Ship detention list June 2018

The safety management system does not make sure that critical
shipboard operations are carried out effectively as demonstrated by:

• The boiler operating with all safety alarms deactivated.
• The engine room not being manned with certified engineer while the boiler is operated in emergency mode. Numerous boiler control contactors linked out JPG463.71 KB. 

• Crew unfamiliar with correct operation of oily water separator.
• Oil content meter alarm arrangements does not comply with MEPC 107(49).
• Arrangements allow discharge overboard when flushing fresh water supplied to meter for in excess of 45 seconds. B219 c rew operating oily water seperator with fresh water flushing through oil content meter JPG338.73 KB.

The onboard safety management system does not make sure that the vessel is prepared for an emergency, and ship and equipment are effectively maintained. This is evidenced by:

• There is no proof that the lifeboat has been lowered and manoeuvred in the water within 3 months.
• A defective pilot ladder.
• Emergency fire pump primed by GS pump.
• G as alarm panel for pump room indicating a fault JPG533.2 KB.
• Remote control for engine room fan dampers inoperative as one actuator unplugged from system and second replaced with manual handle.

2 of 4 engine room fan dampers defective.
Sewage treatment plant defective:

• S ample after treatment in plant JPG390.76 KB.
• Untreated sewage JPG486.64 KB.

The onboard safety management system does not make sure that the ISM Code is effectively implemented in relation to:

• Critical shipboard operations.
• Emergency preparedness.
• Maintenance of ship and equipment.

This is evidenced by:

• L arge air bubble in magnetic compass JPG533.2 KB.
• Rescue boat painter not connected.
• R elease mechanism seized JPG477.65 KB.
• Rescue boat not ready for immediate use on reserve source of power.
• Low insulation fault to 22V.
• All sounding and temperature pipes on deck fitted with wooden wedges JPG390.76 KB.
• Forward liferaft stowed in Bosun store JPG486.64 KB.

CO2 Fixed fire extinguishing system defective:

• Piping has a worn hole.
• Piping from the side view has an obvious defect JPG346.99 KB.

The onboard safety management system does not make sure that the ISM Code is effectively implemented in relation to:

• Critical shipboard operations.
• Emergency preparedness.
• Maintenance of ship and equipment.

This is evidenced by:

• The port lifeboat engine being unable to start on primary or secondary source of power.
• Excessive oil accumulation in galley exhaust trunking.
• Oil accumulation and cotton rags found in engine room tank tops JPG350.67 KB
  and purifier room.
• Multiple engine temperature/pressure sensors faulty.
• Multiple engine room tank sounding pipe heads missing JPG355.52 KB.

One overboard valve in engine room defective:

• Leaking from ruptured valve JPG284.56 KB.
• Spead of liquid from ruptured valve.

Emergency generator defective and failed to connect to emergency switchboard.

Master and senior officer not familiar with documented procedures and cargo securing manual for safe cargo operations—objective evidence of heavy containers loaded on upper tier exceeding limits. Master has a repeated breach in not complying to safety of navigation, vessel safe routeing in adverse weather conditions and protection of environment. 60 containers from Bay 52 and 21 containers from bay 56 lost overboard exceeded tier stack limits set in Cargo Securing Manual. 276 containers from bay 01 to bay 60 intact in stow exceeded tier stack limit set in cargo securing manual.

• Buckled container under other containers.
• Containers falling on top of each other and buckled JPG332.89 KB.
• Buckled container about to fall over edge JPG199.14 KB.
• Extract from Cargo securing manual—tier stack limits not complied with JPG279.9 KB.