Shipping Safety

Incident Reporting

AUSREP

REEFVTS

Declared Vessels

Great Barrier Reef and Torres Strait

Levies and Fees

Standards and Regulations

Navigation Safety

Vessel Tracking

OHS Inspectorate

Port State Control

Flag State Administration

Coastal Pilotage

Codes Manuals and Reports

Review of Ship Safety and Pollution Prevention Measures in the Great Barrier Reef

[back to top]

Contents

Executive Summary

  1. INTRODUCTION

  1. SHIPPING IN THE GREAT BARRIER REEF

  1. EXTENSION OF THE COMPULSORY PILOTAGE AREA

  1. ADVANCING TECHNOLOGY

  1. ENHANCING SHIP ROUTEING, TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AND Emergency Response Division

  1. CONSTRAINING CERTAIN SHIP TYPES

  1. IMPROVING LEGISLATIVE POWERS

    • Commonwealth-State Jurisdiction
    • Defining Jurisdictional Boundaries
    • Shipping Regulation

ABBREVIATIONS

ATTACHMENTS

  1. Terms on Governing Response

  2. Reference

  3. Persons and Organisations Making Submissions

  4. Marine Incidents in the Great Barrier Reef and Torres Strait 1985-2000

  5. Legislative Powers of Intervention and Enforcement

  6. Legislative Penalties and Offences

  7. Legislative Powers Of Restitution And Recovery Of Costs

  8. Legislatio

  9. to a Shipping Incident

LIST OF FIGURES

1. INTRODUCTION

Terms of Reference

1.1 The Commonwealth Minister for Transport and Regional Services, the Hon John Anderson MP, announced the review of ship safety and pollution prevention measures on 6 November 2000.

1.2 The review was initiated in recognition of the potential impacts of shipping on the unique values of the Great Barrier Reef and the need for continuous improvements in regulatory arrangements and operational practices for shipping in the region.

1.3 The terms of reference (at Attachment A) require the review to develop strategies to address five specific areas:

Extending the compulsory pilotage area in the Reef taking into account availability of skilled pilots and possible impacts on fatigue management;

Advancing the introduction of technological developments to track and monitor shipping operations in the Reef;

Enhancing existing ship routeing, traffic management and Emergency Response Division arrangements;

Constraining certain types of ships from operation in the Reef, or adjacent to it, having regard to their condition, operational status and cargo; and

Improving legislative powers of intervention and enforcement, heightening the level of offences and penalties, and ordering restitution, to the maximum extent possible under international law.

The Way Ahead - A Shipping Management Plan

1.4 The review has identified a range of considerations relating to the use of the Great Barrier Reef (GBR) region by shipping. In conducting the review, it was apparent there is no overall coordinated policy relating to shipping in the GBR. Several authorities at Commonwealth and State level have regulatory responsibilities for different aspects of shipping and there is a complex web of legislative requirements.

1.5 The response to the Bunga Teratai Satu incident clearly demonstrated the weaknesses and complexities of these shared arrangements, despite the close and effective working relationship among the various authorities with responsibilities for shipping in the GBR region.

1.6 The four agencies with principal responsibility for management of shipping in the region – the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA), Queensland Transport (QT), the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority (GBRMPA) and the Commonwealth Department of Transport and Regional Services (DTRS) – believe a better coordinated management approach is essential to balance the legitimate operations of shipping and the need to protect the sensitive environment of the GBR.

1.7 These four agencies agree there is a need to form a Great Barrier Reef Shipping Management Group to progress the initiatives identified in this report and to work with other agencies, such as Queensland Fisheries and the Australian Fisheries Management Authority, on policies and practices to improve ship safety and environmental protection for the Great Barrier Reef.

Recommendation 1

The review recommends establishment of an ongoing Great Barrier Reef Shipping Management Group, including executive representation from AMSA, DTRS, Queensland Transport and GBRMPA, to carry forward the review’s recommendations and to ensure ongoing clarification of roles and responsibilities of all relevant agencies involved with shipping operations in the Great Barrier Reef and Torres Strait.

1.8 Management of shipping in the region would be improved by the development of a coordinated Shipping Management Plan. The Plan should clarify the legal regime and responsibilities of Commonwealth and State authorities, and establish broad objectives and policy parameters for shipping to guide management of the region and regulation of the industry.

1.9 It should aim to provide an integrated management regime that is consistent with the multiple use management objectives of the Marine Park, and sustainable access to ports in the region. It should also work towards simplifying the existing complex shared jurisdictional arrangements between agencies.

1.10 In preparing and updating the Plan, there should be full consultation with all interested parties, including the shipping industry, pilots, indigenous communities, the fishing and tourism industries and conservation groups.

Recommendation 2

The review recommends that the Great Barrier Reef Shipping Management Group prepare a Shipping Management Plan as part of a three year rolling program of management for shipping in the Great Barrier Reef.

Recommendation 3

The review recommends that the Great Barrier Reef Shipping Management Group regularly update progress on the review initiatives and provide an annual report to their respective Ministers.

1.11 Proper multiple-use management of the GBR Marine Park requires an understanding of the full economic, environmental and social impacts of the various activities conducted within its boundaries. Impact studies have been prepared already for fishing and tourism. It would be appropriate that a comparable study be carried out for shipping activities.

1.12 Some data is already available from the 1995 Great Barrier Reef and Torres Strait Shipping Study and the Bureau of Transport Economics and private evaluations of the impact of selected ports in the region. This data should be updated and supplemented with information on environmental and social aspects, including indigenous community considerations.

Recommendation 4

The review recommends the Great Barrier Reef Shipping Management Group develop a study of the economic, environmental and social impact of shipping in the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park and Torres Strait, to assist with the long-term management of the industry within the region.

Conduct of the Review

1.13 The review was undertaken by a Steering Committee comprising senior officials of the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA), Queensland Transport (QT), the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority (GBRMPA) and the Commonwealth Department of Transport and Regional Services (DTRS).

1.14 The Steering Committee presented an interim report to Minister Anderson on 15 December 2000, identifying key directions for discussion with stakeholders.

1.15 The review involved an extensive consultative process in line with its terms of reference. Over 80 stakeholders were invited to participate, including coastal pilots and pilotage service providers, the shipping industry, environmental groups, indigenous representatives and other interested parties.

1.16 In late January 2001, a public advertisement invited submissions to be made by 31 March 2001. This deadline was later extended by the Steering Committee to 30 April 2001 for certain indigenous groups needing further time to consult with their communities.

1.17 A discussion paper, which canvassed major issues involved in the review, was released in January 2001 and circulated to stakeholders.

1.18 An initial round of consultative forums were held between 5 and 9 February 2001 in Cairns, Townsville and Brisbane. These involved separate sessions for environmental groups, indigenous representatives, shipping interests and for the general public. Separate meetings were held with pilots and pilotage providers in Cairns and Brisbane.

1.19 Another series of consultations were held from 12 to 14 March 2001 on three Torres Strait islands and in Townsville. These focused on further meetings with indigenous representatives, involving visits to local communities on Thursday, Coconut (Poruma) and Yorke (Masig) Islands in the Torres Strait and another forum with indigenous groups in Townsville.

1.20 The review received 65 submissions from interested parties. A summary of persons and organisations making submissions is at Attachment B. Submissions were received from Commonwealth and State Government agencies, the shipping industry, coastal pilots and their representative organisations, pilotage service providers, conservation groups, ports, users of shipping, community and indigenous groups and concerned members of the public.

Significance of the Great Barrier Reef

1.21 The Great Barrier Reef (GBR) is internationally recognised as a unique marine environment. It is the largest coral reef ecosystem and the world’s largest living structure. It extends over 2,300 kilometres from Lady Elliot Island off the coast south of Gladstone to the tip of Cape York Peninsula in the north, as shown in Figure 1.1.

1.22 The protection of its outstanding natural qualities was enhanced with the establishment of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park in 1975. This is the world’s largest marine park, covering an area of 345,000 square kilometres, and is under the management of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority (GBRMPA).

1.23 In addition to its environmental and cultural significance, the GBR has important economic significance. It supports a billion dollar sector of the tourism industry and a $250 million sector of the fishing industry. In total the GBR is estimated to contribute around $2 billion per annum to the Queensland economy.

1.24 Exports from all Queensland ports, is valued at $16.24 billion or 15% of the State’s GDP. Of this around $10 billion of export merchandise, or about 9% of Queensland GDP, used the eleven ports and shipping in the GBR region. The four major ports in the GBR (Cairns, Townsville, Mackay and Gladstone) are estimated to contribute some $3 billion and 23,000 jobs directly into the Queensland and regional economies.1

1.25 Accordingly, the legislative and management arrangements for the Marine Park provide for its multiple use management, in a way that ensures conservation and scientific research while also allowing reasonable use of the Great Barrier Reef Region and its resources for commerce and recreation.

1.26 Indigenous communities have a close association over thousands of years with the coastal and marine environment in the Great Barrier Reef region for both cultural and economic purposes. Measures impacting on the management of the region need to recognise the continuing use and interest of indigenous communities in pursuit of their culture and protection of their heritage.

1.27 The review recognises the importance for indigenous communities to be involved in development of management plans to ensure their traditional use of resources and rights and interests in the land and sea are respected. There also is a need for culturally appropriate interaction with indigenous communities by agencies and cooperative management arrangements where relevant.

1.28 The GBR was inscribed on the World Heritage List in 1981 under the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of World Cultural and National Heritage. It is the world’s largest World Heritage area.

1.29 The International Maritime Organization (IMO), a specialised agency of the United Nations, designated the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park in 1990 as one of the world’s first Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSA). This provided international recognition by the shipping industry of its unique ecology and environmental sensitivity, and allowed implementation by Australia of associated special protective measures to control shipping operations. These include restrictions on discharges from ships, adoption of ship routeing measures near or in the area in accordance with IMO general principles on ships’ routeing, and other navigational measures, such as compulsory pilotage and vessel traffic management systems.

The Torres Strait

1.30 The Torres Strait between Cape York and Papua New Guinea adjoins the northern boundary of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park and is an important international shipping lane, as well as containing significant fishing grounds. It is similarly an environmentally sensitive area. Its waters are essential for the livelihood of the Torres Strait Islander people and the coastal communities of Papua New Guinea, whose spiritual and cultural heritage and economic needs are inseparably linked to the marine ecology of this region.

1.31 There are over 100 islands and numerous coral cays, exposed sandbanks and reefs in Torres Strait. There about 8,000 people living throughout the Strait in 19 small island communities, of which approximately 6,000 are Torres Strait Islanders and Aboriginal people. The communities are all remote, approximately 1000 kilometres from the nearest city, and highly interactive with the marine environment to support their way of life and cultural heritage.

1.32 The Torres Strait is a major shipping channel for Australia linking the Coral Sea in the east with the Arafura Sea in the west. At its narrowest point, north to south, it is 150 kilometres across. It is the only part of Australia sharing a border with another country and therefore the issues of surveillance and defence are a major consideration.

1.33 The Torres Strait Treaty between Australia and Papua New Guinea, which entered into force in February 1985, defines the border between the two countries and provides a framework for the management of the common border area.

1.34 The Treaty declares the Torres Strait Protected Zone, which is an area of the Torres Strait recognised by Australia and Papua New Guinea as needing special attention. The Zone is primarily aimed at allowing Torres Strait Islanders and the coastal people of Papua New Guinea to carry on their traditional way of life.

1.35 For example, traditional people from both countries may move freely (without passports or visas) for traditional activities in the Protected Zone. The Zone assists in the preservation and protection of the land, sea and air of the Torres Strait, including the native plant and animal life. Subsidiary management arrangements for commercial fisheries in the Zone have also been put in place under the Treaty.

1.36 The Torres Strait also falls within the area of the Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and the Environment of the South Pacific Region to which Australia is a signatory.

1 Capt J Watkinson, 2001, Sustainable Shipping Access to the Great Barrier Reef.

2. SHIPPING IN THE GREAT BARRIER REEF

2.1 This chapter identifies some broad operational, technical, indigenous and legal considerations involved with shipping operations in the Great Barrier Reef and Torres Strait. It provides a background for consideration of proposals to better regulate shipping in the region. More detailed consideration is given to these aspects where relevant to specific measures in subsequent chapters.

Operational and Commercial Considerations

Shipping Routes

2.2 The main navigational shipping routes through the Torres Strait are the Prince of Wales Channel and the Great North East Channel (see Figure 2.1).

2.3 There are two major shipping routes in the GBR region:

The Inner Route extends north-south between the GBR and the Queensland coast from Torres Strait to Gladstone in the south. The northern section from Torres Strait to Cairns is most restricted and passage through these waters involves navigation within confined waters for a long period, normally 40 hours. The inner route is well charted and marked with navigational aids.

The Outer Route commences at the eastern limit of the Torres Strait (the Great North East Channel) continuing southwards through the Coral Sea and rejoining the Queensland coast near Sandy Cape south of Gladstone. The outer route was surveyed and charted to international standards in 1997 encouraging a greater number of vessels, particularly oil tankers, to use the outer route.

2.4 There are some operational advantages for ships to use the inner route in preference to the outer route. The distance from Booby Island (in the western approaches to Torres Strait) to Sandy Cape (north of Brisbane) via the outer route is 1,344 nautical miles compared to 1,220 nautical miles via the inner route. The different distance involves an additional transit time of about half a day for an average trading ship, but taking account of the likelihood of heavy seas and strong winds, ship operators may allow an extra day’s steaming time.

2.5 In addition, ships using the inner route are allowed to load to their Tropical Loadline between 1 April and 30 November each year in recognition of the inner route’s more protected waters. The Tropical Loadline indicates the maximum depth of loading during the fine weather season in certain zones in the tropics. Its extension beyond the fine weather season allows ships to carry greater loads than apply if they are required to load to their Winter or Summer Loadlines.2

2.6 Ships may traverse the GBR at three main transit passages: Grafton Passage near Cairns, Palm Passage near Townsville, and Hydrographers Passage near Mackay and in the south through the Capricorn Channel.

2.7 The navigational task along the Inner Route, in Torres Strait and its transit passages is demanding because of some 2,900 reefs, including 760 fringing reefs, 360 coral cays and 618 continental islands. The region also is subject to strong trade winds, occasional cyclones, and complex tidal streams within the GBR. Ships encounter limited water depths, reduced visibility in the wet season, and narrow restricted shipping lanes in certain parts of the GBR.

2.8 The Torres Strait also is an area of limited depth and complex tidal streams, and transit is subject to tidal constraints for large ships. Additional navigation demands arise from the operation of numerous fishing, tourism and recreational craft in the area.

Shipping Movements

2.9 There is a significant level of shipping traffic in the Great Barrier Reef and Torres Strait area, with a number of commercial ports located within the region. These include Cape Flattery, Cairns, Mourilyan, Lucinda, Townsville, Abbot Point, Mackay, Hay Point, Port Alma, Gladstone, and Bundaberg.

2.10 Approximately 6,000 ship movements of large vessels in excess of 50 metres in length occur within the GBR region every year. Most of these vessels use the inner route with the rest entering or departing through Hydrographers, Palm and Grafton Passages.

2.11 Most vessels using the GBR are bulk carriers (42%) carrying significant tonnages of export cargo, including coal, bauxite, nickel ores, raw sugar, alumina and silica sand. The major bulk ports are Hay Point, Abbot Point and Gladstone. Between 5% and 10% of ships are oil tankers, with most on northerly transits, either in ballast or carrying refined product to service Queensland ports north of Brisbane. Remaining trading vessel traffic consists of container vessels (24%), general cargo (22%) and other types.

2.12 Numerous types of recreational and commercial fishing vessels also ply the Queensland coast on a regular basis. It is estimated that there are some 1,500 tourism vessels and 25,000 commercial and recreational fishing vessels operating in the GBR.

Shipping Incidents

2.13 During the period 1985 to 2000, there were 11 collisions and 20 groundings within the inner route of the GBR, which represents over two incidents each year. This is a relatively small rate of incidents given that over 2,500 ship movements occur in the northern section of the inner route annually, but still considerably higher than anywhere else on the Australian coast.

2.14 The highest incident occurrence is a grounding, which comprised 47% of incidents in the GBR over the past 15 years. Most groundings are caused by human error, with machinery failure being a minor factor. In the five years from 1995 to 2000, there have been eight serious groundings in the inner route and Torres Strait. Seven of these groundings were caused by human error and one by machinery failure. Six of the grounded vessels had a coastal pilot on board. None of these incidents resulted in an oil spill.

2.15 The next highest is a collision, usually between a trading ship and a fishing vessel. Collision statistics show that the only incident between two large ships was between HMAS Fremantle and River Embley in 1997. All other collisions involved trading ships and fishing vessels, caused in most instances by failure to keep a proper lookout.

2.16 A list of incidents from 1985 to 2000 is at Attachment C.

2.17 The largest contributing cause of all incidents was human error at 57%, with other notable causes being a combination of at least two simultaneous factors, at 27%. This compare with international estimates, where human error accounted for approximately 48% of incidents.3

Risks of Shipping Incidents

2.18 The review commissioned a study by Det Norske Veritas (DNV) to ascertain the impacts of various ship safety control measures for the GBR and Torres Strait.4 DNV found that the incident rate can be reduced significantly by a combination of control measures, dropping from around 2.5 per year currently to 1.6 per annum if full vessel traffic control is introduced and there is 100% uptake of electronic chart display and information systems.

2.19 The study found that for the Torres Strait:

2.20 For the Inner Route north of Cairns, DNV found that:

2.21 South of Cairns on the Inner Route, DNV found that:

2.22 In assessing the Outer Route, DNV considered that:

2.23 Over the whole study area, DNV concluded that:

2.24 Incidents that have occurred in the study area are characterised by human error. Such behaviours are hard to predict and the variety of ways human errors can be manifested should be a caution to reacting to any single incident.

Indigenous Considerations

2.25 Indigenous communities raised a number of concerns about shipping in Torres Strait and the Great Barrier Reef.5 The fundamental message from consultations is that local communities understand that international shipping has to happen, but they want all possible measures to ensure safety and pollution prevention. However, some submissions called for a total ban on shipping through the GBR inner reef.

2.26 Specific areas of concern about shipping included:

2.27 In addition, Land Councils noted that indigenous communities are dedicated to the goal of gaining legal recognition of their traditional ownership of maritime estates, protection of cultural heritage sites and full participation in management of the GBR Marine Park.

2.28 During consultation sessions in Torres Strait, the island communities indicated they would like to receive information on ship traffic in the Great North East Channel, from both ownership and waterways management perspectives.

2.29 Island communities indicated that their main concerns about shipping through the Channel was the proximity to islands and the effects of ships’ wash and the deposition of garbage on beaches. Communities are also planning to engage in trawling operations and they see a hazard in interacting with shipping, especially at night.

2.30 Approximately two ships transit the Channel each day. Given that most ships utilising the Channel will only be known as they arrive at the SRS entry and departure points, the SRS cannot presently provide a forward schedule.

2.31 Queensland Transport has identified an opportunity to consult with pilot service providers to ascertain forward bookings to engage pilots for the transit through Torres Strait, as a means of gaining advance knowledge of ship movements.

Recommendation 5

The review recommends improved data sharing arrangements between relevant agencies and with island communities in Torres Strait on traffic monitoring and regular dissemination of information to local communities.

2.32 The review supports Queensland Transport’s efforts to explore compiling shipping data through contact with local pilotage service providers and notifying island communities of future shipping activities.

2.33 The review also supports initiatives by Queensland Transport and AMSA to raise awareness in island communities of the movement, risk and impact of shipping and response arrangements to marine incidents and marine pollution.

Technical considerations

2.34 Proposals for new regulations or technological approaches will involve a range of new infrastructure, equipment, legal and personnel requirements for both commercial and regulatory bodies.

2.35 Infrastructure requirements may encompass introduction of new or additional existing technologies such as Automatic Identification Systems, radar stations and electronic charts and display systems, as well as pilot launches or helicopter services and pilot accommodation.

2.36 In addition, the introduction of new measures will involve consideration of operational arrangements, staffing, qualification and training requirements, as well as other personnel considerations such as fatigue management.

2.37 Some proposals may require amendments to legislation and consideration of arrangements for consultation and participation in planning and management processes.

2.38 An important consideration in implementing any measures that require take-up of new technology and procedures by international shipping using the GBR is the extent to which such measures are endorsed by the IMO and the international timetable for adoption of such measures. As not all ships will universally be equipped with new technologies, according to internationally agreed requirements and timelines, any unilateral requirement by Australia for foreign ships to comply when sailing through the GBR would mean an effective ban on such ships from transiting the area.

2.39 Implementation of a number of the options considered in this report could involve considerable costs. Implementation of the full suite of proposals may not be cost effective for the whole GBR region or for specific sectors of the route.

Legal Considerations

2.40 Australia’s powers to regulate foreign ships in Australian waters are subject to the provisions of the United Nations’ Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS). UNCLOS builds upon earlier conventions on the Law of the Sea and customary international law. The convention was carefully negotiated at the UN over a period of some nine years and represents a delicate balance between the increasing and often competing demands of coastal States and those of traditional freedoms of navigation, as advocated by maritime nations.

2.41 This convention defines the internationally agreed responsibilities and jurisdictions of flag States (the country that has granted a ship the right to sail under its flag), coastal States (the country in whose maritime zones the ship is sailing) and port States (the country in whose port the ship has entered).

2.42 UNCLOS recognises the right of a Coastal State to regulate foreign flag ships in the territorial sea in respect of the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic, but such laws shall not hamper the right of innocent passage. States bordering a strait may designate sea lanes and prescribe traffic separation schemes for safe passage of ships, subject to presentation to a "competent international authority" like the IMO. They also may adopt laws for pollution prevention, control of fishing and loading and unloading of commodities.

2.43 The effect of UNCLOS is that Australia cannot hamper or impair the right of passage of foreign vessels through its waters, including the Torres Strait, and the territorial waters of the area covered by the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park.

2.44 The Commonwealth shares jurisdictional responsibility for regulating shipping with the States and Northern Territory under the Australian Constitution and the Offshore Constitutional Settlement in 1979 between the Commonwealth and States. This included provisions for sharing of powers based on the nature of the voyage being undertaken.

2.45 The Offshore Constitutional Settlement also defined the constitutional boundaries of States and Territories in relation to coastal waters. The rights and title vested in the States are subject to the operation of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975. Where a provision of that Act is in conflict with a State law, the State law will be invalid to the extent of the inconsistency.

2.46 Jurisdiction to regulate activities within internal waters and coastal waters in the GBR lies with the State of Queensland. The majority of the GBR waters are within the territorial sea and come under Commonwealth legislation. A smaller proportion of the waters in the GBR, but significantly the waters most used by shipping, are Queensland coastal waters that come within State jurisdiction, subject to the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975.

2.47 The mixture of international, Commonwealth and State law, with often overlapping requirements, presents a complex process for administration and enforcement of shipping regulations in the Great Barrier Reef. The applicability of legal measures to a ship travelling through the GBR will vary depending on the nature of the ship and its voyage pattern and its precise location at a given time in the course of its voyage. Further details of these legal considerations are provided in Chapter 7.

2 An international convention requires ships to be surveyed and marked with a loadline confirming the limitations on the draught to which a ship may be loaded for maintaining its external weathertight and watertight integrity.  The overloading of a ship and submersion of the loadline relevant to the season and global zone of it's voyage is prohibited under the Commonwealth Navigation Act 1912.

3Capt J Watkinson, 2001, Sustainable Shipping Access to the Great Barrier Reef

4 Det Norske Veritas, 2001, Assessment of Ship Safety Controls in the Torres Strait and Great Barrier Reef

5 Submission No 2 ATSIC Cairns Regional Council and North Queensland Land Council, No 3 ATSIC Queensland Land and Sea Policy Group, No 4 ATSIC Townsville Regional Council, No 17 Central Queensland Land Council Aboriginal Corporation, No 60 Torres Shire Council and meetings with Torres Strait communities, March 2001, Townsville communities March 2001

3. EXTENSION OF THE COMPULSORY PILOTAGE AREA

3.1 The presence of a pilot on board can enhance the safety of the vessel when it is in confined waters. Pilots provide expert guidance for a vessel through navigationally hazardous parts of the coast or into and within ports.6 A pilot is expected to have highly developed navigation and ship handling skills, as well as intimate knowledge of the local area and its environment. Carriage of a pilot, however, does not relieve the ship’s Master from his overall responsibility for the safe operation of the vessel.

3.2 The pilotage area along the Queensland coast falls into three distinct parts (see Figure 3.1):

3.3 There is no pilotage requirement on the Outer Route, and no licensed commercial services are provided, as it is not navigationally challenging and lies within international waters.

3.4 In 1990 the IMO determined that the GBR met its stringent ecological criteria for declaration as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area and endorsed associated special protective measures. One of these measures was the introduction in October 1991 of the compulsory pilotage regime on the northern part of the Inner Route. At the same time, IMO endorsed the recommended pilotage regime for the Torres Strait and Great North Eastern Channel. This ensured that Australia had effective jurisdiction to implement pilotage requirements on foreign flag ships in our territorial waters without imposing on their right to innocent passage under international law.

3.5 The current compulsory pilotage requirement is given effect under the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975. This requires specified vessels to carry a licensed pilot when taking passage through the inner route, specifically between Cape York (latitude 10 degrees 41’ south) and the vicinity of Cairns Roads, north of Cairns (latitude 16 degrees 40’ South) or when passing through Hydrographers Passage or within the Whitsunday Islands. The requirement applies to all vessels of 70 metres or more in length and all loaded oil and chemical tankers or liquefied gas carriers of any length. Cruise vessels in the Whitsunday Islands also must carry a licensed pilot.

3.6 In the Torres Strait and Great North East Channel, ships of the same length and types as covered by the GBR compulsory pilotage regime are recommended to carry a licensed pilot. It is currently estimated that around 45% of ships to which the IMO recommendation applies proceed unpiloted in this part of the GBR region.8

Where can pilotage reduce risk?

3.7 Over the past 16 years, there were averages of 1 shipping incident per year on the Inner Route North, and slightly less than 0.6 per year on both the Inner Route South and Torres Strait. The DNV risk assessment indicates that the greatest risks of incidents, on a per nautical mile basis, arise in the Torres Strait and the Inner Route North. Incident risks decrease significantly as vessels travel southwards on the Inner Route, proportional to the lessening difficulty of navigation.9

3.8 Powered groundings, and to a lesser extent collisions, are the types of incidents where the influence of a pilot could be expected to improve safety. The DNV analysis indicates that the occurrences of these types of incidents are highest in Torres Strait and the Inner Route North, with Torres Strait being the dominant contributor of powered groundings. All but one of the collision incidents involved a trading ship-fishing boat collision, due to the prevalence of fishing vessels in the area, notably on the Inner Route North.

3.9 DNV estimates decreases in risk can be achieved by 100% compulsory pilotage cover in Torres Strait and the Inner Route South, but that the benefits are more clearly evident in Torres Strait, where risks can be reduced by 35%. DNV concludes that pilotage may not be needed on the Inner Route South as it is not navigationally challenging. DNV also cautions that the estimates of risk assume a constant effectiveness of a pilot on board and that extension of a pilot’s duties to the continuous passage of the Inner Route would no doubt compromise his effectiveness through fatigue.

3.10 Conversely, the assumption that the mandatory use of pilots will help to avoid marine incidents has been questioned.10 Pilots have been present during 16 of the 43 (37%) incidents that occurred in the GBR during 1995-2000. Six of the seven serious groundings in the inner route over the past five years were caused by human error, and the remaining one by mechanical failure. Six of those grounded had a coastal pilot on board at the time.

3.11 However, more detailed analysis of grounding incidents indicate that while vessels that have grounded were under pilotage, crew errors were the greatest factor in the incidents by a large degree.11 On balance, a coastal pilot on board is seen as a positive risk mitigation measure against collision or grounding, however a pilot will not eliminate the potential for such incidents to occur.12

Proposals to Extend Compulsory Pilotage

3.12 Following the grounding of the container ship Bunga Teratai Satu south of Cairns in November 2000, outside of the compulsory pilotage area, there were calls for compulsory pilotage to be extended for the entire length of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park. It has been suggested that a blanket approach of this nature, with appropriate safeguards written in for effective pilotage, would instil recognition of the importance of the GBR and Torres Strait to the maritime industry worldwide.13

3.13 Specific proposals have been considered for:

Torres Strait

3.14 There has been strong support for the introduction of compulsory pilotage in the Torres Strait, where many shipping incidents have occurred and where the demand for accurate navigation is more exacting.14 Channel depths and widths are limited and there are some awkward "dog legs" to negotiate. The area is subject to strong tidal currents, and complex tidal patterns due to the confluence of two oceans systems. Careful calculation of tidal windows is required for passage by deep draft vessels.

3.15 The review notes the DNV risk assessment study concludes that compulsory pilotage would significantly reduce the risk of a shipping incident in the Torres Strait.

3.16 Due to concerns about rights of transit passage through international straits, however, implementing compulsory pilotage for the Torres Strait poses complex questions of international law and foreign relations.

3.17 Under Articles 38-44 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), ships of all nations enjoy the right of transit passage through international straits, which shall not be impeded. A coastal State has a right to designate sea lanes and traffic separation schemes through an international strait, and to adopt laws relating to the safety of navigation. However, such laws shall not have the practical effect of denying, hampering or impeding the right of transit passage.

3.18 Many IMO member States are adamantly opposed to the concept of compulsory pilotage regimes within international straits, as they regard it as a clear contravention of UNCLOS provisions. Accordingly, action to extend compulsory pilotage in an international strait, which requires the approval of the IMO, is likely to be a difficult and time consuming process.

3.19 Nevertheless, the review supports sustained efforts through the relevant channels to elevate the status of Torres Strait, including the Prince of Wales Channel and Great North East Channel, from recommended to compulsory pilotage. It is considered that the prospects for persuading the IMO to adopt compulsory pilotage would be enhanced if Torres Strait is included in the IMO designated Particularly Sensitive Sea Area for the Great Barrier Reef. Torres Strait shares many of the same environmentally important features and has similar importance to indigenous populations as the GBR.

Recommendation 6

The review recommends that Australia should immediately initiate the process for seeking endorsement by the IMO for upgrading the current recommended pilotage area in the Torres Strait to compulsory pilotage and an extension of the Great Barrier Reef Particularly Sensitive Sea Area to encompass the Torres Strait to support introduction of compulsory pilotage.

Recommendation 7

In the interim, the review recommends a concerted campaign be conducted by AMSA and Queensland Transport to reinforce the existing recommended pilotage regime for all applicable ships transiting the Torres Strait. This could include notes on charts, reinforcement in Reef Guide, an international education campaign and advice by the Ship Reporting System to all ships operating in the region.

3.20 Intermediate measures to encourage the greater usage of pilots in Torres Strait could also include exploration of economic options and incentives.

3.21 The review notes that this would necessitate a complete restructure of AMSA levies to ensure that, while providing an encouragement to use pilots, the overall and distributional impact on the shipping industry is fully justified.

3.22 As well, consideration could be given to banning ships from Australian ports if they do not comply with the IMO recommended pilotage regime for Torres Strait. It could reasonably be expected that ships that do not comply with the IMO recommendation are those at the lower end of the market and represent a greater risk of an incident. While any such ban would only be enforceable on ships that intend using an Australian port, it would nevertheless help to reduce the numbers of vessels transiting Torres Strait without a pilot, pending development of an IMO agreed compulsory pilotage regime for all ships in the region.

3.23 To ensure the broadest possible coverage of ships transiting Torres Strait and proceeding to ports other than those in the Great Barrier Reef region, agreement from all State and Northern Territory Governments should be sought through the Australian Transport Council

Recommendation 8

The review recommends that consideration be given to raising at the Australian Transport Council the proposal that any vessel transiting the Torres Strait and arriving at an Australian port will not be given access at that port unless a pilot was used throughout the passage through the Torres Strait.

South of Cairns

3.24 Extension of compulsory pilotage south of Cairns to the southern limit of the Great Barrier Reef will approximately double the length of pilotage for vessels proceeding to or from southern ports. Navigation in this part of the GBR is relatively straightforward, with wider channels and relatively sheltered waters (see Figure 3.2). There is more sea room for corrective actions against unexpected developments, and competent watch-keeping officers would have little difficulty in navigating this area.15

3.25 Accordingly, it has not previously been considered necessary to mandate pilotage in this region. However, as there are a number of significant course changes required for safe passage, the Reef Guide recommends pilotage for masters who are unfamiliar with the region, for added safety.

3.26 Palm and Grafton Passages have a similar profile to the area south of Cairns with plenty of sea room and assistance from navigation aids. The risk of incidents and the estimated benefits of risk reduction through pilotage are relatively low in the Passages. However, these areas could be serviced by pilotage providers, given their proximity to the existing pilotage service area and support base in Cairns, although some additions to infrastructure and equipment would be required.16

3.27 The review notes the DNV risk assessment study concludes that compulsory pilotage would only marginally reduce the already small risk of an incident in the Cairns to Townsville sector of the Inner Route South, given the low degree of navigational difficulty in this region. Conversely, DNV warn that extension of compulsory pilotage in this area has the potential to exacerbate pilot fatigue and raise pilotage costs with little commensurate benefits in reduced incidents.

3.28 The main danger area in this stretch is Sudbury Reef. AMSA has received 5 incident reports over the past twelve months of vessels that failed to make the 26 degree course change to the south after dropping the pilot at Cairns and were in danger of running on to Stagg Patches, Sudbury Reef or Scott Reef.17 Once clear of Sudbury Reef, the remainder of the route Cairns-Townsville is almost entirely straight with one course alteration of 32 degrees. Ships have plenty of sea room and few navigational hazards.

3.29 The shipping industry and practising mariners do not support an extension of compulsory pilotage in this region. Practising pilots also do not support an extension of compulsory pilotage from a navigational perspective. Several submissions raised concerns about exacerbating pilot fatigue, which has been a contributing factor to a number of incidents in the existing compulsory pilotage area.18

Recommendation 9

The review recommends the promulgation of a recommended pilotage regime through IMO for the inner route and the entrances to Palm and Grafton Passages.

3.30 Implementation of a pilotage regime for Palm and Grafton passages will require the development of proposals for provision of such services by pilotage providers. AMSA and Queensland Transport will need to consider the requirements for practical application of a pilotage regime for the passages, in consultation with pilot providers.

3.31 The review also supports immediate action by AMSA, GBRMPA and Queensland Transport to implement a package of other safety measures covering the southern part of the Inner Route, as outlined elsewhere in this report.

3.32 The Review noted with concern that there have been five cases in the past 12 months similar to the Bunga Teratai Satu, involving other vessels which have failed to make the course alteration at Fitzroy Island. In these cases a grounding has been averted as a direct result of advice provided by REEFCENTRE or by the crew.

3.33 The review notes the high number of track violations in the area of Fitzroy Island, and the sensitivity associated with Stagg Patches and Frankland Islands. The Frankland Islands area is a highly protected zone within the Marine Park. There are reduced navigation difficulties and associated hazards south of the Frankland Islands, and navigation is further simplified by ensuring that vessels transit outside (to the east) of the Whitsunday Islands group.

3.34 The review considers that an appropriate option is to extend pilotage to or from the Inner Route north of Cairns past the Frankland Islands, to a point off Mourilyan (see Figure 3.3). This is a relatively short additional steaming time from the present pilot boarding ground off Cairns and would not add to fatigue. It also has the advantage of having a port with berths for pilot boats and an airport at Innisfail for helicopter and pilot access. The launch trip from Mourilyan to board a ship would take about 20-30 minutes.

Recommendation 10

The Review recommends that ships transiting the inner route of the GBR north of Cairns should be required to embark or disembark pilots at a new pilot boarding ground off Mourilyan.

3.35 Any more substantial extension of compulsory pilotage on the Inner Route South should not be mandated without a clear and enforceable fatigue management system in place.

Whitsunday Islands

3.36 The Queensland Government submitted its strong support for compulsory pilotage for the Whitsunday Islands area, given its navigational difficulties, density of traffic and environmental sensitivity. The shipping route through Whitsunday Passage is used by a large number of local charter and recreational vessels, creating higher risks of collisions due to the high levels of cross-traffic.19

3.37 Recent studies20 also recommended the introduction of compulsory pilotage arrangements for the Whitsunday Islands for cruise shipping. Under the GBRMPA Whitsundays Management Plan, which has been in place since October 1999, cruise ships already are required to carry pilots to comply with their GBRMPA permit to operate in the area. On 19 July 2001, the GBRMPA declared it illegal for ships carrying oil, chemical or liquefied gas cargoes or for vessels over 70 metres in length to traverse Whitsunday waters without an Australian accredited pilot (Figure 3.4).21

3.38 As this area comprises internal waters within the GBR over which the Queensland Government has jurisdiction, subject to the operation of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975, compulsory pilotage could be further extended under Queensland legislation by declaration of a Pilotage Area under the Queensland Transport Operations (Marine Safety) Act 1994. This will have a wider effect than is achieved under the GBRMPA legislation for compulsory pilotage, as it will also apply to vessels smaller than the 70 metre size covered by the GBRMPA legislation.

3.39 Queensland is proceeding with the declaration of a Pilotage Area and is attempting to make the boundary similar to the GBRMPA compulsory pilotage area in order to minimise confusion among industry.

3.40 The review supports the establishment of an integrated traffic management regime for vessels in the Whitsunday Islands region through the declaration of a Pilotage Area under the Queensland Transport Operations (Marine Safety) Act 1994.

3.41 This option could be implemented unilaterally and quickly without the need for international sanction to be effective over foreign flag ships. The extension of compulsory pilotage for all commercial trading vessels using waters around the Whitsunday Islands will substantially extend use of pilots into the southern part of the GBR beyond the existing compulsory pilotage area. Ships not wanting to engage a pilot would have to take less hazardous but marginally longer routes outside the Whitsunday Islands.

3.42 The review strongly endorses the extension of compulsory pilotage to the Whitsunday Islands region, which was implemented under the GBRMPA on 19 July 2001.

Recommendation 11

The review recommends that shipping be further discouraged from transiting the Whitsunday Islands region by removing "preferred" routes for shipping through the area from charts.

Implications of Extending Compulsory Pilotage

Increased transport costs

3.43 Transport costs can be expected to increase because of additional pilotage fees associated with extending the compulsory pilotage areas. Similar cost considerations also will apply if more shipping is strongly encouraged to voluntarily adopt pilotage that is recommended, rather than mandatory.

3.44 The extent of costs will depend on the operational approach taken by pilotage service providers for making services available, any additional infrastructure and equipment needs, training and commercial decisions on rates of fees and charges. Estimates of pilotage fees range from $8,000-$10,000 for Inner Route pilotage from Torres Strait to Brisbane. The current cost of pilotage from Torres Strait to Cairns is $3,850.22

3.45 Additional costs may be incurred in making up time lost from picking up and discharging additional pilots. These costs will depend on type of ship and cargo and cannot be easily quantified.23

3.46 Alternatively, higher costs also will be involved if ship operators decide to use the Outer Route, where no pilotage considerations apply. These costs relate to the longer steaming times on the Outer Route and safety consequences of adverse weather and sea conditions. It is estimated that transit via the Outer Route can add as much as an extra day to transit time, depending on weather conditions and vessel characteristics. The estimated average additional cost of an extra day’s vessel charter time is around US$20,000.24

3.47 These costs are likely to be passed on to consumers, unless Governments provide incentives to industry to adopt recommended pilotage or to offset increased compulsory pilotage costs. Acceptance of compulsory pilotage by the international shipping industry could be enhanced if costs were ameliorated. The ability to remove commercial considerations in using a pilot would be a quick and effective tool in reducing risk ahead of any IMO sanctioned agreement to extend compulsory pilotage.

3.48 Direct subsidy of coastal pilotage services, however, is not consistent with Government policies, which have promoted the commercially competitive provision of services in the Great Barrier Reef region since the early 1990s.

3.49 Another option is to implement a differential charging scheme for maritime levies based on trading patterns and ports visited. If such a differential scheme were established, it may be possible to provide rebates on payment of the levy to offset any reasonable additional costs of pilotage, within the constraint of revenue neutrality, so that the use of a pilot is not affected by commercial considerations. There would, however, be a potential issue of cross-subsidy from shipping that does not need or use pilots, and whether such a cross-subsidy is legally defensible.

3.50 There also would be an issue with the use (and cross subsidy) of pilots by ships transiting the Torres Strait and/or GBR and not calling into an Australian port. Transiting ships already use Australian provided navigation services, but make no contribution to levies if they do not call at an Australian port during the relevant charging period. Similarly transiting ships not trading with Queensland ports make no contribution to the State’s ship safety regimes. If there is potential to impose levies on transiting ships it would enhance equity and also expand gross revenues to offset any rebates.

3.51 AMSA levies presently are collected on the basis of a sliding scale of rates for different vessel tonnages, irrespective of the number and location of ports visited. It is not within the scope of this review to make specific suggestions about the structure and level of future levies.

3.52 The review notes that the AMSA has commissioned a review of the existing levies. The last comprehensive review of AMSA levies was conducted in 1997. The application of AMSA efforts and resources is increasingly focussed towards risk such as poorer quality shipping and environmentally sensitive areas and the current review is examining pricing policy from a strategic viewpoint taking into account this change in focus.

3.53 The terms of reference of the levy review include consideration of the need to establish a pricing regime that more closely reflects risk and the absorption of revenues by users of or those most closely regulated by AMSA levy funded activities. The levy review provides scope for examining a differential charging regime that encourages the use of pilots or other risk reduction measures in high risk areas such as the Torres Strait and GBR.

Recommendation 12

This review recommends, as an intermediate step, the review of levies should also explore economic options to encourage greater usage of pilots.

Availability of skilled pilots

3.54 If pilotage is made compulsory throughout the Inner Route and the Great North East Channel, one estimate places the requirement for additional licensed pilots at around 30.25

3.55 The increased demand for pilotage services will have an impact on the availability of suitably trained and qualified pilots. Coastal pilots have substantial training and experience in the maritime industry before entering the pilotage profession. The pool from which they are drawn is relatively small, comprising senior navigational officers who have had or aspire to ship command positions.

3.56 The average age of existing pilots is 54 years, with 55% over age 55 and 20% over age 60 years.26 With a similar aging profile in the maritime industry from which pilots are drawn, indications are that there may be a lack of suitably trained and qualified pilots to meet any increased demand caused by extending the compulsory pilotage area.

3.57 The current licensing standards, including Master Class 1 requirement for pilots, may need review for certain classes of vessel transiting the GBR. Pilotage through the GBR requires high-level navigation skills combined with familiarity with local conditions. There are many competent seafarers currently transiting the GBR who do not possess Master Class 1. Internationally similar jurisdictions to Australia, such as the British Columbia coastal pilotage region, deliver a high standard of pilotage without Master Class 1 qualifications.

3.58 In order to redress the possible lack of pilots, it may be necessary to recruit pilots from a different base and adopt a new framework for the qualification and experience levels of pilots. Issuing of a pilot’s licence should still be subject to qualifications, experience, training, medical and testing.

3.59 There is merit in considering a range of different recruitment/training/career structures. A tiered level of pilotage licensing whereby pilots have endorsements for certain classes of ship and area endorsements would assist in reducing the gap of available pilots. For example, a pilot may be licensed for vessels to a certain LOA or draft.

3.60 However, MIIU investigations indicate that less experienced pilots are more likely to be involved in incidents. In recent years the MIIU reports indicate a greater number of incidents have occurred on ships where the pilots has had less than four years’ experience piloting on the GBR. Pilots from the two main service providers consider there has been a fall in the standards of experience and knowledge of new pilots.27

Recommendation 13

The review recommends that an expert task force comprising AMSA, Queensland Transport, GBRMPA, training providers and pilot representatives undertake a reassessment of recruitment and licensing practices for coastal pilots. The task force should examine the training and qualification system for coastal pilots, including on the job specialised training and the potential for tiered levels of pilot licensing.

Exemptions from Pilotage

3.61 Another means of offsetting the costs of compulsory pilotage, without affecting risks of an incident, is to grant exemptions from the pilotage requirements for ships that can demonstrate clearly superior levels of performance and consistent compliance with regulations. These may include regular coastal traders, and well-found ships with highly trained crews and fitted with state of the art navigation technology.

3.62 Provision is made in the GBRMP Act for exemptions from compulsory pilotage requirements to be granted. AMSA provides the technical assessment of temporary applications for exemptions under the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975. The Chair of the GBRMPA is currently the designated authority for approving compulsory pilotage exemptions.

3.63 Dispensations for vessels that trade frequently in the region are supported by the shipping industry and reef pilots.28 GBRMPA supports extending the list of exemptions in new compulsory pilotage areas and reviewing exemption criteria in existing areas.29

3.64 Any exemptions should be subject to examination of the ship’s Master’s knowledge of the region and medical fitness. Consideration may also need to be given to assessing the competency and knowledge of watch-keeping officers other than the Master. Exemptions could also take into consideration any port State control reports of the vessel.

Recommendation 14

The review recommends that the proposed reassessment of recruitment and licensing of pilots should encompass the criteria for issuing pilot exemptions.

Dual Watch Systems

3.65 Another proposal for enhancing safety of navigation, which could potentially be considered either in conjunction with compulsory pilotage or as a grounds for an exemption for compulsory pilotage, is for mandatory requirements for ships to have two qualified officers on watch on the bridge at all times on a voyage through the GBR.

3.66 There are some concerns that such a proposal would raise crew fatigue during the remainder of the voyage, including the critical time of entering a port. Nevertheless, good passage planning and Bridge Resource Management should support consideration of dual watch officers at strategic navigational points during a voyage.

3.67 The review notes that the DNV risk analysis concludes that it was difficult to assess the impact of a dual watch system on reduction of risk for a shipping incident in the GBR.

3.68 The review supports adoption of a dual watch system to ensure that two qualified navigating officers are on the bridge during all strategic course change points in the course of the ship’s transit of the GBR, and that such measures should be incorporated as part of a ship’s passage planning.

Fatigue management

3.69 Pilot and or crew fatigue has been identified as an issue of concern in many submissions.30 On a number of occasions, crew have been offline while they should have been at key operational stations and alert.31 Aspects of current GBR pilot work practices and scheduling, as well as conditions on board individual ships, also contribute to fatigue, are described by the 1999 DNV report on GBR Pilot Fatigue Risk Assessment.32

3.70 It is very difficult to quantify the risk attributable to fatigue. DNV indicated that it is impossible to make a reliable judgement on the contribution of pilot fatigue to the various incidents in the GBR, as incident investigations have not specifically addressed fatigue as an issue. Nevertheless its study indicated that the percentage of accidents attributable to fatigue lies in the range 10-25%.

3.71 DNV concluded that improved pilot fatigue management should reduce the risk of an incident, but there is greater potential for risk reduction in addressing other causes of incidents. A proactive approach by all parties towards risk reduction was recommended.

3.72 There are existing measures in place to manage fatigue, including a need for each pilotage company to have a safety management system that addresses matters such as fitness and availability for duty and rest periods. Pilots have a responsibility to ensure they are sufficiently rested and medically fit before commencement of pilotage duties.33

3.73 On 1 July 2001 AMSA implemented a Great Barrier Reef Pilotage Safety Management Code, which is mandatory under Marine Orders Part 54 (Coastal Pilotage) and subject to audit, verification and certification by AMSA. The Code is designed to facilitate effective and safe management of pilotage services on the Queensland coast. It sets objectives for Safety Management Systems that ensure observance of safe working practices, identification of risks and provision for continuous improvements. It defines the responsibilities of each party involved in the provision of pilotage services.

3.74 The Code applies to all operations involved with the provision of pilotage services to shipping off the Queensland coast covered by Part IIIA of the Navigation Act 1912. It requires every pilot service provider to develop, implement and maintain a Safety Management System (SMS) which must include:

3.75 AMSA reports that the Code has provided a timely reminder to pilot service providers on their obligations to address fatigue and other safety issues.

Recommendation 15

The review recommends that pilotage service providers continue to be expressly included in the regulatory framework covering coastal pilotage services. The review endorses the safety systems approach promulgated in the Great Barrier Reef Safety Management Code, which encompasses both pilots and pilotage service providers.

Infrastructure

3.76 Additional infrastructure may need to be provided if compulsory pilotage is extended throughout the GBR. This may include embarkation management of pilots joining and leaving vessels requiring pilotage services, including the availability of ancillary services such as pilot launch and helicopter services, and the need for pilot houses to provide for adequate rest for pilots.

3.77 Provision of this infrastructure would be the responsibility of the relevant service providers, and it would be reasonable for such additional costs to be recovered in charges for the services on a commercial basis.

Impact of Competition

3.78 Pilot representatives submitted that the deregulation of the coastal pilot market in 1993 has increased operational pressures on pilots, contributing to fatigue, declining competency, reduced capital investment and making the industry less attractive to new entrants. Similar claims previously have been made to the DNV Risk Assessment Study, the Neville Inquiry on Fatigue in Transport, and the Navigation Act Review among others.34

3.79 The Commonwealth Government made it clear at the time of agreeing to regulate coastal pilotage that it considered it was not appropriate for governments to directly control the supply or pricing of pilot services, and that appropriate review mechanisms are available through the Trade Practices Commission and the Price Surveillance Authority (now the ACCC).

3.80 Provided appropriate safety audit and control mechanisms are in place and functioning, the absence of direct commercial regulation should not pose a threat to the safety of the GBR and Torres Strait. The Holden Review noted that shipowners are in favour of the benefits that competition has delivered and that pilots indicated that service providers were the primary source of competitive pressures on pilots.35

3.81 The review supports the adoption of the Safety Management Systems approach under Marine Order 54 (Coastal Pilotage) as an effective way to address safety outcomes in the competitive environment for pilotage services.

Education and Awareness

3.82 There is currently uncertainty among many ship operators about the current compulsory and recommended pilotage requirements within the GBR. Given this uncertainty, pilotage requirements should be more widely promulgated with the objective of encouraging the uptake of pilots in recommended areas.

3.83 Pilotage requirements are detailed in the Reef Guide, with the fourth edition published in December 2000. This publication now needs updating to reflect recent changes, particularly around the Whitsunday Islands.

3.84 There is scope for recommended and compulsory pilotage areas to be shown on charts, particularly on layered arrays in electronic charts, although there are some concerns that paper charts may become too cluttered.

3.85 Other mechanisms for promulgating information include the REEFREP and AUSREP ship reporting systems, Notices to Mariners, international maritime publications and direct notification of ships’ agents and shipping companies operating in and around the Reef.

Recommendation 16

The review recommends that AMSA, GBRMPA and Queensland Transport undertake extensive promulgation of pilotage requirements to promote awareness of both compulsory and recommended pilotage zones.

6 This chapter addresses the provision of pilotage services along the coast of Queensland through the GBR region.  It does not address pilotage requirements within and into ports in the region, which are regulated by the Queensland Government.

7 Queensland Government and AMSA, 2000, Reef Guide - A Shipmaster's Handbook to Torres Strait and the Great Barrier Reef, 4th edition.

8 This represents a significant increase on the 30% of ships transiting Torres Strait without a pilot noted in the Department of Transport, 1995, Great Barrier Reef and Torres Strait Shipping Study, Vol III.

9 Det Norske Veritas, 2001, Risk Assessment of Ship Safety Controls in the Torres and Great Barrier Reef Inner and Outer Routes

10 Submission No 24 Environment Australia and Submission No 6 Australian Chamber of Shipping

11 Marine Incident Investigation Unit reports, various years.

12 Submission No 49 Queensland Government

13 Submission No. 24, Environment Australia.

14 Submission No 59 Torres Pilots,

15 Submission 49 Queensland Government

16 Submission No 13 Australian Reef Pilots and No 33 Hydro Pilots

17 Including the Bunga Teratai Satu which did run aground.

18 Submission No 6 Australian Chamber of Shipping, No 49 Queensland Government

19 Submission No 49, Queensland Government

20 Oil Spill Risk Assessment for Coastal Waters of Queensland and the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, 2000, prepared for Queensland Transport and GBRMPA

Great Barrier Reef Review of Safety Initiatives Study, (the Holden Report), 2000

21 Courier Mail, 20 July 2001, Pilots for Whitsundays

22 Lloyds List DCN, 8 December 2000, Compulsory Reef pilotage would hit shipper costs.

23 Submission No 6 Australian Chamber of Shipping

24 Typical daily charter rates for bulk carriers are in the range 180,000 DWT US$15,000-19,000; 70,000 DWT US$10,500-13,500 and 50,000 DWT US$9,000-10,500.  For Tankers daily charter rates are in the range: VLCCs (100,000 DWT US$20,000-25,000; 40,000 DWT US$15,000-16,000

25 Submission No 13, Australian Reef Pilots

26 Great Barrier Reef Review of safety Initiatives Study, (the Holden Report), 2000, p19

27 Ibid, p19

28 Submission No 6 Australian Chamber of Shipping, No 13 Australian Reef Pilots

29 Communications from GBRMPS, 26 July 2001

30 Submission No 6 Australian Chamber of Shipping, No 12 Australian Marine Pilots Association, No 13 Australian Reef Pilots, No 19 Coral Sea Shipping Lines, No 20 Mr Corrie, No 22 Capt Duelberg, No 24 Environment Australia, No 25 Capt Every, No 30 GBRMPA, No 36 Low Isles Preservation Society, No 52 Capt Richardson

31 Submission No 24, Environment Australia

32 DNV, 1999, GBR Pilot Fatigue Risk Assessment, p13-14

33 Holden Report, 2000, p24.

34 DNV, 1999, GBR Pilot Fatigue Risk Assessment p27; House of Representatives Standing Committee on Communications, Transport and the Arts, 2000, Beyond the Midnight Oil - Managing Fatigue in Transport (the Neville Report); and Department of Transport and Regional Services and AMSA, 2000, Review of the Navigation Act 1912 - Final Report

35 Holden Report, 2000, p22

4. ADVANCING TECHNOLOGY

4.1 As the primary cause of marine incidents is human error, emerging technology that can minimise human error has the potential to improve the provision of safety and navigation services in the GBR.

4.2 Technological improvements such as the Automatic Identification System (AIS), electronic charting, real-time displays, datalinks and improved communications will allow watchkeeping officers and shore based Vessel Traffic Service Officers to make better assessments of developing hazards and allow warnings and corrective actions to be taken earlier.

4.3 Recent amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS) require international shipping to carry additional navigational equipment commencing on 1 July 2002 through to 2008. IMO agreed to a phase-in implementation schedule for different types/sizes of ships for shipborne navigational systems and equipment in general and for AIS in particular. New ships built after 1 July 2002 will be required to be fitted with AIS. For ships built before that date, the requirement will initially apply to passenger ships and tankers one year after 1 July 2002, with the implementation for other types of ships phased in over a seven-year period.

Risk Assessment

4.4 The DNV risk assessment36 found that there would be demonstrable improvements in safety with the adoption of a suite of technological aids. The effect of these technological improvements would dominate in reducing risk in the Torres Strait, but significant safety gains also can be made on both the Inner Route and the various passages.

4.5 Reductions of risk were lower for each of the individual safety measures than for a fully integrated package of 100% adoption of AIS, electronic chart display and information systems (ECDIS), radar, Differential Global Positioning Systems, ship and shore based alarms and a pro-active vessel traffic management system.

4.6 DNV noted that the shipping industry is benefiting from rapid technological innovation which helps to reduce risks of incidents. However, it notes that technology will improve the performance of the quality operators in the first instance. These are the ship operators most likely to adopt new technologies. Shore based monitoring is therefore important to identify, track and advise the lower quality vessels. The potential for risk reduction as a result of shore based monitoring, vigilance and guidance was found to be significant.

Early introduction of Automatic Identification Systems

4.7 The AIS is a shipboard broadcast transponder system that is capable of automatically sending ship information (such as identity, position, course, speed, ship length, draught, ship type and cargo details) to shore and to other ships or suitably fitted aircraft. It is also capable of receiving such information from similarly fitted ships and to monitor and track ships, including the exchange of data with shore-based facilities. A diagrammatic representation of AIS is at Figure 4.1.

4.8 AIS originally was conceived as a shipboard collision avoidance tool. It has since been extended to incorporate shore based functionality and information exchange. There is now greater interest in extending its uses to include traffic monitoring and management.

4.9 AIS operates in the VHF maritime band and therefore has propagational advantages over radar. This provides an ability to detect other AIS fitted vessels behind obstacles such as islands, rainstorms, etc and to detect AIS tracks through sea clutter. It offers highly accurate near real-time positional information and near instantaneous indications of ship course alterations.

4.10 While IMO has adopted a schedule for installation of AIS on ships, equipment standards are still being developed. These are expected to be finalised by the end of 2001. The IMO mandate does not apply to the implementation of coastal AIS equipment.

4.11 AMSA is conducting a series of trials to gain experience of the technology and to evaluate the effectiveness of AIS when integrated with the existing mandatory Ship Reporting System (SRS), known as REEFREP, that covers the Torres Strait and the Inner Route of the GBR. Preliminary reports of the trials show encouraging results for the ability to track and monitor shipping in the GBR. As not all ships will have AIS in the short term, a second series of sea trials is being conducted to provide data on the capability of portable AIS transponder units for carriage by pilots aboard ships.

4.12 GBRMPA and the Queensland Government supported moves to advance the mandatory introduction of AIS in the GBR region ahead of the IMO schedule.37 Such proposals have to be considered in the context of the need for IMO approvals for special measures, the availability of type approved equipment and the take up rate of the equipment by the international shipping industry.

4.13 The shipping industry supports phased introduction of AIS, but argues that Australia should not advance the introduction ahead of the international program. It also suggested that AIS should be fitted to all fishing and small craft to assist navigators and enhance safety.38

4.14 GBRMPA also noted that large numbers of fishing craft operate in restricted passages through the northern area of the Reef and present a collision risk with trading ships. Many fishing vessels carry Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS), which use an INMARSAT C transponder which, when interrogated, transmits its identity, position, course and speed. GBRMPA suggested integration of VMS into REEFREP would provide additional information and assist their safe passage through the area.39

4.15 Incident statistics indicate that the great majority of collisions are between trading ships and fishing vessels, rather than between two trading ships. Incident reports generally show that collisions are often caused by a failure to maintain an adequate lookout.

4.16 In the ship to ship mode, AIS information primarily assists in decision making for collision avoidance. Since collision is not a primary contributor to risk within the relatively sparsely trafficked GBR study area, DNV found its benefit to overall risk reduction when implemented in isolation is only around a 5% reduction in risk. If implemented in concert with other measures discussed below, the effectiveness increases to around a 20% reduction in risk across the GBR area.40

4.17 The DNV analysis assumes 100% AIS uptake by trading ships alone. Effectiveness could be further enhanced by integration of fishing vessel VMS information into REEFCENTRE.

4.18 If trials of pilot packs prove effective, together with coastal base station and network infrastructure, AMSA may be able to fast track the introduction of AIS in the GBR region. AMSA and Queensland Transport have a responsibility to maintain the currency of the Ship Reporting System and to position it to take advantage of new sources of real time shipping information from AIS.

4.19 At the international level, however, several aspects of shore-based applications of AIS remain unresolved and fast tracking AIS introduction could result in additional technical difficulties and high costs due to the immaturity of AIS technology. Associated issues are the need for integration of technology with Queensland port requirements, network engineering and equipment availability in what is a very remote region of Australia – particularly from Cairns to the Torres Strait.

Recommendation 17

The review recommends AMSA and Queensland Transport prepare by March 2002 an AIS implementation plan for the Great Barrier Reef for shipping participating in the Ship Reporting System. The plan should address the capacity for introducing a vessel management system within the Great Barrier Reef. A mid term review should be conducted in 2003-04 to take account of uptake of AIS by international shipping and technological advances.

Automated Position Reports

4.20 The ship encounter information is regarded as the most valuable information provided by REEFREP. The system calculates ships’ positions and course based on last known reporting point and dead reckoning. Information is displayed to SRS operators to read to ships when they report at the declared reporting points.

4.21 Technologies such as radar and AIS provide some opportunities to improve estimation of individual ship positions. However, only a small proportion of the SRS region is monitored by existing radar, at the major entry/exit points. The major routes through the GBR have no radar coverage. AIS is still undergoing trials and it is unlikely that there will be total ship to shore coverage throughout the region in the foreseeable future.

4.22 The limitations of the current system mean that it is not always able to provide real time information to operators. The information can be anywhere from minutes to several hours out of date. It is therefore not able to provide ships of encounter information on all ships they may encounter on the next leg of their journies, and information may provide a false picture of where vessels actually are. In addition to potential incidents, this gives rise to credibility problems for REEFCENTRE and provides difficulties for planning and management purposes.

4.23 The use of automated pre-programmed position reports would provide an enhanced understanding of the main routes taken by shipping and improve the ability to monitor vessels that may be in increasing risk of grounding in shallow waters outside areas with radar coverage.

4.24 The use of Inmarsat C in the fisheries industry has clearly demonstrated it to be a reliable, cost effective method of obtaining near real time positions from vessels. Position reporting intervals can be programmed from 5 minutes upwards, providing for rapid and constant updating of data.

4.25 The review notes that Inmarsat C provides an opportunity to complement both radar and AIS technology throughout the SRS. Its use would have little impact on the shipping industry as most vessels operating under the mandatory reporting provisions of the SRS already have Inmarsat C installed as part of GMDSS requirements. Consideration could be given to exempting masters and pilots from mandatory VHF reporting if Inmarsat C position reporting is introduced.

Recommendation 18

The review recommends that the use of Inmarsat C be required for all vessels subject to mandatory reporting requirements, to complement other technologies in providing near real time positions for vessels throughout the SRS. The voluntary use of Inmarsat C should be encouraged for all other vessels.

Ship Reporting System Management Role

4.26 Ship Reporting Systems (SRS) are used by coastal authorities to keep track, via radar and radio, of ships in the area, to provide navigational and marine safety information, and to respond quickly if there is an emergency. Information obtained may be used for search and rescue, marine pollution prevention and vessel traffic services.

4.27 IMO Resolution A.857(20) – Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Services indicates three levels of service provided by a VTS:

4.28 Each level requires progressively higher degrees of intervention and investment in appropriate staff skills and equipment.

4.29 The Ship Reporting System in the GBR, known as REEFREP, is largely equivalent to a VTS Information Service. REEFREP was formally recognised and adopted by the IMO under Regulation V/8-1 of the SOLAS Convention.

4.30 REEFREP is a joint initiative of AMSA and Queensland Transport to effectively manage the GBR Particularly Sensitive Sea Area. It was established in 1997 with the aim of significantly enhancing navigational safety in the area, thereby reducing the risk of a marine accident, environmental pollution and damage to the marine environment.

4.31 REEFREP operates through a joint AMSA-QT ship reporting centre at Hay Point, near Mackay. The centre is known as REEFCENTRE.

4.32 REEFREP is mandatory for the following categories of ships:

4.33 Prescribed ships are required to report to REEFCENTRE on VHF at various designated reporting points in the ship reporting area, when entering, transiting, or leaving the ship reporting area and when leaving or entering ports in the area (Figure 4.2). The reporting area covers Torres Strait and the whole of the Inner Route. Radio reports are supplemented by remote radar coverage of the major entrance channels for mandatory reporting and compulsory pilotage areas within the Inner Route. However radar coverage is limited to five locations and is impractical in terms of covering the whole extent of the GBR.

4.34 REEFCENTRE in turn provides ships with information relevant to their safe passage through the area, such as weather conditions, concentrations of fishing vessels and small craft, navigation warnings and hazards and other shipping movements.

4.35 Information to ships is provided only as broad guidance. Responsibility for taking navigational decisions based on this information rests with the ship’s Master. REEFREP is not declared as a Vessel Traffic Service under IMO guidelines and Regulation 8-2 of SOLAS Chapter V, and REEFCENTRE operators are not qualified navigators.

4.36 The Australian Transport Safety Bureau report41 on the Bunga Teratai Satu incident recommended that REEFCENTRE:

4.37 GBRMPA supported establishment of a vessel management system for the GBR similar to aviation air traffic control. The Queensland Government supports a higher level role for the SRS in managing ship movements in the GBR and note that there is scope for improving current technology and operational procedures that will enhance its capacity to monitor traffic and take on more of an advisory service. However, they note significant training and resource issues would be involved.42

4.38 The REEFCENTRE, with improved radar coverage and full AIS technology, when available, and the use of Inmarsat C transponders, (AMSA SRS 1/8/01) would be able to perform a traffic management role, enabling continual monitoring and intervention when required.

4.39 The DNV risk analysis notes, however, that a vessel traffic control system that parallels the air traffic control operation is an extremely large undertaking.43

4.40 In a passive VTS system, such as an Information Service or a Navigation Assistance Service, ship Masters and pilots retain most of the decision making about ship navigation. Under active VTS such as a Traffic Organisation Service, their responsibilities are more limited. Active VTS requires planning, authorisation, surveillance and recording of ship movements by the VTS authority. It stipulates routes to be taken and speed limits to be observed.

4.41 Important legal and operational differences exist between air and maritime traffic control arrangements. Organisation of ship guidance services involves a far reaching revision of public international law and centuries old maritime customs, particularly the right to freedom of navigation and the sole responsibility of the Master for navigation decisions.44

4.42 A significant concern with provision of a full traffic control system is the extent of the Government’s exposure to liability in the event of an accident involving a ship under the direction of a traffic control service. At present, international law places liability on a ship’s owner and master for damage caused by the vessel, although there are provisions under various conventions allowing an owner to limit his liability. If the ship were operating in accordance with mandatory traffic control instructions, however, it would seem likely that an owner would seek to pass to the Government liability for any costs resulting from an accident.

4.43 The REEFREP SRS Management Group recently initiated a review to determine the feasibility of overlaying the current SRS with a Coastal Vessel Traffic System (VTS) providing a Navigational Assistance Service. The review will include a full description of the proposed service, an assessment of the requirements, implications and emerging technologies, a cost-benefit analysis and a draft implementation plan. It is expected to be completed by the end of 2001.

4.44 The issue of cost effectiveness is significant. A VTS with full Navigational Assistance Service may be uneconomical given the significant development and on-going costs and the relatively low volume of traffic in the area. The associated costs may not be fully recoverable from the maritime industry and consideration will be required of how such costs should be met.

4.45 A further consideration is the need for appropriate levels of endorsement by IMO. Specifically, Chapter V of SOLAS requires that no VTS "should prejudice the rights and duties of governments under international law". On this basis a VTS may only be made mandatory in sea areas within a State’s territorial waters. The question then arises whether a VTS which is an extension of an existing mandatory SRS could be made mandatory, particularly in Torres Strait.

4.46 This review strongly supports augmentation of the Ship Reporting Service to incorporate a Coastal Vessel Traffic System (VTS) providing a Navigational Assistance Service as a means of enhancing navigational safety in Torres Strait and the GBR.

4.47 The review supports the proposed upgrade of the role of REEFCENTRE, pending a full cost-benefit analysis of adopting such an approach and drafting of an implementation plan.

Ship Monitoring in the GBR and Torres Strait

4.48 The majority of trading ships transiting the GBR are professionally run and strictly adhere to their onboard safety procedures. Given the competitive pressures on international shipping, it is important that these operators are not disadvantaged or discouraged from continuing to strive for best practice.

4.49 There is a case for implementing variable levels of ship monitoring and reporting based on assessments of their operational status. The best operated ships, for example, are likely to use the latest technologies and to adopt official recommendations for pilotage, whereas it can be expected that the lower quality operators will not take up such ‘best practices’ so readily. The quality of passage planning, Bridge Resource Management and watchkeeping can also be expected to vary.

4.50 Accordingly, ship monitoring in the GBR could better target the lower quality ships. For example, unpiloted ships could be required to report more frequently and be more closely monitored than piloted ships. Procedures in the SRS would need to be reviewed to implement such a differential arrangement.

4.51 As well, the ATSB report into the Bunga Teratai Satu incident identified a number of features of the current SRS operations that could be improved.

Recommendation 19

The review recommends that a reassessment of the role of REEFCENTRE be conducted, which should examine:

4.52 Concerns have been expressed that ship watchkeepers do not always take due care in exercising their responsibilities. It has been suggested that all ships should be required to advise to REEFCENTRE the names of their watchkeeping officers on duty during the ship’s transit of the GBR and that the SRS could call duty watchkeepers at regular intervals on their passage through the GBR.

4.53 The DNV risk assessment indicates that the greatest gains in reducing risk can be made in the Torres Strait, where pilotage is recommended rather than compulsory and the take up rate of pilots is still relatively low. At present there is only partial radar coverage in Torres Strait. Enhancement of radar in this area would improve the ability of the SRS to monitor and intervene with ships that do not use pilots in advance of the adoption of AIS by all ships under the IMO timetable. Statistically, however, there have been no groundings in the Great North East Channel. Higher risk areas are already covered by radar at present.

4.54 Supplementation of radar coverage in Torres Strait also would deliver safety improvements through a more interventionist role of the SRS sooner than proposals to seek IMO endorsement of compulsory pilotage in the region.

4.55 The review recognises that improving radar coverage in the Torres Strait would add to the overall monitoring of shipping transiting this region. However the cost of an additional radar is estimated at about $1 million per site in remote areas. The review recommends this action only if other alternatives suggested in this report are unviable.

Recommendation 20

The review recommends improving radar coverage in the Torres Strait to enhance overall monitoring of shipping transiting this region, in consultation with indigenous communities.

Electronic Navigation and Charting

4.56 There is a growing demand for digital hydrographic information from scientific, commercial and defence organisations. From mid 2002, amendment to the SOLAS Convention will support greater demand for and use of electronic chart information by the international shipping industry. When displayed in an appropriate Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) with input from satellite positioning, Electronic Navigation Charts (ENCs) provide a comprehensive navigation aid that includes automated warnings of impending course alterations and shoal water.

4.57 The use of Electronic Chart Display and Information Systems (ECDIS) is seen as a positive way to improve navigation safety and reduce human error.

4.58 In 1998 the Australian Hydrographic Service (AHS) of the Royal Australian Navy commenced the compilation of a vector based Electronic Navigation Chart (ENC) for the shipping routes in Torres Strait and the Inner Route of the GBR. In draught critical areas this data base is being sourced from the original highly detailed surveys and will provide a quantum leap in detail available to the mariner.

4.59 The ENC is currently completed from Weipa, through Torres Strait and south in the Inner Route to about 90 nautical miles south of Cape York. It is available in the form of evaluation data and is being trialled by commercial vessels operating in the GBR. The ENC for the remainder of the GBR will be progressed as resources permit.

4.60 However, AHS estimates that current production capability is 40% deficient due to limited resources. Approximately 50% of AHS cartographic staff presently are engaged on production of official ENCs, and wherever possible AHS supplements its capacity through appropriate outsourcing. Quality control and production management are key Commonwealth responsibilities and resources in these areas are presently overstretched.45

4.61 The provision of ENCs will only be useful if ships are fitted with an approved ECDIS. The use of ECDIS cannot yet be mandated and AMSA does not have in place a reg