



Australian Government
Australian Maritime Safety Authority



Exercise Northerly



Northern Territory Government



DARWIN PORT CORPORATION



AMOSC
Australian Marine
Oil Spill Centre Pty Ltd

Darwin 2014

REPORT

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Steering committee comments

Executive Summary

As noted by the exercise evaluation team Exercise Northerly is considered a success from both the exercise management and the learning and development perspectives. The Exercise Steering Committee endorses this view also based on full achievement of the exercise Objectives and acknowledges the efforts of all participants and organisers, most notably our Northern Territory hosts.

The purpose of Exercise Northerly was to identify areas for improvement in our response to maritime environmental emergencies. The exercise was a valuable testing ground for recommendations that have been adopted from previous exercises as well as also identifying areas for future improvement; it is these areas that are the focus of the evaluation team's report.

The Exercise Steering Committee (two of whom were present in the Incident Control Centre (ICC) throughout the exercise) notes that Exercise Northerly was primarily a learning and skills reinforcement activity. Given this focus, there were several 'exercise artificialities' that challenged exercise participants, organisers and evaluators alike. Some commentary from the evaluation team indicates that intra-team communication improved on day two. Noting that the first day of the exercise commenced at 1pm and activities for the day were completed about 6pm it is reasonable to assume that in a real event activities would have continued into the night and the process of the team 'norming' would have been reached much earlier. The Committee acknowledges the artificialities of the exercise and has taken these into account in its recommendations.

There were areas identified where preparatory activities of National Plan partners may improve responder performance. Primarily these areas relate to skills retention. The Committee acknowledges that very few of the National Response Team Members have spill response as their full-time function, for many it is only through an annual exercise and training that any learning re-enforcement occurs. In acknowledging this constraint and in order to achieve some measure of 'skills transfer', the Committee has made specific recommendations towards continual improvement.

The Committee requests that the report is read with the view of taking these factors into account.

Scope

The Steering Committee was established for this exercise to review the planning, organising, leading and controlling aspects of Exercise Northerly. Further, the Steering Committee has a responsibility to feed the lessons and recommendations to the National Plan committee structure to support the ongoing planning process.

Exercise Structure

Exercise Northerly was designed as a week of activities designed to enhance the skills and knowledge of Northern Territory Personnel, National Response Team (NRT) members and Industry attendees and encourage the strategic thinking of Maritime Emergency Managers.

The week commenced with two days of training held simultaneously with a two day master class for key maritime emergency decision makers. A two day functional exercise (which commenced with a hypothetical panel discussion) followed the training and development days.

The functional exercise consisted of an Incident Management Team (IMT) responding to a fictitious collision between two vessels spilling up to 400 cubic metres of heavy fuel oil into Darwin Harbour and its surrounds. There were no field deployments and no external engagement. All inputs and outputs were processed through exercise control.

Aim & Objectives

The Aim was to implement and review the effectiveness of a combined Commonwealth, Northern Territory and industry marine pollution response to a tier 3 pollution incident in Northern Territory waters.

The **Objectives** included:

1. Establish and maintain an IMT that functions effectively
2. Develop an effective Incident Action Plan in response to the situation
3. Effective incident communication
4. Develop and implement an effective public communication and media strategy
5. Develop and notionally implement an effective Wildlife Incident Action Plan (WIAP)

In general, the Aim was achieved. Through the implementation of this exercise, the review of the arrangements to respond to a Tier 3 incident in the Northern Territory waters is achieved.

Key findings

There are report comments around the command and control aspects within the Incident Coordination Centre (ICC). The Committee observed that the motivation of IMT members was high and that considerable effort was clearly being put into trying to effectively manage the scenario. However, there was a general consensus amongst the exercise evaluators that key outputs were either not delivered or were not delivered in a timely fashion.

It is considered that issues such as teamwork, span of control and roles/responsibilities require more effort to become enhanced. We note that the short duration of the exercise did not allow a longer review of the critical success factors or allow the Incident Controller (IC) & IMT to settle into a 'rhythm'.

The exercise report notes organisational issues around role clarity, information management, governance, incident action planning and communications. These issues appear to be symptomatic of the experience level being exercised within the ICC. While a structure can be implemented and enforced, the population of the response organisation requires personnel

experienced with response issues and operations to achieve a successful outcome.

It is noted that the Northern Territory also viewed this exercise as a development opportunity and a safe training context where less experienced people could develop experience in a simulated environment. The Committee endorses and agrees with this philosophy.

Nevertheless it is worth noting that many of the key observations regarding the issues mentioned above have been raised after previous exercises and incidents and recommendations stemming from these have been implemented to address these.

The challenge for NRT members and their agencies would appear to be an issue of “Skills Transference”. Translated this asks ‘how can National Plan partners ensure that skills acquired in training and utilised infrequently are reinforced so as to be easily recalled when required?’ The Committee notes the information on skills loss, as provided by the exercise evaluators in appendix 3 of the report and considers this to be a key to most of the observations and insights reached by the evaluators.

The recommendations of the Steering Committee focus on this challenge.

Findings and Recommendations

The Steering Committee agrees with the findings listed in the exercise report and makes the following recommendations.

1. That jurisdictions consider developing an annual program of capability development activities that enable greater levels of skills transference and maintenance to provide greater opportunities for response personnel to build greater understanding of their roles and responsibilities and IMT deliverables and outputs.
2. That a series of functional checklists be designed and developed for use in marine pollution emergencies.
3. That the national training content is reviewed to ensure that a greater emphasis is placed on the development of key incident outputs, such as; leadership, information management and incident planning.

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Background

As part of the national capability strategy, the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) led the development and facilitation of a national level oil spill exercise “Exercise Northerly”, which was held in Darwin on the 4th and 5th of June 2014.

Exercise Northerly, was a full simulation exercise (without field deployments) and was designed to challenge the Incident Management Team (IMT) and participants with a real-life multi-faceted scenario, involving the collision of two vessels and the subsequent spill of a large quantity of oil, which impacted on the Darwin coastline.

Exercise Northerly had five key objectives;

- 1 Establish and maintain an IMT that functions effectively
- 2 Develop an effective Incident Action Plan (IAP) in response to the situation
- 3 Effective incident communication
- 4 Develop and implement an effective public communication and media strategy
- 5 Develop and notionally implement an effective Wildlife Incident Action Plan (WIAP)

These objectives were all designed to enable the participants to practice the key deliverables and outputs required of a high-performing IMT. The specific details of these can be found in Appendix 1.

Worthy of note was that the exercise was preceded by a two-day training workshop for National Response Team (NRT) members, the curriculum of which was designed to provide participants with specific refresher and developmental training in preparation for the exercise.

As part of the exercise, specialist external consultants were engaged to conduct an independent evaluation of the IMT and their collective performance against the exercise objectives. These consultants were: Captain Graham Edgley from Tactical Maritime Solutions (TMS), and Stephen Young - Turning Point Crisis Management (TPCM). They were supported during the evaluation process by Mick Fleming from AMSA and Brett Aimers from Emergency Management Australia.

This report is a summary of the observations and insights from the evaluation team, the post-exercise debrief findings and other unsolicited observations from participants and exercise observers. The insights represent an honest and accurate reflection of the performance of the IMT, and are not provided to reflect negatively on the capability or competence of any individual or of the IMT as a whole, but rather provided as lessons for future consideration.

The complete list of observations can be found in the supporting Master spreadsheet supplied to AMSA. This report contains numerous sections that enable the diversity of the IMT role to be broken down into manageable parts.

Exercise evaluation

For this evaluation, the exercise evaluators adopted part of the observation, insight and lesson model as outlined in the Attorney-General's Department 2014 - Handbook 8 Lessons Management.

- **Observations:** A record of noteworthy fact or occurrence seen during the exercise, it is evidence or data collected based on what was observed. Observations may be negative or positive, and can be found in the master spreadsheet.
- **Insights:** A deduction drawn from observations that requires further analysis. The insights have been validated across the observations from different sources. This provides a greater level of rigour for the development of the insight. Insights may be negative or positive.
- **Conclusions:** Analysis on the insights that suggests the cause or causative elements and suggests areas for improvement or further analysis.

Exercise insights

The exercise evaluation team identified many observations, which are contained in a working tool (master observations spreadsheet) and have distilled these observations into 23 standalone insights. This post exercise report does not make comment on the exercise design, management and or the arrangements for exercise control.

Exercise evaluations are often qualitative rather than quantitative, as there is no formal standard for incident management in Australia, however the National Plan for Maritime Environmental Emergencies has adopted the Australasian Inter-Service Incident Management System IV (or AIIMS). AIIMS is considered the nationally accepted standard for incident management in Australasia.

The insights highlighted in this report are based on the application of AIIMS, the National Plan for Maritime Environmental Emergencies and the expertise of the evaluators and other observers and the feedback derived during the debrief. For the functionality of the report, these observations have been broken up into specific themes that best represent the intent of the insight.

The themes are:

- Role Clarity
- Information management
- Governance
- Incident Action Planning
- Communications

Role Clarity

- 1 There appeared to be a lack of clarity around the roles and responsibilities and interdependencies between the functions, sections and units within the IMT. It was not evident that the functional leaders or team members referred to the AIIMS checklists and/or Aides Memoire prior to, or during the exercise
- 2 The IMT leadership group did not initially identify the key deliverables, which may have contributed to the IMT not producing key IMT outputs (refer to Appendix 2 - Key IMT outputs and deliverables)
- 3 There was a noticeable disconnect between the Operations Team and the Planning Team on the first day and part of the second day, in particular with respect to consolidating and sharing information and the development of the objective, options analysis and operational strategies. This was evidenced by the fact that the Operations Section had five objectives on their board, all different to the ones the Planning section had listed on their board. It should be noted that this improved on day two and the two sections appeared to be more collaborative and trusting
- 4 Whilst the Finance and Admin Team was under resourced, it was felt that it was one of the better performing sections. It is thought that this was because they are a support function and responded to the needs of the other sections, because they adopted a checklist approach and developed and utilised the information systems available to assist them to effectively manage their function and outputs
- 5 The appointment of a Deputy IC assisted with the functionality and operation of the IMT, however it was not evident that there were agreed roles, responsibilities or areas of demarcation established between the IC and his deputy (accepted recommendation from Exercise Sea Dragon)
- 6 The use of Incident Advisors was seen as a positive influence for the IC and the broader IMT (accepted recommendation from Exercise Sea Dragon)
- 7 The planning function did not fully perform their role of gaining situational awareness for the IMT and this was a limiting factor in the IMT's output

Information Management

- 8 Management of information in the IMT was unstructured and not effectively managed or controlled, and would not have met the requirements had a formal post incident inquiry be conducted
- 9 There was no methodology for getting sign-off from the IC for key IMT outputs
- 10 There was no system or structure put into place to ensure that the IMT leaders and team members had the best possible situational awareness
 - status boards not being utilised effectively
 - information inconsistently portrayed on the status boards, in particular the Operations and Planning sections
 - current and forecast information was ad hoc and often incorrect
 - valuable display or projection space was left empty or had out of date information displayed.
- 11 WebEOC, like many information management systems provides a useful tool for managing an incident, however in this case there were not any directions given to its use during the exercise, which led to it not being utilised to its fullest extent during the exercise. There was an IMT log kept on WebEOC, however when benchmarking the official log against the exercise injects, less than 50% of information provided to the IMT was recorded in the log.

Governance

- 12 The immediate introduction of 60 people into the IMT caused confusion and made it difficult for the functional heads to immediately establish effective control of their teams
- 13 The utilisation of the AMSA Liaison Officer role appeared to function well and was used effectively by both Operations and Logistics section
- 14 There was no Safety Officer appointed nor was a Safety Plan developed
- 15 There was a meeting schedule developed, but this was not strictly adhered to. This affected the ability of the IMT to establish effective situational awareness, develop a common operating picture and share information.

Incident Planning

- 16 It was not apparent that the IMT adopted or utilised the Planning Cycle as outlined in AMSA NRT training and the AIIMS methodology
- 17 There was no initial or observable effort put into developing a shared incident objective or set of objectives, the Planning Team had a different objective to that which was guiding the Operations team. When finally developed, the incident objectives were unclear and did not provide an overall direction. It took some hours for them to be made more specific, although it is considered that they did not conform to the SMARTA¹ format
- 18 There was no options analysis conducted either by Planning or Operations. Operations on the water were delayed as a result, e.g. fixation on aerial dispersant as opposed to vessel dispersant; continuing attempts to source AMSA aircraft rather than contract alternatives, and focus on receipt of modelling rather than gathering actual surveillance data. Similarly the Planning Section had an over reliance on the OSTM² as the sole source of intelligence
- 19 Once developed, the IAP had a clear aim, objectives and some strategies were identified. It was felt that the IAP took too long to develop, and was delivered to the IMT at around midday on day two. It was observed that there were up to three different versions of the IAP being used at the one time, each with differing content, the IAP was not approved by the Incident Controller
- 20 The Situation Report (SitRep) was developed in isolation and it was not apparent that an official approved SitRep was ever produced, nor was it clear that a schedule was established for SitReps.

Communications

- 21 The overall management of the media and their interaction with the IMT was considered less than optimal, binding statements about the outcomes of the response, were given to the media, these proved to be incorrect after the day two update
- 22 There was no formal stakeholder engagement strategy, or stakeholder management plan developed
- 23 There was no communications, media log or record developed or kept.

¹ SMARTA - Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic, Timeframe and Agreed

² OSTM - Oil Spill Trajectory Modelling

Analysis

The following analysis is provided to guide discussion on the factors that contributed to the insights.

The initial number of members of the IMT caused knock-on effects to the establishment and initial performance of the IMT. At exercise commencement, an injection of 60 personnel into the IMT was initiated. While the IMT numbers were high, their efficiency and effectiveness was limited due to a slow amalgamation into the exercise response. Consideration on quicker inductions and overall command briefings by DIC's would have greatly enhanced the effectiveness of this team. This statement contributes to the insights 2,4 & 12.

Role clarity

This general issue could be considered the root-cause behind most of the insights raised in this report and is also a perennial issue for IMT members, particularly those that form infrequently and for those team members that perform the role within an IMT as a part-time function.

The typical cause for the lack of role clarity is multi-faceted but it is felt that in this instance the following are contributing factors:

- The time between training and development activities and the gaps between the skills acquisition, transference and skill maintenance opportunities³
- The failure to utilise existing checklists and aides-memoire
- The failure to check and clarify team member roles and responsibilities at the establishment of the IMT.

Information Management

Managing information during an incident is often one of the biggest challenges of an IMT. Recent reviews and enquiries into major events have shown that the inability to effectively manage information exposes the IC, the leadership team and those affected by the incident. In this instance the IMT did not effectively manage information in or out of the IMT, it is felt the following were contributing factors:

- Even though there was a key learning activity on information management in the two day NRT training provided immediately before the exercise, the IMT leadership group did not develop a protocol or process for the management of information at the outset and this impacted their ability to manage information
- Had checklists been utilised at the outset, the IMT would have been prompted to establish an information management protocol and process.

³ Refer to Appendix 3 - Skills Loss research

Governance

The absence of systems and processes to run the IMT, including an information management process and simple elements such as a meeting schedule (which was developed but not adhered to), impacted on the situational awareness, running of, and functionality of the IMT. It appeared that the focus of the IC and the leadership team was distracted by the following factors:

- the amount of time the IC spent out of the ICC and the absence of an effective span of control and support for the Incident Controller
- having the key government emergency management leaders in the Incident Control Centre
- the distractions of attending to the media requirements. (see comments in Communications below)

Incident Planning

Incident Planning is one of the most important improvements in incident management over the past few decades, although it is an element that IMT's frequently do poorly. This is primarily due to two factors; the natural tendency to 'get on with the response' rather than waste time developing objectives, options analysis and the relevant IAP to guide, support and manage the response; and secondly the lack of understanding or experience in developing these key IMT planning outputs.

- AMSA does regular training with National Plan stakeholders and specific planning modules are delivered on all National Plan incident management courses. Planning Officer courses are also held, and focus in greater detail on the functional deliverables such as the development, approval and implementation of an IAP. It is felt that in this instance the Planning Team may not have had recent training and the skill loss issues highlighted in this report may have led to the Planning Team not delivering the required planning outputs during the first day.

Communications

It was felt that the challenges faced within this element were due to multiple factors, these are:

- the failure to appoint an experienced Crisis and Strategic Communications specialist
- the failure to adequately manage, support and direct the function
- the primary focus of the communications team was outbound media management
- the lack of familiarity with specific incident management communications and stakeholder engagement requirements
- the absence of sufficient resources to effectively run and support the Communications and Public Information function within and across the IMT.

Conclusions

The exercise evaluation team notes that the issues identified in this report are normal for an exercise of this nature and they contribute to the overall general improvement of responders during an actual response, Exercise Northerly should be considered a success, from both the exercise management, and the learning and development perspectives.

The following conclusions have been made using the expertise of the evaluators, and are supported by the exercise observations and insights:

- It was clear that some key IMT members did not fully understand their role, their responsibilities and or the operation and deliverables of the IMT. This may be due to the lack of experience and the skills and knowledge transference⁴ post training. It is felt that the jurisdictions and sector participants should develop and maintain an annual schedule of activities to ensure that members of the NRT and those immediately affected are able to practice, and further develop their incident management skill sets
- Checklists and aide-memoire's are essential support and validation tools used extensively by professional incident managers as highlighted to the NRT during the Human Factors training conducted prior to Exercise Northerly. It is felt that the sector should actively promote the use of checklists and aide-memoire's and focus effort on either developing or utilising checklists from other sectors to support the operation of future IMT's
- When utilising technology in any event, whether it be an exercise or real activation experience shows that it must be properly supported by the host agency and vendor. In this instance there was little if any prior training provided to many of the exercise participants and they were in fact learning on the job, which impacted on the effectiveness of the system and its contribution to the management of the incident.
- Even though a stakeholder engagement activity was held in the preceding days with the NRT members, there was no effective direction and support provided to the communications function, however, this was a contributing factor in the failure to deliver the basic incident management communications requirements and stakeholder engagement strategies and plans during the exercise
- Information management as highlighted in the insights was not managed well, even though a practical exercise with the NRT was undertaken in the days immediately preceding the exercise. This draws attention to the fact that the management of information in and out of the IMT it is seen as a lesser priority than the response.

⁴ Refer to Appendix 3 - Skills Loss research

Appendix 1 – Aim & Objectives – Exercise Northerly, Darwin 2014

Exercise aim

To implement and review the effectiveness of a combined Commonwealth, Northern Territory and industry marine pollution response to a tier 3 pollution incident in Northern Territory waters.

Exercise objectives & key performance indicators

Objective one: Establish and maintain an incident management team that functions effectively

There is a clear and commonly understood IMT structure
AIIMS main functional roles and sub-roles established and effective
Reference for establishing IMT structure:
NT Port Emergency Response Plan
NT Government Emergency Management Plan

IMT structure is established commensurate with incident size & scope: (Sea Dragon recommendation 2)
Deputy Incident Controller appointment(s)
Span of control requirements
Public information section established (AIIMS V4)

The ICC facility is suitable for an incident of this size and scope , including: (Sea Dragon – Victoria lessons learnt)

- Communication arrangements
- Space
- Equipment
- Display boards

Participants have role clarity and a common understanding of responsibilities
Clear direction is provided by IC and Section Leaders
Team members are aware of their responsibilities
A mentoring team is established to provide advice to the IC and functional team leaders (Sea Dragon recommendation 3 & 5)

<p>Appropriate and effective induction processes are conducted for: (Sea Dragon 8)</p> <p>WHS Risk & Safety Fatigue Management Financial delegations & procurement Security</p>
<p>The IMT gains and maintains situational awareness Regular situation briefings are held. Incident Controller briefings Section briefings Unit briefings</p>
<p>Information is managed appropriately, e.g. record keeping, logs, security of documents Information security procedures are in place incident logs are accurately maintained Incoming information is sourced, verified and recorded Outgoing information is timely, accurate and targeted appropriately</p>
<p>Intelligence is generated and effectively used by the IMT -</p>
<p>Handover procedures are managed appropriately Use of an appropriate briefing program (e.g. SMEACCS or similar) Handover planned, prepared & facilitated effectively</p>
<p>Workplace Health and Safety is managed effectively, e.g. fatigue, stress and general welfare Risk & safety manager appointed Fatigue plan implemented WHS Inductions ICC risks identified & managed</p>
<p>External stakeholders are identified and appropriately informed Whole of Government stakeholders Territory & Municipal emergency management groups Community and interested parties</p>
<p>Effective liaison between ICC and AMSA, Darwin Ports, NT Government, Industry, Community and Media</p>
<p>IMT display effective decision making to direct the response decision making protocols Actions and tasks are accurately recorded and allocated appropriately</p>
<p>IMT initiates effective security of IMT location</p>
<p>Financial delegations are in place for effective NT management of the incident (Sea Dragon – Victoria lessons learnt)</p>

Objective two: Develop an effective Incident Action Plan in response to the situation

Develop an Incident action plan in a timely fashion and communicate effectively to strategic and tactical teams

Reference is made to all available data (including cultural information) and this is reflected in decision making protocols

A Net Environmental Benefit Analysis (NEBA) is conducted and agreed in suitable timeframes

Incident AIM and OBJECTIVES are developed using the SMARTA principle (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, Time-based and Agreed)

Protection priorities are determined and agreed

Oil spill response strategies are determined & IAP considers (not limited to):

- Risk
- Protection Priorities
- Social and economic impacts

Oil product & behaviours

Vessel position & condition

Quantity of oil

Weather & tidal conditions

Environment & ecological considerations

Incident tools available to the IMT were utilised effectively in preparation of plans:

- OSTM
- ADIOS
- OSRA
- GIS & spatial data systems

The decision-making process for approval and application or non-use of dispersants is timely and effective (Sea Dragon recommendation 7)

Sub plans are developed and communicated effectively, i.e. marine operations, shoreline response, wildlife response, aviation, OH&S, waste management, media, etc.

Visual references / displays are used appropriately

Resources are identified to achieve objectives

Resource mapping and tracking strategies are established and managed effectively

IMT & notional field operations rostering & fatigue management arrangements

Notional transport and accommodation arrangements

physical resources & assets notionally sourced, transported and managed at staging areas

<p>Community engagement strategies and volunteer management are considered notional volunteer strategies include coordination, briefing & induction and OH&S management Indigenous communities are notionally engaged and considered in response activities the IAP acknowledges & develops a public management / information component</p>
<p>Input from stakeholder engagement considered in IAP preparation</p>
<p>Operational risks are assessed and listed in main or sub-plans as appropriate: includes but not limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • environmental risks to marine, wildlife & shoreline • economic risks to local industry, shipping • community risks to health, quality of life, media • response risks to OH&S, asset / resource management, weather, timeliness, government expectations • reputational risks to government, response agencies, emergency management arrangements
<p>IAP review process is commensurate to changing situational circumstances</p>
<p>The IAP is robust and is able to withstand interrogation & scrutiny post incident</p>
<p>Operational strategies are developed commensurate with notional capability and resources</p>

Objective three: Effective incident communication

<p>Communications are timely, accurate and targeted appropriately:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incident Action Plan • High level communications, e.g. SMPC / Ministerial briefings • Across IMT Sections and functional areas • Sub-plans
<p>Communication flow is effective and timely within and external to the IMT</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • across functional areas (planning – operations – logistics) • between the IMT and Northern Territory strategic bodies • between the IMT and the NT Government • between the IMT and regional / municipal emergency management structures / arrangements • effective liaison & interaction between Territory & Federal agencies
<p>Operational strategies are communicated effectively from the ICC to notional forward operating bases and field teams</p>

<p>IMT Sections communicate effectively resulting in:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategies discussed and agreed by Planning & Operation Sections • Strategies commensurate with capability and resource availability • Effective management of spill intelligence • Understanding logistical arrangements and supply capability • Effective IAP and Sub-Plan development
<p>Effective liaison and agreed process with notional Salvage & Intervention management teams Intelligence gathered from salvage operators utilised effectively</p>
<p>Communication with industry effective with consideration given to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commercial interests • Insurer representatives

Objective four: Develop and implement an effective public communication and media strategy

<p>NT Gov is established as the incident media lead agency and this is understood by State, Federal and Local / Regional bodies</p>
<p>A communications and media team is established on site with appropriate liaison officers</p>
<p>Key internal & external stakeholders identified including local & regional bodies, and indigenous groups Communications & media team have appropriate representation and/or awareness of cultural sensitivities</p>
<p>The communications & media team develop strategies that are clearly understood, consistent & are widely consultative; strategies include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • agreement on key speakers to the media and/or community groups • timeliness for media requirements • process for sign off of key messaging in a timely manner • process for briefing key speakers • process for logging media enquiries & responses • identifying resources for media management including briefing room & managing media in field operations
<p>Develop key messages and timely holding statements means of communicating key messages agreed and implemented Incident Controller approval process</p>
<p>Develop regular media releases and talking points Consistent and agreed key messages across all stakeholder groups FAQs developed & kept up to date</p>

<p>Develop community engagement strategy in consultation with planning team & appropriate stakeholders:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public meetings • Consistent key messages • Contemporary social media management
<p>High level support is provided to Incident Controller and key IMT members</p>
<p>Regular contact with Ministers' offices and their key advisors / media advisor is established & maintained</p> <p>Requests for information from 'VIPs' is managed appropriately</p>
<p>Consider the role of Emergency Management Joint Public Information Committee (EMJPIC) in a marine pollution event, including any interaction with the Commonwealth</p>

Objective five: Develop and notionally implement an effective Wildlife Incident Action Plan (WIAP)

<p>The appropriate personnel, Government and non-Government agencies and Senior Managers / Ministers are notified of the incident and an oiled wildlife response is mounted in an appropriate timeframe</p>
<p>The Protocol, Wildlife Response Plan for Marine Pollution Emergencies, is known and used / referenced.</p>
<p>The Wildlife Incident Management Team is notionally deployed and scaled up as required</p>
<p>The Wildlife Incident Action Plan (WIAP) is developed using the correct relevant forms, and followed / implemented</p>
<p>Responses to media enquiries are dealt with in accordance with the Communications Plan in the WIAP.</p>
<p>Maps of significant environmental values (such as breeding/roosting sites, Ramsar sites, seal colonies, etc.) are obtained and used in forming search and rescue priorities.</p>

Appendix 2 – Key IMT outputs and deliverables

These are a consistent set of deliverables and output required of an IMT during such an event as was portrayed during Exercise Northerly.

- Communication and media management strategy
- Stakeholder management plan
- Information management plan and strategy
- Incident Action Plan, including:
 - Operation Marine Sub Plan
 - Operations Shoreline Plan
 - Operations Waste Management Plan
- Aviation Sub Plan
- Environmental Sub Plan
- Wildlife Sub Plan
- Option Analysis
- Risk Management Plan
- Logistics Plan
- Current and updated organisational (IMT) structure chart
- SitRep
- Logs
- IMT
- Section/unit
- Personal
- Finance plan

Appendix 3 – Skills loss research

Research indicates that there can be substantial skill loss with non-practice or non-use, with the identified amounts of skill loss ranging from a minimal amount of .01% immediately after training to major skill losses after extended periods of non-use. The Boeing Company in Seattle Washington, determined that *“failure is increased substantially if high performance and skill retention is not effectively maintained over long durations of task inactivity”* (Garden & Smitterly 1972).

Several American researchers, such as J Naylor and G Briggs examined skills retention and skill degradation in both the military/disaster management context and within industry. They found that the duration of the retention interval, ranging from 1 minute to two years post-training affected the skill loss and formed the lower absolute level of initial retention.

The typical paradigm for testing retention usually involves training individuals to some initial criterion, and then testing for performance after a period of non-use. It is also noted that skill retrieval or retention is maximised if the conditions at retention assessment match as closely as possible those present during the original learning.

How much practice people engage in post learning, can be expected to affect retention. Mental rehearsal or imagery practice appears to be an effective strategy to reduce forgetting, or skill decay during the period of non-use, therefore regular events such as desktop scenarios, practical exercises, and network meetings can assist in skill retention and knowledge refreshing.

The implications of this research for National Plan Training and State jurisdictions, is that skill degradation can occur over periods of non-use, and that regular practice is one component in the retention or regaining of identified skills. Therefore there is a recommendation to hold planned events that will assist trained NRT responders to maintain their skills and preparedness.

Appendix 4 – Agenda - NRT Training, Darwin 2014

Training Details

NRT preparation for incident management functions for the major National Plan exercise, Exercise Northerly. The intent of this training is to provide awareness and generate discussion on:

1. Application of contemporary incident management practices & protocols
2. Informed decision-making and effective use of intelligence
3. Understanding the communication requirements of a significant multi-agency event

Program

Monday 2 June 2014

Session 0	Welcome & Introductions
0900 – 0930	Training program intent & process
Session 1	Setting the scene
0930 – 1015	National Plan Arrangements AIIMS V4

Morning Tea

Session 2	Human Factors in Decision-Making
1030 – 1415 (incl. lunch break)	We are all human, we are all fallible, and we all make mistakes. And there's nothing we can do about that – or is there?
Session 3	The water is poisoned
1415 – 1630	Complex Multi-Agency Discussion Objective setting Risk & Options Analysis Incident Action Planning Stakeholder Management After Action Review

Tuesday 3 June 2014

Session 3	Managing Information
0900 – 1030	Managing information flows early in an incident response can be problematic. An activity and discussion on how to manage high volume high tempo environments.

Morning Tea

Session 4	Incident Management Advisors – Group Discussion
1100 - 1200	Recommendation 4 of Exercise Sea Dragon June 2012 recommended that the Incident Management Team for major marine oil spills be supported by a small group of expert observers to provide incident management, specialist advice and support.

Lunch

Session 5	Crisis Communications
1300 – 1530	Contemporary approaches to crisis communication Risks associated with crisis communication What should be communicated in a crisis & how Engaging diverse stakeholders
Session 6	Wrap up
1530 - 1600	Group debrief

