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Review of ship safety and pollution prevention measures in the Great Barrier Reef

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6. CONSTRAINING CERTAIN SHIP TYPES

6.1 A number of interest groups have called for a ban on certain ships from using the Inner Route through the Great Barrier Reef.

6.2 While a large proportion of ships operating in the GBR are visiting Queensland ports, a significant number are transiting the GBR and some of these are making no port calls in Australia. Over 6000 ships movements occur throughout the GBR and Torres Strait each year, of which around 2,500 movements occur in the inner route north of Cairns. Around 20% of vessels transiting the Inner Route currently do not call at a Queensland port.⁶⁸ This represents a decline from the estimated 35% of ships in 1995 using the inner route that were in transit and did not call at a Queensland port.⁶⁹

6.3 If more ships were persuaded or required to use alternative routes, the risk of a major incident in environmentally sensitive parts of the Inner Route could be reduced. However, consideration also needs to be given to the operational aspects of moving ships on to alternative routes, the international legal regime and the economic, social and environmental consequences.

Outer Route

6.4 Following the 1995 GBR shipping study recommendation⁷⁰, AMSA and the RAN Hydrographer surveyed and charted the Outer Route, as a means of encouraging more vessels that did not need to use the Inner Route to use this alternative. This activity was completed in 1997. The Outer Route is some 150 nautical miles longer than the Inner Route.

6.5 Major oil tanker companies have already adopted a voluntary routing policy to use the Outer Route. Tankers carrying crude oil are encouraged to use this route, especially if the vessel is not calling at a northern or central Queensland port. Companies have taken this decision, despite the longer steaming time and potentially worse weather conditions, in recognition of the risk assessment conducted by the 1995 GBR Shipping Study and the public concern about potential for significant environmental damage in the event of an oil spill on the Inner Route. However, most of these are crude tankers which could not use the Inner Route because of draught considerations. Product tankers still use the Inner Route.

6.6 The shipping industry, however, is opposed to any moves to mandate greater use of the Outer Route that will affect the right of innocent passage for commercial shipping and increase the risk of a major shipping incident.⁷¹

6.7 There are operational factors that may influence a ship operator in the choice of the Outer or Inner Route through the GBR. The advantages to shipping of using the Outer Route arise from potentially higher transit speeds in the less restricted, deep water in the Outer Route and savings in pilotage fees that are applicable to the compulsory pilotage area on the Inner Route. Ships using the Outer Route are positioned further from environmentally sensitive areas of the GBR in the event of a pollution incident.

6.8 However, on the Outer Route strong south easterly winds prevail for most of the year, particularly through winter, and in the summer there is the threat of cyclonic conditions. The forces and stresses of heavy sea and swell conditions are greater than in the relatively calm waters of the Inner Route and strong wind and rough seas may mean slower transit times and/or increasing fuel usage. In general terms a ship transiting the Outer Route will incur extra steaming time compared with using the Inner Route.

6.9 A ship suffering a mechanical failure could not safely anchor for repairs or await assistance for an extended period on the Outer Route. In the case of a shipping incident on the Outer Route, the prospect of a vessel breaking up after grounding on the outer fringe of the GBR is significantly greater than on the Inner Route. The increasing distance seaward from the GBR also increases the time and distance for pollution response, salvage and rescue services to reach a ship in distress. If an oil spill was to occur close to the outer edge of the reef, prevailing winds would blow oil onto the reef and may cause more damage than if it occurred in the calm waters of the Inner Route.

6.10 The review notes that the DNV risk assessment study concludes that rerouting of shipping to the Outer Route is not a reasonable risk control measure, because of the increased threat of total catastrophic loss faced by shipping in the event of an incident in the Coral Sea, the consequent potential for greater pollution and the difficulties in responding to a major pollution incident. The review notes the need to exercise considerable caution in respect to encouraging ships to use the Outer Route.

6.11 It is also important to note that access to the Outer Route for ships passing through the Torres Strait is via the Great North East Channel and increased traffic would impose greater risks to Torres Strait. The Torres Strait has equivalent environmental significance to the GBR and the Great North East Channel poses a demanding navigational transit not dissimilar to the Inner Route.

Legal limitations on controlling foreign ships under international law

6.12 Australia's powers to regulate foreign ships in Australian waters are subject to the provisions of the United Nations' Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS). As Australia has ratified most of the international conventions governing shipping, including UNCLOS, it has an obligation to give effect to them in its national law. Australian legislation and case law for shipping also lies in the mainstream of international law and practice. The recent review⁷² of the Navigation Act 1912 recommended that Australia should continue to base its regulation of shipping and port State control on international maritime conventions.

6.13 UNCLOS establishes the rights of a ship to innocent passage through the territorial sea and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of other Coastal States. Passage is innocent as long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the Coastal State. The effect of the Convention is that Australia cannot hamper or impair the right of passage of foreign vessels through its waters, including Torres Strait, and the territorial waters of the area covered by the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park.

6.14 UNCLOS provides that the right of innocent passage can be subject to some regulation as long as the requirements do not deny or impair the right of innocent passage. For instance, UNCLOS allows Coastal States, acting through a competent international organisation, like the IMO, or general diplomatic conference, to establish rules and standards to prevent pollution of the marine environment from vessels.

Impact of a complete ban on the Inner Route

6.15 The 1995 study⁷³of options for using alternative shipping and land transport routes to reduce the level of shipping on the Inner Route found that:

Closure of some or all Queensland ports would reduce, but not eliminate, shipping use of the Inner Route, and could only be achieved at very high cost in terms of alternative transport costs and social and regional economic losses;
Complete closure of the Inner Route through the Reef would add $6 billion to Australian transport costs, with the least obtrusive restrictions adding $273 million (in 1995 dollar values); and
Closure of the Torres Strait would add $104 million (1995 values) to costs of domestic transport and international shipping servicing north Queensland ports;
The huge increases in transport costs would fall predominantly on bulk commodity exporters, and would in all probability make them uncompetitive in world markets; and
Environmental benefits of reduced shipping traffic on the Inner Route would be offset to some degree by increased environmental impacts of alternative transport options.

6.16 The study concluded that blanket closure of or restricting access to Queensland ports by shipping in the Inner Route was not a realistic option.

6.17 Approximately $26 billion of trade is generated through Queensland ports per year, accounting for 18% of Queensland's Gross Domestic Product. Recent estimates place the value of export merchandise from Queensland ports abutting the GBR at nearly $10 billion in 2000. These ports are a vital link in the State's logistics supply chain. Studies of four major ports in the region (Gladstone, Mackay, Townsville and Cairns) indicate they contribute some $3 billion directly and indirectly to the regional economies and generate around 23,000 jobs.⁷⁴

6.18 GBR ports are an integral part of the economy of the State and of Australia, with substantial direct and flow-on effects on regional economies. The significance of their contribution to employment, income and community services cannot be underestimated.

6.19 The Department of Industry, Science and Resources (DISR) notes that petroleum industry activities near the Reef require vessels to have passage on the landward side of the Reef and to transit across the Reef. Banning of petroleum industry ships could affect exploration and development of resources in the region outside the GBRMP and could negatively affect the economic viability of potential petroleum production in the Coral Sea. DISR notes similar concerns for flow-on impacts for other industries such as tourism and minerals that depend on shipping access in the GBR.⁷⁵

6.20 DISR also notes that mobile drilling rigs are relocated between the Timor Sea and Bass Strait using tows through the GBR region. Passage through the reef is safer for this high value equipment and delays of even a couple of days in relocation can significantly affect the costs of a drilling program. DISR believe that, where additional protection is required, industry should be afforded the opportunity to demonstrate the safety of its transit proposals against objectives of a plan of management.

6.21 The application of restrictive shipping access would result in higher transport costs applied to industries within the GBR region and reduced economic stability of regional communities. It also would significantly affect the Queensland and national economies.

Types of ships and cargoes

6.22 While it is not practical to ban all shipping from the Inner Route, consideration could be given to encouraging some higher risk vessels, having regard to ship condition, operational status and type of cargo, to use other alternatives.

6.23 To some extent this already occurs. As noted, major oil companies already encourage tankers to use the Outer Route. Other vessels also choose to use the Outer Route since it was accurately charted. The proportion of ships transiting the Inner Route without calling at a Queensland port has declined to around 20%, from an estimated 35% in 1995⁷⁶, despite an overall growth in the volume of shipping traffic in the region.

6.24 The shipping industry prefers that the choice of route should be left to the discretion of Masters, who will take into account the existing conditions and observance of good seamanship. Industry also noted that exclusion of ships carrying hazardous goods may be impractical given that most container ships already carry hazardous goods in accordance with the IMDG Code, but that consideration could be given to denying passage for ships carrying toxic waste or other commodities that require special environmental clearances.⁷⁷

6.25 Well-run ships can safely carry hazardous cargoes. All ships carry bunker fuels, which represent a pollution threat as much as oil as cargo. However, there have been no significant oil pollution incidents in the Inner Route of the GBR from a ship grounding or collision in the past 16 years.⁷⁸ The risk of a pollution incident depends less on the nature of the cargo than the quality of the ship and its crew.

Recommendation 31

The review recommends that it is inappropriate and impractical to impose constraints on certain ship or cargo types using the Inner Route.

Port State Control

6.26 Consideration could be given to restricting vessels with poor port State control records from using the Inner Route.⁷⁹ It could be expected that poorly run ships have a greater prospect of a collision or grounding incident. However, as these ships are also likely to be older and less well maintained, it would be more prudent for such ships to use the Inner Route, where weather conditions are less severe and there is less risk of catastrophic losses in the event of an incident.

6.27 Given these safety considerations and international legal constraints on denial of innocent passage, regulatory effort is better focussed on targeting the identification of particularly poor ships and selective monitoring and possibly detention or banning their access to ports.

6.28 A number of international maritime safety conventions recognise the right of a port State to undertake inspections of foreign flag ships when they are voluntarily visiting its ports. If a ship does not meet the requirements of these conventions such that it poses a danger to life, property or the environment, a port State may detain the ship until the situation is rectified.

6.29 Australia has implemented a strong port State control regime to enforce international convention standards, which is administered by AMSA under the Commonwealth Navigation Act 1912. AMSA sets target inspection levels for "eligible" foreign ships visiting Australian ports to identify those of higher risk in relation to safety and environment pollution.

6.30 AMSA aims to inspect 50% of eligible ships calling at Australian ports. An "eligible" ship is one that has not been inspected by AMSA during the last six months (three months for a passenger ship or a tanker over fifteen years old) immediately preceding the date of arrival at a port.

6.31 AMSA recently strengthened its risk analysis for targeting ship inspections at higher risk ships and focusing on the inspection of particular areas of ship operation. The targeting system already set minimum inspection levels based on the type of ship and its age.

6.32 AMSA is refining its targeting processes through the introduction of a Ship Inspection Decision Support System (SIDSS), aimed at improving the risk assessment of each ship. This system takes into account a wider range of factors including:

the ship's flag;
classification society;
age;
type of ship; and
its previous inspection performance record.

6.33 Other factors will be considered if relevant and if sufficient data is available, such as the history of particular shipowners, operators and charterers in relation to ship quality.

6.34 Increasingly the international community is targeting substandard shipping for port State control inspection. Better information on substandard shipping will inevitably lead to better decision making. Both commercial and regulatory bodies have established databases about substandard ships. The Paris and Tokyo MOUs on Port State Control, the US Coast Guard, various national authorities and the European Commission are making efforts to improve the capture and dissemination of more data on substandard ships. The widest possible dissemination of port State control data is supported by the international shipping industry and regulators.⁸⁰

6.35 The review notes that improved electronic information exchange on port State control data with other countries and agencies in the region has the potential to track and give warning on substandard ships.

6.36 Full use should be made of all available ship safety data, including real time data from coastal pilots. There are no local port State control inspections carried out on ships transiting Torres Strait or the Inner Route when these vessels do not call at an Australian port. In some cases it may be that such ships are avoiding Australian port State control because of Australia's tough reputation. As well, a ship calling into Great Barrier Reef ports may have conducted a voyage through the Reef before a ship inspection is undertaken.

6.37 To fill this gap, and to enable authorities to seek and assess international port State control information on ships with a poor record, the SRS could seek information from pilot bookings as a source of prior notification of ships operating in the region.

6.38 The review supports Queensland Transport's initiatives obtaining prior advice of the ships using the GBR and Torres Strait from pilotage service providers. Currently one of the pilot companies provides a schedule of expected movements. This assists the Vessel Traffic System Operators in their duties at REEFCENTRE. It is planned to acquire this information from all three pilot companies.

Recommendation 32

The review recommends that Queensland Transport obtain forecast shipping schedules from all pilot companies for provision to REEFCENTRE.

6.39 The first reporting points for vessels entering the GBR region are currently within the defined boundaries of the SRS. Vessels on departure routes from the SRS may encounter substandard vessels without having received encounter information in their last traffic report from REEFCENTRE.

6.40 A requirement for reporting prior to entering the SRS region, for example one hour before entering the region, together with better information sharing on ships' port State control histories would enable better warnings to be given. As well, the submission of passage plans to REEFCENTRE prior to entry into the SRS would considerably enhance the capacity to monitor vessels.

Recommendation 33

The review recommends that submission of passage plans and prior notice of entry into the Great Barrier Reef region be introduced to enhance the Ship Traffic Information provided by REEFCENTRE.

Recommendation 34

The review recommends evaluation of all available data using AMSA's Ship Inspection Decision Support System to identify high risk ships operating in the Great Barrier Reef and to target port State control inspections if these ships call at Australian ports.

6.41 Internationally, increasing attention is being given to proposals to ban certain ships from access to ports as a means of dissuading substandard ships from operating in particular regions. While the general consensus is that a ban on all ships of a particular flag or type is not practical, as well as there being legal difficulties in banning the right of transit passage, there is increasing support for banning port access for individual ships that have a particularly poor record of detentions.

6.42 Canada is amending its shipping law to provide for port State control authorities to ban sub-standard ships from entering Canadian ports, and intends to use this tool to the fullest extent. This measure also has been adopted by the European Commission for tankers more than 15 years old. The US provides for the banning of high risk ships, particularly if they cannot demonstrate compliance with the ISM Code.⁸¹

6.43 The European Commission has proposed amending Directive 95/21/EC to include banning manifestly substandard ships from European waters. The proposal extends to certain ships⁸² that are more than 15 years old, that may be considered as past offenders (eg detained more than twice in the last two years) and that fly the flag of a State on a "black list" of detentions established by the Paris MOU on Port State Control. The Commission has developed procedures for the application and lifting of this measure and will publish a list of banned ships every six months.⁸³

6.44 The Paris MOU on Port State Control Working Group is presently considering amendments to the Paris MOU with the objective of reflecting the provisions of the final EC Directive.

Recommendation 35

The review recommends strategies be developed to improve tracking and monitoring, and to notify shipping that access to ports will be denied for ships with particularly serious port State control records.

Confidential Reporting

6.45 With ships now spending less time in ports, the opportunities for port State control authorities to conduct detailed inspections of ships is limited, particularly when a ship arrives loaded and access to holds and tanks is restricted. Authorities also have limited opportunities to witness a crew in action and to assess its competence.

6.46 One means of providing intelligence to identify particular problems of a ship, or systemic unsafe practices and hazards in a company or a range of ship types or locations, is confidential reporting. Several parties are in a position to pass such information to the authorities, such as pilots, crew members, unions or seamen's missions. However, many of these people may be unwilling to openly pass information to authorities for fear of retribution, particularly job loss.⁸⁴

6.47 Confidential reporting of hazardous or potentially hazardous incidents has been accepted in the aviation industry for several years in the USA, the UK, Canada and Australia.

6.48 The Australian Transport Safety Bureau's confidential air incident reporting (CAIR) system recognises that, despite stringent mandatory reporting requirements, not all incidents are reported, particularly if punitive action may be taken by an employer or contracts might be lost.

6.49 The CAIR system started in 1988. It focuses on systems, procedures and equipment rather than individuals. It protects a reporter's identity provides a means for passing on safety information that does not meet the requirements of the mandatory reporting system. The program helps to identify and rectify safety deficiencies and is used to promote safety education.

6.50 In the maritime sector, there are already in place extensive mandatory reporting requirements for notifying regulatory and safety investigation authorities of incidents. The reporting of significant incidents such as groundings or collisions is well established and observed by the industry.

6.51 There is less reporting of "near miss" incidents or unsafe practices, as these may involve a degree of subjective judgement and there is the fear of reprisals. Such incidents, however, can yield important information allowing for pre-emptive safety actions, enhancing safety of life and protection of the environment.

6.52 A confidential reporting system could help to identify unsafe operating practices, ships with deficient equipment, or idiosyncratic handling characteristics. It would allow ships assessed as high risk to be targeted by port State control or other marine regulatory authorities without the ship owner being aware that a ship had been subject to a report. It also would allow safety authorities to develop education and awareness campaigns for the whole industry to alert them to particular unsafe practices or particular hazards relating to passage through the GBR.

6.53 To be accepted, a confidential reporting system would need procedures to ensure protection of the identity of the person making a report, and to establish that reports are genuine and not made out of malice or are otherwise vexatious. It also would require a concerted education campaign to establish its availability and purpose of improving safety and environmental protection.

6.54 Pilots are often the first Australian independent professionals to board a ship, and are able to witness a crew in action. The inclusion of pilots in the confidential reporting system will be essential. Given the small pool of pilots and the pilotage structure in the GBR region, however, it would be difficult to ensure confidentiality of reports by pilots unless the reporting system is made available. To all pilots, harbour and tug masters, port managers, ships' crews, mooring gangs, VTS operators and others in the industry.

Recommendation 36

The review recommends that the Australian Transport Safety Bureau establish a confidential marine incident reporting system and develop mechanisms to relay relevant information to AMSA, REEFCENTRE, Queensland Transport and GBRMPA

Double Hulled Tankers

6.55 Risks of pollution following a grounding may be reduced if ships are constructed with double hulls and these tanks are not used for carrying the ships' fuel.

6.56 The IMO recently approved a new timetable for the phasing out of single hull oil tankers. Most single hull tankers will be eliminated by 2015. A port State has the authority to deny entry to any single hull tanker operating beyond 2015.

6.57 However, most laden tankers in the GBR region already use the Outer Route, in recognition of environmental concerns. The real need is for protection of ships' fuel tanks in the event of a grounding or collision. There have been recent ship casualties worldwide that resulted in pollution and environmental damage from the ships' fuel oil. Bunker fuel is heavier, more difficult to remediate and more environmentally damaging than some petroleum cargo types. Today's ships are bigger and will continue to increase in size. There is a corresponding need for ships to carry increasing quantities of fuel.

6.58 There are international moves to prevent pollution by spill of ships' bunker fuel. The IMO Marine Environment Protection Committee has decided to include in its work program a high priority item on protection of fuel tanks. This item will only apply to new ships, and would initially be applied to any ship carrying large amounts of fuel as bunkers.

6.59 The review strongly supports measures to mitigate the risk and effects of bunker spills. These measures include support for the ratification of the Bunkers Convention and for actions by IMO to review construction standards which will lessen the risk of bunker fuel spills.

Recommendation 37

The review recommends support for IMO action in relation to phasing out single-hulled tankers, adopting interim measures to allow port States to deny entry to single-hulled tankers and for measures to improve protection against bunker fuel spills.

⁶⁸Submission No 6 Australian Chamber of Shipping, p9

⁶⁹ Department of Transport, 1995, Great Barrier Reef and Torres Strait Shipping Study, Vol 1

⁷⁰ Department of Transport, 1995, Great Barrier Reef and Torres Strait Shipping Study, Vol 1

⁷¹ Submission No 6 Australian Chamber of Shipping

⁷² Department of Transport and Regional Services and AMSA, 2000, Review of the Navigation Act 1912, Final Report

⁷³ Department of Transport, 1995, Great Barrier Reef and Torres Strait Shipping Study, Volume 1

⁷⁴ Capt J Watkinson, 2001, Sustainable Shipping Access to the great Barrier Reef, address to ICHCA Annual Conference, Canberra, 2001.

⁷⁵ Submission No 18 Department of Industry, Science and Resources

⁷⁶ Department of Transport, 1995, Great Barrier Reef Shipping Study

⁷⁷ Submission No 6 Australian Chamber of Shipping

⁷⁸ DNV, 2001, Assessment of Ship Safety Controls in the Torres Strait and the Great Barrier Reef

⁷⁹ Submission No 6 Australian Chamber of Shipping

⁸⁰ International Commission on Shipping, 2001, Ships, Slaves and Competition

⁸¹ International Commission on Shipping, 2001, Ships, Slaves and Competition,p153

⁸² Gas and chemical tankers, bulk carriers, oil tankers and passenger ships.

⁸³ European Commission, Document 500PC0142(01), Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Council Directive 95/21/EC Concerning The Enforcement, In Respect of Shipping Using Community Ports And Sailing In The Waters Of Member States, Of International Standards For Ship Safety, Pollution Prevention And Shipboard Living and Working Conditions.

⁸⁴ International Commission on Shipping, 2001, Ships, Slaves and Competition, p192

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last updated: 4 September 2001