigue factors associated with pilotage work patterns are unchangeable. For example, starting times of work assignments and rest breaks, night work and assignment duration cannot be altered. However, there are a number of areas which are amenable to intervention and hence, the recommendations have focused on these areas.

The recommendations are made with the aim of reducing the risk of developing a level of fatigue which may impair the work performance of GBR pilots, compromise personal health and increase the risk of accidents. While these recommendations may, at times, be at variance with commercial interests, it is anticipated that any modification of fatigue management procedures will be implemented following close collaboration between the various parties.

The areas targeted by the recommendations include the development of strategies designed to:

implement rest break guidelines which minimise fatigue potential;
develop a more systematic method of work allocation to maintain compliance with rest break guidelines;
enhance monitoring of rest breaks and work allocation at official levels;
enhance the accident/incident reporting procedures with respect to fatigue;
provide adequate educational programs and greater personal responsibility for the management of fatigue;
enhance the medical monitoring of pilots in terms of risk of fatigue-related problems; and
provide adequate educational programs on health and lifestyle issues including stress management.

Recommendation 1: Reassessment of present guidelines for minimum rest breaks between work assignments and develop guidelines which will minimise fatigue potential.

To avoid the development of fatigue, there needs to be sufficient time between work periods to enable pilots to completely recover from fatigue due to previous work demands. Guidelines need to consider factors contributing to pilot fatigue, contemporary knowledge in the area of work, rest and recovery, and the standards set by international transportation research relating to recovery periods.

Findings from this research provides considerable evidence which questions the adequacy of present break guidelines.

Logbook and work schedule findings revealed that 30-40 percent of sleep ashore was currently outside optimal sleeping hours (2200-0800) and thus its recuperative value may be considerably diminished.
Exploratory modelling procedures indicated that the duration of the break preceding an assignment contributed to a considerable degree to alertness during bridgework.
Current minimum rest break guidelines for Great Barrier Reef pilotage address basic differences in shipping route duration (i.e. more extensive breaks are required prior to work on the longer Inner Route) (AMSA, 1997). However, current guidelines do not consider break starting times which determine the duration and recuperative value of sleep during time ashore.
Study results raised questions over the appropriateness of similar duration rest breaks prior to work on the GNE Channel and Hydrographers Passage shipping routes. There was considerable statistical evidence in the project indicating pilotage work in the GNE Channel region was more demanding despite the similar duration of assignments on both shipping routes.
Factors such as shipping route conditions, the duration of work assignments (including transit times), the physical and mental demands of the work and the timing of work and rest in relation to the 24 hour cycle should all be considered in the development of work rest guidelines(States/BC OSTF, 1997).

In reviewing and developing break duration guidelines the following approaches should be considered:

Breaks should provide the opportunity for two full nights of uninterrupted recovery sleep during optimal hours (2200-0800). Differences in shipping route duration and difficulty should also be taken into account when considering break duration guidelines and opportunities for recovery sleep
To enable two full nights of uninterrupted recovery sleep during optimal hours (2200-0800) a minimum of approximately 34 hours break (for a break starting at 2200) and a maximum of about 50 hours (for a break starting at 0600) would be required. Presently, about 40-50 percent of current breaks provide the opportunity for two full nights or more of recovery sleep.
The wording of guidelines should be specific rather than general. Currently, the wording of rest break guidelines is very general and does not specify hours or timing of sleep or even where the break should be taken (i.e. ashore). For example, guidelines should be worded more specifically: "following a work assignment, x sleep periods of at least y uninterrupted hours during optimal sleeping hours (i.e. between 2200 and 0800) while ashore are required".
AMSA and pilot companies should jointly work towards the development of appropriate and workable break guidelines. Finalised guidelines should be endorsed by an expert panel.
The development of strategies to deal with extenuating circumstances in situations where it is not possible for pilots to comply with guidelines. For example, upon completion of the next work assignment, an extended rest break to provide optimal sleep should then be made available.
A predictive model for ‘probable fatigue status’ of the pilot should be developed. Such a model should be based on a number of calculated variables identified in the study findings and these include: (i) the number of previous assignments within the tour; (ii) present assignment duration; (iii) present rest break duration; (iv) shipping route characteristics; and (v) amount of night work undertaken during the present tour. It may be possible to monitor ‘probable fatigue status’ by way of a cumulative assessment following each work and rest period; factors increasing fatigue could be assigned a negative score, whereas factors reducing fatigue could be assigned positive values.
The development of a predictive model to assess the recuperative value of sleep periods ashore. This model should consider the duration and timing of sleep in relation to the 24 hour cycle.

Recommendation 2: Implementation of revised guidelines – self regulation with minimum prescription.

Factors contributing to fatigue and its consequences in transportation have been debated internationally and nationally for many years. These discussions have cast doubt over the notion that highly prescriptive work hours are effective in reducing fatigue and fatigue related accidents (Moore, 1998). Moreover, economic pressure in transportation poses a considerable challenge to compliance with strict regulatory procedures. Strategies involving fatigue management plans have been implemented in a move away from strict prescription. However, while some sectors of the road and rail transportation industry in New Zealand and Australia have embraced fatigue management plans (Gander et al., 1998; McDonnell & Featherstone, 1998), it is fully acknowledged that these alone are not the answer to fatigue problems. More recent approaches to the hours of work and fatigue have involved a combination of minimum prescription with self regulation (Haworth, 1998).

An overview of a suggested approach to the implementation and review of guidelines is shown in Figure 1.0. In addressing the implementation of revised break guidelines the following approaches should be considered:

Guidelines should involve minimum prescription and be based on study findings and refined through consultation between regulators, companies and pilots. Minimum prescription should be combined with appropriate self-regulation through formal fatigue management programs targeting both companies and individuals.
Fatigue management programs/strategies at company and pilot level would require full documentation and audits at regular intervals.
The demonstration by each company of work allocation in line with prescriptive break guidelines.
Guideline monitoring should be carried out by AMSA in consultation with an appointed expert panel.
In cases where certain prescriptive guidelines were considered extremely limiting, companies could request a change, with alterations monitored for a 6 month period and revisions endorsed by an expert panel. Monitoring would include subjective and objective performance measures across a stipulated time period for a designated number of pilots.

Recommendation 3: Development of a system enabling companies to allocate work to pilots in a way that is consistent with guidelines for rest breaks

While many variables influence the work schedules of GBR pilots, it is important that a systematic approach for allocating work to pilots that minimises fatigue, maximises safety and complies with rest guidelines is adopted. It should be objective in nature and aim to make the distribution of work and rest more even. Such a system should minimise the occurrence of those instances where pilots perform considerably greater workloads and experience shorter rests as compared with average company figures.

In addressing this issue the following approaches should be considered:

A review and report by each pilotage company on the criteria currently used to allocate work to pilots. By reviewing this criteria, company personnel may identify objective measures which could be used to allocate work and assess fatigue.
Explore procedures used to allocate work in other industries e.g. airline.

Review a number of existing practices with the aim of making optimal use of a limited workforce and minimising fatigue in non-alterable situations (e.g. at sea). These include:

The practice of pilots being on ships for significant amounts of time while not performing any pilotage, particularly on the non-compulsory region of the Inner Route. Given that accommodation facilities on board vessels are frequently less than optimal, this practice may compromise the pilot’s level of alertness prior to commencing bridgework. Additionally, during busy periods this practice would not appear to be the most efficient use of a limited workforce.
The feasibility of having access to a reserve group of pilots who would be available to perform work during busy periods. This group could involve pilots who are semi-retired or who desire a reduced workload. Naturally this group of pilots would be required to comply with all licensing and training requirements.
Enhance strategies currently used to optimise the utilisation of a small workforce during predictably busy periods. For example, communication with pilotage company officials has confirmed that the increased work availability evidenced in the second time period of the work schedule files (July 1, 1996-December 31, 1996), is an annual occurrence resulting from sugar cane harvesting.
Pursue the optimisation of the limited sleep opportunities at sea. Strategies such as the charting of the Fairway Channel and extension of navigation facilities in other regions should be undertaken as soon as possible.

More longer term approaches to work allocation would involve developing a computerised system for allocating work in compliance with rest break guidelines.

Recommendation 4: Upgrading reporting procedures of work schedules to: (i) enhance work schedule files with additional information; (ii) monitoring of fatigue potential in a more timely fashion.

(i) Enhancing the present work schedule files with additional information

The present work schedule files are designed to enable pilotage companies and Government authorities to monitor the ship and non-ship time of GBR pilots. As shown in the retrospective analysis of the existing work schedule files a considerable amount of information is available which could be better utilised to monitor pilot fatigue at a basic level. At present not all data within the files is being fully utilised for this purpose. The more appropriate fatigue indicators from these files include:

The number and duration of assignments during a tour; (ii) amount of night work; (iii) the number of assignments undertaken on potentially more stressful shipping routes (i.e. Inner Route); and (iv) the timing of rest breaks. It is also possible from the existing files to identify those situations when considerably greater workloads are undertaken with respect to the number and duration of tours and work assignments, the proportion of night work, and the length of rest breaks. This information is limited however, and the findings from the log book analyses have identified additional items which, if added to the current reporting procedures, would enhance the fatigue monitoring process.

These additional factors were determined from the statistical modelling procedures which were undertaken to identify those work and sleep related factors which were associated with high levels of fatigue and stress and low levels of alertness during bridgework. Further refinement of the present model should be undertaken to include more detailed temporal aspects of work and breaks. However, at this time it is recommended that the following additional items be included to enhance the existing system in relation to fatigue monitoring:

total duration of bridge periods;
total duration of bridge periods during an assignment and during critical hours; and
travel to and from the ship. A draft data collection form based on the results of the preliminary modelling is shown in Appendix 5.

This model should be evaluated and further refined following:

A 6-month trial period using the enhanced reporting system with all pilots. The information would be analysed monthly and an assessment of the value of the enhanced system made at the end of the 6-month period.
Extension of the current models to include more detailed temporal aspects of work and sleep patterns. These steps would enable changes in fatigue, stress and alertness during bridgework to be predicted for each additional hour of duty on the bridge, and enable a predictive formula for fatigue, stress and alertness to be calculated.
More long term strategies may pursue the development of a predictive model for the classification of work difficulty or ‘probable fatigue status of pilots’ (as described earlier). The classification system could also incorporate an index of difficulty associated with shipping characteristics such as ship type (length and draft), status and flag (States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force, 1997).

(ii) Monitoring of rest breaks and fatigue potential in a more timely fashion

regulatory/company level;
personal level.

(a) regulatory and company level

To enable a preventative, rather than a reactive system of monitoring to be implemented, data within work schedule files should be accessed by company personnel and regulatory authorities in real time. This would then enable meaningful intervention to take place, if necessary.

In addressing this issue the following approaches should be considered:

At a regulatory level, AMSA would be required to maintain an active role in updating the rest guidelines to ensure the regulations are in line with current findings in the areas of work, rest and recovery. This process of updating guidelines should be based on:
findings from their own research and industry specific experience;
published findings in the literature;
feedback from pilot companies; and
data gathered by the Marine Incident Investigation Unit.
Pilotage companies should update work schedule files as soon as practical after receiving pilot invoices.
Explore the practicality of using other on-line maritime reporting systems such as AUSREP to enable AMSA to view and monitor work schedule files in a more timely fashion should be considered.
In situations where inadequate breaks are unavoidable, explanation of the circumstances should be shown in the file in real time.
More long term approaches should involve developing a computer program which would alert pilotage company and AMSA personnel when a pilot may have an unacceptable risk of fatigue. This program should be based on objective measures for assessing workload and probable fatigue status of the pilot. Meaningful intervention could then take place and subsequent work could be allocated in such a way to balance the level of work undertaken. A schemata of a possible reporting and monitoring procedure is shown in Figure 1.0.

Figure 1.0 An overview of a suggested reporting and monitoring procedure.

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(b) personal level of fatigue monitoring

Encourage pilots to become pro-active in the fatigue issue by monitoring their own personal fatigue from a short checklist.
A draft checklist has been designed and is shown in Appendix 4. This may be modified if required and include in the Passage Planning document completed by pilots.

Recommendation 5: Implement an education program on the nature and consequences of fatigue.

Evidence from the many phases of the project indicated the approach to fatigue by the pilotage workforce and participating groups appeared to be based on maritime traditions relating to hours of work and compromised sleep at sea, followed by lengthy recuperative periods ashore. However, pilotage work is considerably different in may aspects to general maritime work; thus attitudes towards fatigue based on the general maritime setting may be quite inappropriate for pilots. Moreover, there appears to be a general acceptance and expectation that demanding work schedules and conditions are a necessary and an unavoidable consequence of being a GBR pilot.

The educational program would be an important component of the overall fatigue management program for pilots and would include information which addresses issues which impact on fatigue such as: the impact of work and sleep in opposition to normal circadian cycles; the effects of fragmented sleep and an understanding of human circadian rhythms; sleep disorders and the lifestyle and other health related issues (Sanquist et al., 1996). In fact, extensive fatigue education programs targeting drivers and managers are currently applied in road and rail sectors of the transportation industry in the US, New Zealand and Australia (Rogers, 1998; Gander et al., 1998; McDonnell & Featherstone, 1998).

In addressing this issue the following strategies should be considered:

The development of a fatigue education program targeting pilots, company personnel and AMSA officials involved in pilotage matters. This program would supplement personal monitoring of fatigue shown in Recommendation 4.
An examination of the appropriateness of fatigue training programs such as the National Aeronautics and Safety Administration (NASA) Fatigue Countermeasures Program which offers education in the basic aspects of human performance and fatigue. Other programs such as The Alert Driver (Rogers, 1998) could be used as a general introduction to enhancing fatigue knowledge in marine pilots.
Providing pilotage specific material to supplement a general fatigue awareness program.
The incorporation a fatigue education/training program within the existing area of Pilot Professional Development.
The use of knowledge gained from marine accident investigations internationally and nationally to enhance the content of fatigue education programs for pilots (McCallum et al., 1996; Marine Incident Investigation Unit, Australia).
Consideration of a distance education approach to fatigue education given the scattered home bases of pilots and the home and away nature of the work.
The development of a system to regularly and systematically distribute fatigue updates to pilots based on the latest findings from scientific and industry literature. This process would ensure that the fatigue focus is maintained.

Recommendation 6: Review the current medical screening procedures for pilots.

Several factors associated with pilotage work have the potential to impact negatively on long term health outcomes. These include irregular working patterns, displaced work and sleep from normal circadian cycles, night work, and varying levels of physical and mental stimulation (Costa, 1996; Monk & Folkard, 1992; Scott & Ladou, 1990). Similarly, health impairments and decreased fitness levels may have a detrimental impact on work performance, particularly when work involves irregular working hours (Harma, 1993).

During the present and earlier projects substantial evidence has been collected which raises questions regarding the health status of pilots and the adequacy of current medical screening standards for pilots.

Although based on self report data, the present pilots displayed a greater incidence of elevated cholesterol and blood pressure by comparison with other seafarers and population data (Parker et al., 1997); and a considerable number of pilots reported experiencing breathing difficulties while sleeping (Parker et al., Report No 4, 1998). Similarly, several early and more recent studies have also raised concern over the high risk of cardiovascular risk factors such as hypocholesterolemia, hypertension, obesity and low levels of physical fitness in pilotage groups (Shipley, 1978; Saarini, 1992; Harrington, 1972; Berger, 1984; Parker et al., 1997). Despite these health profiles, pilot injury and sickness rates are approximately half those of the working population (Shipley, 1978; Berger, 1984). This finding suggests pilots may tend to ignore early warning signs of health problems, particularly in self-employed situations.

Currently, the level of assessment and frequency (2 yearly) of medical screening for Australian seafarers is also applied to GBR pilots (AMSA, 1995). By comparison most marine piloting organisations in the United States require that pilots health be reassessed yearly after age 55 (States/BC OSTF, 1997). Although not directly comparable, but nevertheless relevant, the extent and frequency of airline pilots medicals tend to be based on: age, the presence of risk factors and the licence type held. It is noteworthy, that some road transport companies require drivers to undertake yearly medicals which also incorporate assessment of fatigue related issues. For instance, these medicals involve preliminary screening for excessive daytime sleepiness as well as risk assessment for sleep disorders such as sleep apnoea (Gander et al., 1998). Given that pilots experience short and fragmented sleep at sea and a considerable number of pilots self-reported breathing difficulties while sleeping, risk assessment for sleep disorders is also warranted for the present pilots.

Thus several factors including the health and age profiles, self employed status of pilots, contemporary knowledge on the consequences of fatigue, and recent approaches to medical screening for those at risk for fatigue related problems indicate the reassessment of current medical standards is appropriate and essential.

In addressing this issue the following strategies might include:

A review of the current procedures for medical screening of pilots in terms of the type and frequency of assessment.
A review of medical assessments for other groups (e.g. airline and marine pilots) and adoption and/or modification of assessment standards to suit GBR pilots.
The development of the most appropriate medical screening procedures which should be undertaken in consultation with an occupational physician/s and with consideration of the age profile of pilots and the fatigue consequences of work and sleep patterns revealed from the current study.
The promotion of a more preventative approach to health through pilot professional development and ongoing education within that structure. Encourage pilots to consider approaches to health with a view to extending, rather than shortening, their working life.

Recommendation 7: Implement a healthy lifestyle education program to complement Recommendations 5 and 6.

Positive long term health outcomes are closely linked to suitable patterns of health and lifestyle behaviours including appropriate amounts of exercise, sleep, relaxation and the avoidance of risk factors such as smoking and excessive alcohol consumption. The home and away nature of pilotage work, including living in alternate accommodation and reliance on shipboard and hotel meals, places considerable additional demands on maintaining healthy lifestyle habits.

Within the present and previous projects there was considerable evidence that pilots’ lifestyle habits were compromised. Both pilots and their wives/partners (Parker et al., 1997, Parker et al., Report No’s 4 and 3, 1998) identified a relatively high level and frequency of stress associated with pilotage and raised concerns regarding the impact of this stress on pilot health.

Additionally, in the current investigation a considerable number of pilots were classified as either overweight or obese, 30 percent have been identified as smokers (Parker et al., Report No 4. 1998) and 70 percent of pilots did not comply with National Heart Foundation exercise guidelines to promote cardiorespiratory fitness (Parker et al., 1997).

Health and lifestyle education programs have assumed an important role in fatigue management plans in various transportation sectors (Rogers, 1998; Gander et al., 1998; McDonnell & Featherstone, 1998). The focus of these programs has been on various health and lifestyle topics which are likely to impact on work performance and stress levels.

In addressing this issue, the following approaches might include:

The implementation of health and lifestyle education programs which include stress coping strategies, exercise and nutritional issues especially for those in home and away work situations.
Liaision with the School of Human Movement Studies at the Queensland University of Technology regarding the suitability of existing programs for application, with modification, to the pilotage workforce.
The incorporation of health and lifestyle education into the pilot professional development structure and encouragement of pilots to become proactive on this issue.
An investigation of the availability of such programs for delivery and monitoring using a distance education approach.
Trialing and evaluation of health and lifestyle programs with GBR pilots.

Recommendation 8: Enhance the accident/incident reporting procedures with respect to fatigue

It is now acknowledged from recent research work that fatigue may play a considerably greater role in marine accidents than previously identified. The contribution of fatigue to vessel and personnel accidents in the US coastguard has been estimated at 16 and 33 percent, respectively (McCallum et al., 1996). Australian data suggests that fatigue contributes to 10 percent of marine accidents, however, one author has suggested that a figure closer to 30 percent would be more realistic when performance impairments due to chronic fatigue are considered (Filor, 1998).

Knowledge of the precise role of fatigue in transportation accidents has been constrained by several factors. These chiefly relate to the difficulty in detecting human fatigue, and the lack of universal definitions of fatigue and non-standardised accident investigating procedures (Brown, 1994; McCallum et al., 1996; Transportation Safety Board, 1997).

However, progress has been made towards the classification of specific characteristics of work and sleep as predictors of fatigue and increased accident risk (McCallum et al.,1996). For instance, modelling based on the outcomes of casualty investigations found sleep and work duration in the past 72 hours and reports of fatigue symptoms correctly classified 80 percent of casualty cases in terms of the presence of fatigue (McCallum et al., 1996).

Additionally, fatigue has been identified as a contributing factor in a number of groundings involving pilots working within the Great Barrier Reef. In the opinion of Filor (1998) investigations of marine casualties have considerable difficulty in objectively proving the presence of fatigue, particularly chronic fatigue. However, Filor (1998) acknowledged that considerably more effort was required in gathering pre-accident data in relation to work and sleep patterns. It is likely that several key measures associated with fatigue identified in the current work schedule analysis may also be utilised in the identification of both acute and chronic fatigue in pre-accident data collection processes during accident investigations.

A measure of the effectiveness of changes in fatigue management procedures is a reduction in the number of vessel and personnel casualties in which fatigue is likely to have a contribution. It is important therefore that AMSA in conjunction with the marine Incident Investigation Unit implement strategies to more effectively link human factors fatigue information with objective incident statistics.

In addressing this issue the following approaches should be considered:

Provide information from this research to upgrade the human factors investigation and reporting procedures.
Review the current procedures for accident investigation to assess the adequacy of the collection and access to information concerning human factors issues.
Consider the use of the present work schedules in an investigation of chronic fatigue problems during accident investigations. From basic calculations on work schedule data pre-accident data could be evaluated on: (i) workloads (number of tours and assignments across the previous two or three months; (ii) the number and duration of assignments during a tour; (iii) amount of night work; (iv) the number of assignments undertaken on potentially more stressful shipping routes (i.e. Inner Route); and (v) the timing of rest breaks.
Establish or maintain investigation of the contribution of human factors to accidents/incidents as a priority.
Establish a close working link between the Marine Incident Investigation Unit, AMSA and the pilot companies with a view to a proactive rather than reactive approach to fatigue issues.
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last updated: October 1998