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Australian Maritime Safety Authority



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Transport
for NSW

Exercise Dumaresq 2024

National Oil Spill Response Exercise
Exercise Evaluation Report



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Acknowledgement of Country

We acknowledge the Traditional Custodians of Australia and their continuing connection to land and sea, waters, environment, and community. We pay our respects to the Traditional Custodians of the lands and waters we live and work on, their culture, and their Elders past and present.

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Table of Contents

Evaluation Report Structure	iv
Acronyms	vi
Glossary	vii
Recommendations for jurisdictional consideration	ix
1. Executive Summary	1
1.1 Exercise Overview	1
1.2 Achievement of Objectives	2
1.2.1 Exercise Dumaresq Objectives Snapshot	2
1.3 Recommendations	6
1.3.1 Key Recommendations	6
2. Background to Exercise Dumaresq	9
2.1 Exercise Requirements under the National Plan	9
2.2 Exercise Structure	10
2.3 Exercise Governance	10
2.4 Exercise Objectives	11
3. Exercise Evaluation	12
3.1 Evaluation Approach	12
3.1.1 Exercise Evaluation Team	12
3.2 Evaluation Methodology	13
3.3 Evaluation Analysis	15
4. Evaluation Findings and Recommendations	17
4.1 Summary Evaluation - Phase 1	17
4.1.1 Day 1 Findings	18
4.1.2 Key Successes	18
4.1.3 Key Areas for Improvement	19
4.1.4 Day Two Findings	20
4.1.5 Key Successes	20
4.1.6 Key Areas for Improvement	21
4.1.7 Phase 1 Recommendations	23
4.2 Phase 2 Summary Evaluation	24
4.2.1 Key Successes	25
4.2.2 Key Areas for Improvement	26
4.2.3 Phase 2 Recommendations	28
4.3 Exercise Management - Summary Evaluation	29
4.3.1 Exercise Management Key Successes	30
4.3.2 Exercise Management Key Areas for Improvement	31
4.3.3 Exercise Planning and Management Recommendations	33
4.4 Conclusions	34

Appendices	36
5. Detailed Evaluation Results on Exercise Dumaresq	36
5.1 Phase 1 Evaluation Findings	36
5.1.1 Phase 1 – Objectives and Key Performance Indicators	36
5.1.2 Phase 1 - Evaluation Findings against Exercise Objectives	39
5.1.3 Phase 1 - Stakeholder and Participant Feedback	43
5.2 Phase 2 Evaluation Findings	44
5.2.1 Phase 2 – Evaluation Findings against Exercise Objectives	44
5.2.2 Phase 2 Participant Feedback	57
5.3 Detailed Evaluation Findings on Exercise Management	61
5.3.1 Exercise Governance and Planning	61
5.3.2 Exercise Control and Logistics	61
5.3.3 Exercise Evaluation	62
6. Exercise Details	63
6.1 Exercise Governance	63
6.2 Phase 1 Exercise Participants	64
6.3 Phase 1 Exercise Approach	65
6.4 Phase 2 Exercise Participants	66
6.5 Phase 2 Exercise Scenario and Approach	68

Tables

Table 1: Evaluation of Phase 1 Objectives	3
Table 2: Evaluation of Phase 2 Objectives	4
Table 3: Key Recommendations related to Exercise Dumaresq objectives	7
Table 4: Key Recommendations related to exercise planning and management	8
Table 5: Outline of management schedule of Exercise Dumaresq	10
Table 6: Areas of evaluation for Exercise Dumaresq	13
Table 7: Evaluation methodology used in Exercise Dumaresq	14
Table 9: Rationale for the evaluation of Objective 1	45
Table 10: Rationale for the evaluation of Objective 2	47
Table 11: Rationale for the evaluation of Objective 3	49
Table 12: Rationale for the evaluation of Objective 4	51
Table 13: Rationale for the evaluation of Objective 5	53
Table 14: Rationale for the evaluation of Objective 6	54
Table 15: Rationale for the evaluation of Objective 7	56

Evaluation Report Structure

This evaluation report presents the findings, analysis, and recommendations arising from Exercise Dumaresq 2024.

The report is structured into six sequenced sections, designed to support strategic oversight and operational learning. Each section builds on the previous section to provide a coherent narrative from context through to actionable outcomes.

The evaluation report contains the following sections:

Section 1

Provides an **Executive Summary** of the evaluation of Exercise Dumaresq, including the following:

- Exercise Overview
- Achievement of Objectives
- Recommendations

Section 2

Provides the **Background** to Exercise Dumaresq, including the following:

- Exercise requirements under the National Plan
- The exercise structure adopted
- Exercise Governance to guide exercise management
- Exercise objectives for Phases 1 and 2

Section 3

Provides a description of the **Exercise Evaluation**, including the following:

- The evaluation approach adopted
- A description of the evaluation methodology used
- An outline of the analysis methodology

Section 4

Provides the detailed **Evaluation Findings** for Exercise Dumaresq, including the following:

- A summary of the Phase 1 findings in terms of:
 - key successes
 - key areas for improvement
 - recommendations arising from the evaluation
- A summary of the Phase 2 findings in terms of:
 - key successes
 - key areas for improvement
 - recommendations arising from the evaluation

- A summary of findings about the management of Exercise Dumaresq in terms of:
 - key successes
 - key areas for improvement
 - recommendations arising from the evaluation
- A conclusion, summing up the key evaluation outcomes archived by Exercise Dumaresq

Section 5

Appendices to the report which provide further details in the following areas:

- Further substantiation of evaluation findings against key performance indicators in Phase 1 [S. 5.1] and Phase 2 [S. 5.2]
- Further substantiation of evaluation findings with respect to exercise management [S. 5.3]

Section 6

Appendices to the report which provide background on how Exercise Dumaresq was conducted, including:

- Exercise governance
- Exercise participation
- Exercise approach and scenarios

Acronyms

The following acronyms are used throughout the exercise documentation.

Acronym	Definition
AEO	Advanced Equipment Operator
AIIMS	Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System
AMOSOC	Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre
AMSA	Australian Maritime Safety Authority
ARC	AMSA Response Centre
BEO	Basic Equipment Operator
COP	Common Operating Picture
EPA	Environment Protection Authority
ExCon	Exercise Control
FOB	Field Operating Base
FRNSW	Fire and Rescue NSW
HNS	Hazardous and Noxious Substances
IAP	Incident Action Plan
IC	Incident Controller
ICC	Incident Control Centre
IMT	Incident Management Team
IT	Information Technology
JSA	Job Safety Analysis
JSCG	Joint Strategic Coordination Group
KPIs	Key Performance Indicators
MPR	Marine Pollution Response
KR	Key Recommendation (of the Evaluation Report)
MIMS	Maritime Incident Management System (NSW)
MSQ	Maritime Safety Queensland
NEMA	National Emergency Management Agency
NRT	National Response Team
PIU	Public Information Unit
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
QFD	Queensland Fire Department
QA	Quality Assurance
SCAT	Shoreline Cleanup and Assessment Team
SME	Subject Matter Expert
TfNSW	Transport for NSW
WHS	Workplace Health and Safety

Glossary

The following glossary terms are used during the evaluation process and in the exercise documentation.

Term	Definition
Common Operating Picture (COP)	A single display of relevant operational information (e.g. the position and status of resources, geographical information, and current incident status) that is shared by multiple agencies or jurisdictions.
Control (Combat) Agency	The agency or company assigned by legislation or within the relevant contingency plan to control response activities to a maritime environmental emergency.
Exercise Control (ExCon)	The team responsible for the planning, conduct, and evaluation of the exercise, ensuring that the exercise objectives are met.
Forward Operating Base (FOB)	A location set up to support field operations during an incident, providing logistical and administrative support.
Functional Lead	Person in charge of a functional unit set up under the AIMS structure; synonymous with Team Lead.
Hazardous and Noxious Substances (HNS)	Substances that, when released into the environment, can pose significant risks to human health, safety, or the environment.
Incident Action Plan (IAP)	A plan that defines the incident objectives, strategies, and specific actions for a defined operational period.
Incident Controller (IC)	The individual responsible for leading and coordinating all aspects of an incident response, making critical decisions and organizing resources to resolve the incident. The IC is the central authority during an incident.
Incident Control Centre (ICC)	A centralized location where incident management teams gather to coordinate activities and resources during an emergency.
Incident Management Team (IMT)	A team that manages the operational aspects of a response to an emergency, including planning, operations, logistics, and finance.
Joint Strategic Coordination Group (JSCG)	A group established to manage strategic decision-making, shared situational awareness, and resource coordination among multiple jurisdictions during an incident. Derived from an National Plan Guidance document.
KPIs	The Key Performance Indicators that align to the exercise objectives.
National Response Team (NRT)	A team of trained responders who are activated to support incidents involving marine pollution and other emergencies.

Term	Definition
P ² OST ² E	People, Process, Organisation, Support, Technology, Training, Exercise Management is a process used by the Emergency Management Sector in Australia to categories and theme identified lessons.
PESTLEO	Considerations in undertaking a risk assessment (Political, Environmental, Social, Technological, Legal, Economic, and Operational).
Phase 1	The first part of a two-part exercise series being conducted for the National Plan Exercise in 2024.
Phase 2	The second part of a two-part exercise series being conducted for the National Plan Exercise in 2024.
Quality Assurance (QA)	A systematic approach that focuses on preventing mistakes and ensuring that products or services consistently meet expectations, benchmarks and standards.
SitReps	A situation report- an update or report, that provides a quick understanding of the current situation.
Subject Matter Expert (SME)	Expert providing specialised knowledge or skills in a particular area or field.

Recommendations for jurisdictional consideration

Key Recommendations – recommendations that have been prioritised for consideration.

- KR.1.** Implement unified digital platforms to enhance real-time data sharing and situational awareness across jurisdictions.
- KR.2.** Strengthen strategic cross-jurisdiction coordination to improve decision-making and oversight for multi-jurisdictional incident management.
- KR.3.** Standardise public information strategies and messaging protocols to ensure consistent communication during multi-jurisdictional responses
- KR.4.** Develop a transparent, unified resource allocation system to prioritise and track assets across jurisdictions efficiently.
- KR.5.** Enforce the development and alignment of scenario tasks and injects with exercise objectives from the start of the exercise planning to ensure robust quality assurance and cohesive scenario design.
- KR.6.** Implement stricter accountability measures for meeting exercise planning timelines to prevent last-minute adjustments and ensure readiness.
- KR.7.** Strengthen governance structures for exercise planning, with strengthened exercise governance accountability measures.
- KR.8.** Integrate evaluation criteria into objective setting from the outset and ensure that the objectives align with measurable outcomes.

Other Recommendations – further recommendations that should be considered.

- R.1. Review and strengthen cross-border collaboration protocols** as part of the National Plan and consider opportunities for alignment to National Emergency Management Protocols to support strategic cross jurisdictional coordination.
- R.2. Conduct a detailed gap analysis of resource-sharing protocols** to identify specific areas for improvement in cross-jurisdictional asset deployment.
- R.3. Review the structures that are needed to provide strategic oversight** during a response that enable effective coordination and resource prioritisation and sharing in a multijurisdictional response.
- R.4. Improve Response Information Management Systems** to consider sharing of real time data between jurisdictions to be more accessible to all IMT participants.
- R.5. Continue to support the development of NRT members' skills** in addition to ongoing and targeted professional development across all functional areas. This includes field-based leadership roles to support higher performing IMTs and field operations in executing effective control strategies.
- R.6. Strengthen strategic cross-jurisdiction coordination** to improve oversight and decision-making for multi-jurisdictional incident management teams.

- R.7. Develop standardised procedures for establishing and managing FOBs** to reduce logistical delays, establish clear leadership structures and improve operational efficiency.
- R.8. Enhance communication protocols for field operations** to ensure consistent and reliable information flow between field teams and IMTs.
- R.9. Standardise public information messaging**, where possible noting political considerations, to ensure consistent communication with stakeholders and the public.
- R.10. Integrate the National Response Team (NRT) into operational planning** from the outset to ensure seamless collaboration during incidents. AMSA to also consider incorporating NRT member into the AMSA IMT as part of broader response capabilities.

1. Executive Summary

1.1 Exercise Overview

Exercise Dumaresq 2024 was a two-phase exercise designed to assess and enhance Australia's capacity to respond to maritime pollution incidents across multiple jurisdictions under the National Plan for Maritime Environmental Emergencies (National Plan). The exercise involved Queensland (QLD), New South Wales (NSW), and the Commonwealth, marking the first time such a coordinated effort was undertaken between three jurisdictions. Over the course of two phases, the exercise engaged three jurisdictions in a comprehensive scenario-based exercise. This national-level exercise successfully demonstrated the strengths and adaptability of existing maritime environmental response frameworks while providing a robust foundation for future capability development.

The exercise scenario involved the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) Marine Pollution Duty Officer receiving notification from the AMSA Response Centre (ARC) that a vessel located approximately 10 nm east-northeast of the Tweed River had lost 36 containers overboard with a punctured portside forward bunker tank releasing at least 100 tonnes of very low sulphur fuel oil (VLSFO) into the water. The captain requested refuge in Brisbane, making their own way once the bunker tank had been emptied. Modelling indicated oil and shipping containers were likely to run ashore in NSW and QLD coastal waters. Transport for NSW - Maritime (NSW Maritime) and Maritime Safety Queensland (MSQ) were notified and both agencies established IMTs to respond to the potential pollution.

Phase 1 centred on strategic discussions and the initial establishment of strategic coordination and Incident Management Teams (IMTs). In Phase 2, these IMTs progressed to operational deployment and field-level coordination activities. The exercise affirmed that existing legislative frameworks and operational procedures are generally adaptable to complex scenarios. However, it also highlighted opportunities for enhancement in areas such as information management systems, the creation of shared situational awareness and cross-jurisdictional governance practices.

It is important to note that the jurisdictions agreed during Phase 1 that a central IMT was not required and that coordination would be maintained through other means such as ongoing communication, liaison and exchange of information between all jurisdictions. However, as indicated below, the wording of Objective 1 for Phase 2 does not correctly reflect this decision.

This evaluation report provides a comprehensive assessment of Exercise Dumaresq 2024, identifying key successes and areas for improvement where further refinement is possible. Notably, it emphasizes the importance of evaluating not only the extent to which objectives were achieved, but also the planning and management factors that influenced those outcomes. Improvements in exercise design and implementation can play a critical role in enabling participants to meet their objectives. A holistic and balanced focus on both outcomes and the processes that support them is key to drawing meaningful lessons and fostering ongoing improvement.

1.2 Achievement of Objectives

As the exercise was conducted in two phases, each phase had a separate set of exercise objectives. Phase One had four exercise objectives, while Phase 2 had seven exercise objectives. Most of the objectives were at least partially achieved as specified in Tables 1 and 2. The evaluation of Phase 1 was internal and designed to provide a strategic foundation by examining how well the Joint Strategic Coordination Group (JSCG) was functioning. It also provided some planning guidance for Phase 2 of the exercise. However, some of the key findings from Phase 1 are outlined in the report as they add value to the findings of Phase 2 and the overall evaluation of the entire exercise. While there were some commonalities between Phase 1 & 2 objectives, they were analysed separately due to the evolution of the exercise planning and execution.

Key performance indicators (KPIs) were developed for the assessment of each of the objectives that allowed a thorough analysis to determine if the objectives were met. The analysis identified some objectives were not fully met due to the identified gaps. These will be further explored throughout this report.

The exercise's objectives were evaluated based on their intended outcomes, with the following results:

1.2.1 Exercise Dumaresq Objectives Snapshot

An overview of the achievement of the exercise objectives across Phase 1 and Phase 2 are outlined below. The report advocates viewing exercise objectives (whether achieved, partially achieved, or not) as opportunities for continuous improvement. Falling short of an objective is not a failure but a chance to learn, adapt, and identify growth pathways. Conversely, consistently meeting all objectives could risk fostering complacency or stagnation through confirmation bias. By valuing both successes and areas for improvement as instructive, stakeholders can cultivate resilience, motivation, and sustained capability development.

The evaluation of the achievement of the objectives was based on how well the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) had been met. For further information on the KPIs refer to the appendices – Section 5.1.1. for Phase 1 and Section 5.2.1 for Phase 2 objectives.

Table 1: Evaluation of Phase 1 Objectives

Objective	Status	Rationale
1. Explore the response arrangements and processes in place at a State and Commonwealth level for the management of a marine pollution, hazardous noxious substances (HNS) and maritime casualty incident that has environmental, social, and economic impacts on the Commonwealth, QLD, and NSW jurisdictions	Partially Achieved	Strategic discussions among stakeholders successfully clarified the legal and policy frameworks governing pollution incidents, identifying applicable regulations and responsibilities across jurisdictions. However, the discussions fell short in clearly articulating the strategic control and coordination structures and processes needed for cross jurisdictional responses.
2. Practice standing up incident management teams in response to a multi-jurisdictional HNS, and pollution incident.	Achieved	QLD and NSW both established an initial IMT. Notably under the given the scenario a valuable opportunity to stand up a unified IMT involving multi-jurisdictions was missed. However, that was never within the scope of the exercise. Furthermore, the absence of a unified strategic oversight body such as the JSCG led to inconsistent coordination and decision-making.
3. Practice shared situational awareness and strategic decision-making processes as the marine pollution response escalates (including command, control, coordination, and communication)	Partially Achieved	Individually state jurisdictions achieved this. However, the focus was on a joint approach to situational awareness and decision making through strategic coordination that needs further development.
4. Explore and implement the multijurisdictional use and deployment of resources and personnel, including those for Incident Management Teams (IMTs) shoreline, marine, wildlife and HNS.	Partially Achieved	The exercise effectively pinpointed significant gaps in governance structures and resource-sharing protocols and inadequate mechanisms for prioritising and allocating resources across agencies.

Table 2: Evaluation of Phase 2 Objectives

Objective	Status	Rationale
1. Develop and maintain a Common Operating Picture (COP)	Partially Achieved	Digital tools and systems were employed to create a shared situational awareness platform within each jurisdictional IMT. However, full integration internally and across all jurisdictions was not achieved collectively. This was due to incompatible systems and limited data-sharing agreements, reducing the COP's effectiveness and is the reason why it was only partially achieved. In addition, it is important to note that a decision was made not to maintain a single IMT, and therefore a single COP, because this was not feasible given differing geographical areas, policies and procedures across the three jurisdictions. Given jurisdictional focus on the incident within their boundaries, QLD and NSW maintained their own COP. COP access was appropriately limited to relevant people.
2. Practice standing up incident management teams in response to a multi-jurisdictional HNS, and pollution incident.	Not Achieved	Efforts to coordinate IMTs across jurisdictions were undermined by the lack of a fully activated governance body for strategic coordination. Without a joint strategic coordination group providing centralised leadership, roles overlapped, and joint decision-making was at times disconnected.
3. Establish FOBs to support field operations.	Partially Achieved	FOBs (marine, shoreline &, wildlife) were established at key locations to support field operations. However, logistical challenges (e.g. delays in supply delivery) and communication breakdowns between bases and IMTs limited their operational effectiveness.

Objective	Status	Rationale
4. Provide effective control of FOBs and field teams.	Partially Achieved	Field operations were carried out, with teams responding to simulated incidents. The exercise identified the value in providing an opportunity for staff to develop experience in leadership. The exercise also identified opportunity for improvements in logistics and communication between field units and command IMTs.
5. Coordinate public information, community engagement and public warnings.	Partially Achieved	Attempts were made to align public messaging across agencies and jurisdictions. Despite some success in drafting joint statements, inconsistent timing and content in executing communications reduced the effectiveness in a fully aligned and coordinated public information function.
6. Deploy resources and personnel for shoreline response, marine response and wildlife response for oil and HNS pollution.	Partially Achieved	Resources such as personnel, equipment, and vessels were deployed to support the exercise. It should be noted that, while significant resources were allocated to the exercise, in a real life incident additional resources would likely be made available. The exercise also identified the need for improved communication and tasking of personnel.
7. Integrate National Response Team (NRT) into operations	Partially Achieved	The NRT was incorporated into the exercise, participating in planning and response activities. However, their effectiveness was limited by inadequate pre-exercise planning and restricted access to operational systems, hindering full integration.

1.3 Recommendations

The following recommendations have been drawn from the high-level findings identified throughout the evaluation process and represent key opportunities for strengthening future exercises and multi-jurisdictional responses. They are intended to enhance planning cohesion, coordination mechanisms, and operational readiness if adopted and implemented. These insights reflect areas where targeted improvements can lead to more effective and streamlined exercise delivery across jurisdictions. The following key recommendations are not the final list, and other findings are listed throughout this report.

As this was a multi-jurisdiction exercise, the intent is to provide a list of recommendations and findings that each jurisdiction may reflect upon and consider their relevance for continual improvement in a Marine Pollution Response (MPR) within the context of their own legislation and policy.

The recommendations do not identify a specific agency or jurisdiction involved. Qld and NSW have agreed to review and develop actions to address.

1.3.1 Key Recommendations

The report organises its key recommendations into two distinct categories:

- **Exercise Objectives:** Targeting improvements in operational capabilities.
- **Exercise Planning and Management:** Addressing the exercise management processes that underpin the exercise.

This separation reinforces the need to evaluate both the outcomes and the enabling processes, recognising that issues in planning and management can directly impede objective achievement.

Exercise Dumaesq 2024 provided valuable insights into cross-border collaboration, resource-sharing protocols, and operational demands. Addressing the identified gaps in both response capabilities and exercise management will enhance future exercises, strengthening Australia's preparedness for complex maritime environmental emergencies.

Table 3: Key Recommendations related to Exercise Dumaesq objectives

Key recommendations
KR.1. Implement unified digital platforms to enhance real-time data sharing and situational awareness across jurisdictions. This platform is essential for improving operational coordination and decision-making in cross jurisdictional responses. <i>(Addresses Phase 2, Objective 1: Establish a Unified Common Operating Picture, refer to pp. 43 & 45 in this report)*</i> * It is important to note that the jurisdictions agreed during Phase 1 that a central IMT was not required and that coordination would be maintained through other means such as ongoing communication, liaison and exchange of information between all jurisdictions.
KR.2. Strengthen strategic cross-jurisdiction coordination to improve decision-making and oversight for multi-jurisdictional incident management through a joint strategic coordination mechanism. Enhanced coordination will address governance challenges and streamline response efforts. <i>(Addresses Phase 2, Objective 2: Coordinate Multi-Jurisdictional Incident Management Teams, refer to pp. 36, 43 & 45 in this report)</i>
KR.3. Standardise public information strategies and messaging protocols to ensure consistent communication during multi-jurisdictional responses Uniform messaging will enhance public trust and reduce confusion. <i>(Addresses Phase 2, Objective 5: Coordinate Public Information, refer to pp. 41 & 44 in this report)</i>
KR.4. Develop a transparent, unified resource allocation system to prioritise and track assets across jurisdictions efficiently. This system will reduce delays and optimise resource deployment. <i>(Addresses Phase 2, Objective 6: Deploy Resources Effectively, refer to pp. 36 & 45 in this report)</i>

Table 4: Key Recommendations related to exercise planning and management

Key recommendations
KR.5. Enforce the development and alignment of scenario tasks and injects with exercise objectives from the start of the exercise planning to ensure robust quality assurance and cohesive scenario design. Early planning and development are essential for designing a realistic and effective exercise, as well as fostering meaningful discussion and thorough testing of scenario injects. <i>(Refer to pp.56, 60 & 62 in this report).</i>
KR.6. Implement stricter accountability measures for meeting exercise planning timelines to prevent last-minute adjustments and ensure readiness. Stronger accountability will enhance planning discipline and reduce risks of delays as well as deviations from the objectives. <i>(Refer to pp.56, 58 & 62 in this report).</i>
KR.7. Strengthen governance structures for exercise planning, with strengthened exercise governance accountability measures. While exercise planning roles and responsibilities were outlined in the original concept document and there was clearly a strong level of collaboration in exercise planning, the adherence to agreed planning deadlines and production of agreed exercise product outputs needed strengthening. A review of the exercise project planning methodology including governance accountability measures is needed to improve coordination and efficiency in exercise planning. <i>(Refer to pp.58, 59 & 62 in this report).</i>
KR.8. Integrate evaluation criteria into objective setting from the outset and ensure that the objectives align with measurable outcomes. The achievement of exercise objectives is evaluated on the assessment of the agreed exercise KPIs for each objective. Where the KPIs are not developed at the same time as the objectives and after detailed planning has evolved then this can result in a disconnect between the initial objective setting and the development of evaluation KPIs. Embedding more meaningful evaluation KPIs before scenario planning will streamline evaluation assessment and improve exercise outcomes. <i>(Refer to pp. 56 & 63 in this report).</i>

Note: The above are key recommendations. Other recommendations in the latter part of the report, are recommendations for further consideration.

2. Background to Exercise Dumaresq

2.1 Exercise Requirements under the National Plan

The National Plan outlines the framework, policies, and cooperative arrangements necessary for managing maritime environmental emergencies across Australia. Since its inception in 1973, the National Plan has facilitated collaboration between governments, industry, and other stakeholders to deliver timely, coordinated, and effective responses to maritime pollution incidents.

Exercises are a crucial element of the National Plan, designed to enhance preparedness, develop national response capabilities, and strengthen coordination among stakeholders. Regular exercises ensure ongoing readiness by promoting a clear understanding of roles, responsibilities, and best practices for managing maritime environmental emergencies. They also foster continuous improvement by highlighting insights and capturing lessons learned from realistic scenarios.

The exercise involved QLD, NSW and the Commonwealth, marking the first time such a coordinated effort was undertaken between three jurisdictions. The exercise engaged the three jurisdictions in a comprehensive scenario-based assessment over two phases at two separate times, which involved the incident spanning across the three jurisdictions borders.

Under the National Plan arrangements, a national response capability exercise is conducted annually, rotating the location to maximise jurisdictional participation and capability development. However, due to COVID-19 restrictions in 2020 and 2021, there was a temporary pause in AMSA conducting these National Plan exercises, thus impacting the continuity and regularity of the national exercise program. Both QLD and NSW conducted their own exercises during that time.

Exercise Dumaresq 2024 was designed and conducted as part of these ongoing efforts to enhance national and jurisdictional preparedness. Co-hosted by QLD and NSW, this exercise specifically addresses cross-border coordination in response to a Level 3 maritime environmental emergency scenario. The scenario and activities were deliberately structured to test national, state, and interagency arrangements, ensuring that participants experience realistic operational complexities and collaboration challenges.

Evaluation forms a key part of any National Plan exercise, to ascertain how well the exercise objectives have been met and identifies opportunities for future improvement. A range of assessment methods are typically deployed to ensure the robustness of the evaluation findings. This Evaluation Report presents strategic summaries of key outcomes, insights, and recommendations, based on observations and feedback from Phase 1 and Phase 2 of Exercise Dumaresq 2024. To maintain a strategic focus within the main report, detailed observations, supporting evidence, and participant feedback are only included in the appendices.

Key successes, areas for improvement and insights are identified through the evaluation will guide recommendations for enhancing future response capabilities and inform continuous improvement in the national framework.

2.2 Exercise Structure

Exercise Dumaresq 2024 was designed to test cross-border coordination in a Level 3 maritime emergency, building on the National Plan’s collaborative ethos. The exercise was conducted in two phases as outlined below.

Table 5: Outline of management schedule of Exercise Dumaresq

Phase 1 (12-13 June 2024)
Day 1 Phase 1 (12 June 2024) Delivered over two days, Phase 1 began with panel discussions involving senior managers. These sessions addressed high-level governance, strategic coordination, and policy guidance related to maritime environmental incidents under the National Plan framework.
Day 2 Phase 1 (13 June 2024) - Functional Exercise involving the formation of a JSCG and Incident Management Teams (IMT). NSW and QLD each established an IMT, with both jurisdictions and the Commonwealth setting up strategic coordination functions. - IMTs were established and worked through Day 1 of the incident developing several key outputs (e.g. Incident Action Plan, Risk Assessment, Communications) Plan.
Phase 2 (29-30 October 2024) - Operational-level IMTs in NSW and QLD, alongside AMSA liaison and NRT participation, activated practical response exercises at FOBs. - Field deployments included shoreline, marine, wildlife, and HNS response elements.

2.3 Exercise Governance

Exercise Dumaresq 2024 was governed by a Steering Committee that managed the high-level strategic planning and coordination maintaining consistent strategic oversight across the two phases of the exercise.

An Exercise Planning Team developed the exercise scenario and materials and managed the execution of the exercise.

Both the Steering Committee and the Planning Team involved staff from:

- AMSA
- MSQ
- NSW Maritime

The Exercise Planning Team also included staff from:

- Fire and Rescue NSW (FRNSW)
- NT Dept of Environment, Parks, and Water Security
- Tigertail (Contracted Exercise Manager for planning and exercise control)
- Resilience Planning (Contracted Evaluation Coordinator)

2.4 Exercise Objectives

The aim of Exercise Dumaresq 2024 was to:

“Practice national, state, and cross border arrangements in response to a level 3 maritime environmental emergency occurring in Commonwealth, impacting QLD and NSW jurisdictions.”

Phase 1 Objectives:

1. Explore the response arrangements and processes in place at a State and Commonwealth level for the management of a marine pollution, HNS and maritime casualty incident that has environmental, social, and economic impacts on the Commonwealth, QLD, and NSW.
2. Practice standing up incident management teams in response to a multi-jurisdictional HNS and pollution event.
3. Practice shared situational awareness and strategic decision-making processes as the marine pollution response escalates (including command control, coordination, and communication).
4. Explore and implement the multijurisdictional use and deployment of resources and personnel, including those for Incident Management Teams (IMTs) shoreline, marine, wildlife and HNS.

Phase 2 Objectives:

1. Develop and maintain a common operating picture at an operational level.
2. Coordinate multi-jurisdictional IMTs.
3. Establish FOB to support field operations.
4. Provide effective control of FOB and field teams.
5. Coordinate public information, community engagement and public warnings.
6. Deploy resources and personnel for shoreline response, marine response and wildlife response for oil and HNS pollution.
7. Integrate NRT members and other agencies into a state-based response.

Each objective was expanded into detailed measurable KPIs, forming the basis of exercise evaluation. Observations, insights, and participant feedback were systematically collected to evaluate the exercise's effectiveness against these objectives.

3. Exercise Evaluation

Exercise evaluation is a critical component of the exercise lifecycle, providing structured analysis of performance against objectives. It enables the identification of strengths, gaps, and opportunities for improvement across planning, coordination, and operational execution. An Exercise Evaluation Plan guides the assessment of the exercise KPIs and provides governance arrangements to those undertaking the exercise evaluation. The Evaluation Plan should also be an integral link to the exercise objectives and the two should be developed simultaneously. Through real-time observation, participant feedback, and post-exercise analysis, evaluation helps ensure that lessons are captured and translated into meaningful changes. Ultimately, it supports continuous improvement and strengthens preparedness for future incidents.

3.1 Evaluation Approach

This section outlines the primary aims of the exercise evaluation, which were to assess the effectiveness of planning, coordination, and operational delivery against the established objectives. The evaluation sought to identify strengths, areas for improvement to inform future exercises and real-world responses. By systematically analysing performance across all phases of the exercise, the evaluation aimed to support continuous improvement and strengthen multi-jurisdictional incident management capabilities.

An Evaluation Plan was developed for the exercise and outlined the purpose for evaluation as well as the methodology for data collection and analysis. The evaluation plan is consistent with the methodology contained in the AIDR Managing Exercises Handbook and the AIDR Lessons Management Handbook. The evaluation plan outlined the particular methodology to be used in undertaking the evaluation with a focus on whether the exercise meets its intended objectives, as well as the participant's response to the developing scenario. A key component of exercise evaluation was the triangulation of data to achieve validity in the insights and ensuring that there was more than one observation that led to an insight.

3.1.1 Exercise Evaluation Team

Exercise Evaluation was managed by the AMSA Evaluation Advisor with the assistance of the Exercise Evaluation Coordinator. Exercise Evaluators were drawn from jurisdictional personnel provided by MSQ, NSW Maritime and AMSA, as well as external evaluators provided by the Evaluator Coordinator.

3.2 Evaluation Methodology

The purpose of exercise evaluation is twofold. Firstly, exercise evaluation enables the critical evaluation of the achievement of the set exercise objectives. Secondly, evaluation enables the identification of insights not directly related to the objectives but draws out the experiences of exercise participants related to how the exercise was conducted. These additional findings provide insight into the key successes and areas for improvement of the exercising process. By achieving these objectives, the evaluation process contributes to the continuous improvement of exercise design, as well as building response capabilities within jurisdictions.

The following collection methods were adopted in evaluating the outcome of Exercise Dumareshq:

- Online observations by exercise participants (voluntary, conducted throughout the exercise).
- Online surveys by exercise participants (voluntary, conducted pre-phase 1, post phase 1 and post-phase 2).
- Hot debriefs at the end of each day and at the end of the exercise with all exercise participants (mandatory, conducted in Phase 1 Day 2 and Phase 2).
- Direct observations by exercise evaluators against agreed KPIs and the recording of other insights gained through their subject matter expertise (SME) (mandatory, conducted throughout Phase 1 Day 2 and Phase 2).
- Documentary examination of exercise output such as plans, COP-related documents, briefing documents and communiques (mandatory, conducted after Phase 1 and Phase 2).
- Post exercise interviews with key participants and members of the exercise planning team after Phases 1 and 2 (voluntary).

Table 6: Areas of evaluation for Exercise Dumareshq

Areas of evaluation
Assess Effectiveness Objective: To evaluate whether the exercise met its intended objectives and achieved the desired outcomes. Method: Assess performance against predefined KPIs for each exercise objective. Outcome: Determine if the exercise effectively simulated the response to a marine pollution incident and if the participating agencies and teams performed as expected.
Identify Successes and Key Areas for Improvement Objective: To identify what worked well during the exercise and areas that need improvement. Method: Gather feedback through observations, surveys, and interviews with participants and exercise planners and consider exercise outputs. Outcome: Highlight successful elements of the exercise and pinpoint specific areas where protocols, processes, coordination, or communication can be enhanced for both future exercises or insights for future response efforts

Areas of evaluation

Enhance Future Exercises

Objective: To use the insights gained from the evaluation to improve the design and execution of future exercises.

Method: Analyse feedback and performance data to develop actionable insights and recommendations.

Outcome: Refine exercise management methodology and processes used in delivering future National Plan Exercises.

During this exercise the use of surveys, online observations, debriefs interviews, and use of evaluators placed within the Exercise Control Centres enabled data, artefacts such as Incident Action Plans (IAPs), Risk Assessments and photographs to provide observations that could be analysed. The purpose of each of these are outline below.

Table 7: Evaluation methodology used in Exercise Dumaresq

Evaluation methodology

1. Online Observations

Description: Voluntary qualitative data collection from exercise participants.

Purpose: Capture real-time observations from participants to understand their perspectives on the exercise's effectiveness and conduct.

Implementation: Participants submitted their observations through an online platform, focusing on various aspects of the exercise.

2. Online Surveys

Description: Voluntary qualitative and quantitative feedback from exercise participants.

Purpose: Gather structured feedback on participants' experiences, insights, and suggestions for improvement.

Implementation: Surveys were distributed to participants at the end of each day, collecting feedback on specific elements of the exercise.

3. Hot Debriefs

Description: Mandatory debrief sessions conducted at the end of each day and at the end of the exercise.

Purpose: Facilitate immediate reflection and discussion among participants about the day's activities, identifying strengths and areas for improvement.

Implementation: Incident Controllers and Functional Managers led debrief sessions, encouraging open discussion and capturing key points raised by participants.

Evaluation methodology

4. Direct Observations by Exercise Evaluators

Description: Evaluation team members conducted direct observations of the exercise against agreed KPIs.

Purpose: Assess performance in real-time and gather insights from subject matter experts.

Implementation: Evaluators used checklists and observation forms to record their findings, focusing on predefined KPIs and note evidence generated by exercise participants.

5. Post-Exercise Interviews

Description: Qualitative data collection through interviews with key participants and exercise management personnel after the exercise.

Purpose: Gain in-depth insights into participants' experiences, challenges, and recommendations.

Implementation: Interviews were conducted with selected participants and exercise management personnel, focusing on their roles, observations, and feedback on the exercise.

3.3 Evaluation Analysis

To provide rigour in the evaluation process multiple analysis processes were utilised to ensure validation of the observations. During evaluation analysis both qualitative and quantitative approaches were used as outlined below. Qualitative analysis interprets text, audio or video data to understand concepts and build core themes that emerge. Whereas quantitative analysis is based on numbers so that trends or concepts can be explored through graphs or similar.

Qualitative Analysis

- **Theming Framework:** Responses from observations, open-ended survey questions, and interviews were analysed using thematic analysis to identify common themes, insights, and areas for improvement.
- **Triangulation:** Cross-referencing data from different sources to ensure the validity and reliability of the findings, insights and recommendations from multiple data points.

Quantitative Analysis

- **Survey Data:** Quantitative data from day-specific surveys were analysed to measure satisfaction levels, perceived effectiveness, and the achievement of exercise objectives.
- **IMT Outputs:** The processes undertaken by exercise participants and the outputs achieved provided documentary evidence to support the evaluation of the objectives.

The outcome of this approach is the identification of themes which can be developed further into identified successes and key areas for improvement and provide learning insights. This is usually expressed as findings and recommendations.

The analysis was conducted using the P²OST²E structure. By using such an approach, the following elements of capability can be assessed, allowing for a root cause analysis of the lessons identified.

Table 8: P²OST²E evaluation framework – key domains

P²OST²E	
P – People:	Roles, responsibilities, accountabilities, and skills of personnel involved.
P – Process:	Plans, policies, procedures, and workflows in place.
O – Organisation:	Structure, jurisdiction, and governance frameworks.
S – Support:	Infrastructure, facilities, and maintenance capabilities.
T – Technology:	Equipment, systems, standards, interoperability, and security measures.
T – Training:	Qualifications, skill levels, and identification of required training programs.
E – Exercise Management:	Development, structure, management, and conduct of exercises.

The evaluation findings and recommendations are presented against each phase of the exercise. A separate section deals with the evaluation of the exercise planning and management process, which is where the P²OST²E evaluation framework is applied to determine the effectiveness and success.

4. Evaluation Findings and Recommendations

The evaluation findings highlight key strengths and areas for improvement observed throughout the exercise. These insights reflect the effectiveness of planning, coordination, and operational response across jurisdictions. Based on these findings, a set of targeted recommendations has been developed to support continuous improvement. If implemented, these recommendations will help enhance future exercise design, execution, and interagency collaboration, contributing to more effective responses in real-world scenarios.

The evaluation findings outline a series of key successes and key areas for improvement. It should be noted that in developing the key successes and key areas for improvement no major contradictions emerged. It is also possible that similar areas for improvement appear in both successes and areas for improvement. This will depend on how the topic was observed during the exercise and the data collected from the evaluation process. Each participating organisation will need to reflect on the findings in the context of their operating environment and determine for themselves what successes need reinforcing and what improvements need to be adopted.

4.1 Summary Evaluation - Phase 1

At the conclusion of Phase 1, an interim (and unpublished) evaluation report was produced to support the development of Phase 2 exercise planning. The focus of reporting on Phase 1 in this evaluation report is to retain and highlight the residual findings which have wider application.

Phase 1 was successful in establishing a foundational understanding of the strategic and legislative frameworks governing marine pollution and HNS responses, with robust panel discussions that engaged senior leaders from the Commonwealth, NSW, and QLD and industry representatives.

This phase successfully set a baseline for incident management for this exercise by introducing key concepts such as multi-jurisdictional coordination and the importance of inter-agency collaboration. However, there remained significant challenges and a lack of cohesive quality assurance in scenario inject development, which undermined the overall integration of cross-border processes.

Key aspects to retain for future exercises included the strong engagement of senior leadership, the structured approach to delivering panel discussions and strategic insights, and the initial formation of incident management teams that provided a platform for operational planning.

For Phase 2, improvements were recommended to ensure more robust and unified data-sharing systems, and the formal activation of a JSCG. These enhancements were critical in bridging the identified gaps in cross-jurisdictional decision-making, streamlining resource allocation, and ensuring that all exercise components were cohesively integrated into a unified, realistic response simulation. These outcomes informed Phase 2's expanded scope, shifting focus to operational deployment and field coordination.

4.1.1 Day 1 Findings

The key findings from Day 1 are drawn from the analysis of participant survey results, evaluation observations and post exercise interviews. The key findings provide important insights into how the exercise was conducted and the learnings from participants.

The insights incorporate a range of positive statements and lessons drawn from the surveys and observations that demonstrates a range of positive outcomes as a result of the exercise activity undertaken during Day 1.

While the overall rating from the surveys and evaluation observations regarding the effectiveness of the panel discussion on Day 1 were positive, there were several comments and observations that highlighted areas for improvement that also need further consideration.

4.1.2 Key Successes

People

- **Panel Discussions and Information Exchange** – Provided a strategic overview of pollution response frameworks, setting the stage for the exercise. Interactive Q&A sessions allowed participants to clarify key issues, fostering a better understanding.

Process

- **Clarity on Legislative Frameworks** – Provided a comprehensive understanding of international (MARPOL), national, and state-specific maritime pollution response frameworks.

Support

- **Room Environment and Comfort** – Participants were accommodated in a setting conducive to discussion, although some further improvements were identified.

Training

- **Structured Approach to Learning** – Clear presentations and guided discussions contributed to participant comprehension.

Exercise Management

- **Setting the Context for Day 2** – Structured presentations and briefings ensured participants were well-prepared for the functional exercise.

4.1.3 Key Areas for Improvement

People

- **Training for Facilitators** – Large group sessions indicated a need for greater confidence and capability in managing discussions and responding to technical queries dynamically, suggesting that further development in this area could enhance the facilitators' ability to strengthen overall session delivery.

Organisation

- **Depth of Engagement** – The sessions were overly lecture-based with limited opportunities for in-depth exploration of topics beyond those discussions involving panel members.

Support

- **Room Environment and Comfort** – Poor ventilation and lack of comfort affected participants' focus and engagement.

Training

- **Structured Learning Improvements** – More interactive elements, such as breakout discussions and table-based tasks, may have supported deeper engagement and enhanced learning during the exercise.
- **Integration of Interactive Learning Tools** – The use of simulations, and interactive exercises facilitated better retention of information.

Exercise Management

- **Audience Participation and Interaction** – The sessions permitted only limited engagement beyond passive listening and a brief Q&A session, thus reducing the effectiveness of absorption and knowledge transfer.
- **Clarity and Structure in Q&A Sessions** – While there was a structure for each session with associated questions, the format lacked organisation, making it difficult to comprehensively address participant queries.
- **Integration of Interactive Learning Tools** – Over-reliance on presentations limited participant engagement and retention of information. The use of small group discussion would have supported the broader group sessions.
- **Exercise Design for Active Participation** – More interactive components, such as live polling, small group discussions, and case studies, should be incorporated to enhance learning outcomes.

4.1.4 Day Two Findings

Day 2 of *Exercise Dumaresq 2024* showcased several key successes that contributed to the effective management of the simulated marine pollution incident. The establishment of well-organised IMTs, effective use of liaison officers, regular briefings, and enhanced situational awareness were crucial elements that worked well.

Additionally, the positive inter-jurisdictional collaboration and the use of technology and systems like GUARDIAN significantly enhanced the exercise's overall effectiveness. These successes demonstrate the strength of the existing response framework and provide a solid foundation for further improvements.

Planning during any major real-life emergency management takes time to develop as more situational information about the incident comes to hand. It is also acknowledged that preliminary planning of the type expected at the start of any incident did occur on Day 2 and that further developments and refinements were anticipated in Phase 2.

4.1.5 Key Successes

People

- **Effective Use of Liaison Officers** – Liaison officers enhanced coordination and situational awareness, improving inter-team communication.
- **Involvement of Traditional Owners** – Engagement with Traditional Owner Liaison contributed culturally sensitive insights into response planning.
- **Communication and Stakeholder Engagement** – Public information and stakeholder engagement were recognised as crucial components of the response framework.

Process

- **Development of Key Outputs** – Essential documents such as IAPs, Situation Reports, and Talking Points were produced to guide response efforts.
- **Regular Briefings and Meetings** – Occurred on a regular basis within the respective IMTs and ensured continuous communication and alignment across teams, supporting informed decision-making.
- **Enhanced Situational Awareness** – Common operating pictures (COP) and situation reports at jurisdictional level enabled functional units within each IMT to maintain a shared understanding of the incident within their jurisdiction.

Organisation

- **Establishment of Incident Management Teams (IMTs)** – NSW and QLD successfully set up structured and well-defined IMTs for efficient incident response. In addition, Phase 1 demonstrated the benefits of establishing early incident management structures. These teams, although at an initial stage, provided valuable insights into the benefits of inter-agency coordination and highlighted the importance of timely information sharing.

Support

- **Resource Allocation and Management** – Clear decisions were made regarding jurisdictional resources, improving transparency and accountability within the jurisdiction.

Technology

- **Use of Technology and Systems** – Where used, the integration of tools such as GUARDIAN supported efficient information management and operational coordination.
- **Information Management Systems Access** – Participants effectively utilised available Information Technology (IT) systems to manage and disseminate data.

Training

- **Participant Feedback on Structured Learning** – The structured approach to learning was well-received, aiding in the effective communication of complex topics.
- **Integration of Interactive Learning Tools** – The use of simulations, and interactive exercises facilitated better retention of information.

Exercise Management

- **Exercise-Based Knowledge Application** – Practical activities allowed participants to apply theoretical knowledge in a realistic setting.

4.1.6 Key Areas for Improvement

People

- **Inclusion of Traditional Owners** – While engagement began during the exercise, continued integration of Traditional Owner perspectives is needed.

Process

- **Communication and Stakeholder Engagement Plan** – These were still in early development, and therefore there was room for improvement in the public information function, as well as the broader incident management team.
- **Resource Allocation and Management** – Inconsistent recording of decisions reduced transparency and accountability in resource deployment.
- **Joint Situational Awareness and COP** – the inward focus on planning for and resourcing jurisdictional areas of operation and areas of concern in the early phase of the response limited the drive for prioritising joint situational awareness and a joint COP. The missed opportunity to establish this early in the developing response structures impeded the ability for jurisdiction to later pivot and effectively adopt formal structures and processes in support of this joint understanding as the response progressed.

Organisation

- **Establishment of JSCG** – The process for establishing both strategic coordination and incident management structures simultaneously was a challenge. The exercise scenario provided a platform to establish a JSCG and practice collaborative decision-making and coordination in that environment. However, it did not provide solid triggers or expectations to bring strategic decision makers together with a clear purpose. The intent to practice the formalisation of a structured JSCG did therefore not occur. The group lacked a clear mandate and disbanded early due to ineffective coordination.
- **Establishing Operational Teams** – While it was out of scope for this exercise, it was identified that AMSA missed an opportunity to practice the establishment and operation of their IMT. AMSA's participation in the exercise was through liaison officers and role-playing aspects of AMSA's response via exercise control. While effective for the exercise, the opportunity to fully engage and practice real time collaboration and communication between all jurisdictions would have enhanced the overall exercise outcomes.

Support

- **IMT Equipment and Resources** – There were varying levels of preparedness in setting up jurisdictional IMT spaces and a general lack of preparedness for providing the full cache of resources, infrastructure and IT support for effectively establishing and maintaining an operating environment for the incident management teams.

Technology

- **Information Management Systems Access** – Restricted access to IT systems hindered the efficiency of information management and decision-making.
- **Use of Technology in Maintaining Situational Awareness** – The use of technology allowed for the maintenance of a well-managed and informed COP within both IMTs.

Training

- **Capability** – There was a broad range of participant skill and experience that impacted the smooth and rapid establishment of IMTs. Ongoing initial training and skills maintenance programs for jurisdictional State Response Team (SRT) and NRT members enhances capability of IMTs.

Exercise Management

- **Participant Identification and Role Clarity** – Observers and Exercise Control (ExCon) members were not all clearly distinguished, causing confusion at times about roles.

4.1.7 Phase 1 Recommendations

The exercise successfully tested key elements such as situational awareness and strategic planning, confirming that the current response arrangements have a strong baseline. The activities of Phase 1 set a solid platform for refining and expanding operational capabilities in Phase 2. The following recommendations go beyond the improvements identified for the Phase 2 exercise arrangements and are highlighted for further consideration.

- R.1. Review and strengthen cross-border collaboration protocols** as part of the National Plan and consider opportunities for alignment to National Emergency Management Protocols to support strategic cross jurisdictional coordination.

(Linked to Phase 1, Objective 1: Explore response arrangements and processes)

- R.2. Conduct a detailed gap analysis of resource-sharing protocols** to identify specific areas for improvement in cross-jurisdictional asset deployment.

This analysis will inform the development of more effective resource-sharing mechanisms.

(Linked to Phase 1, Objective 4: Multijurisdictional use and deployment of resources.)

- R.3. Review the structures that are needed to provide strategic oversight** during a response that enable effective coordination and resource prioritisation and sharing in a multijurisdictional response.

A strategic oversight committee will monitor and address gaps in governance and coordination identified during Phase 1. More effective strategic oversight will enhance response arrangements.

(Linked to Phase 1, Objective 4: Multijurisdictional use and deployment of resources. Also refer to KR 7.)

- R.4. Improve Response Information Management Systems** to consider sharing of real time data between jurisdictions to be more accessible to all IMT participants.

A more agile system will better support effective incident management.

(Linked to Phase 1, Objective 3: Shared situational awareness and COP, noting that a single COP was not in scope.)

- R.5. Continue to support the development of NRT members' skills** in addition to ongoing and targeted professional development across all functional areas. This includes field-based leadership roles to support higher performing IMTs and field operations in executing effective control strategies.

A more proficient and highly skilled resource pool available as part of the National Plan arrangements will better support effective incident management.

(Linked to Phase 1, Objectives 2, 3, Phase 2, Objectives 1-7)

4.2 Phase 2 Summary Evaluation

Phase 2 of Exercise Dumaesq demonstrated, in comparison to Phase 1, progress in several key areas—particularly the increased use of technology (GIS mapping, digital dashboards, drone imaging) and the presence of a more structured daily rhythm within and across IMTs. This was due, in part, to the jurisdictions operating out of their own ICCs and they were not constrained by the artificialities of a conference room as on Day 2 of Phase 1.

However, developing a shared situational awareness without the ability for integrating multiple platforms (MIMS, SharePoint, Guardian) remained a key challenge, with data accessibility barriers and the parallel systems used by the jurisdictions identified as an area for improvement. Field operations benefited from stronger risk analyses (PESTLEO, NEBA) and mentorship. However, formal risk briefings and sub-plans were not always effectively communicated to FOBs.

Cross-border coordination continued to be the most significant area for improvement, in part because each jurisdiction has its own emergency management arrangements and accompanying terminology. The exercise demonstrated the benefit in developing a JSCG in a real-life incident, and the benefit of how such a group might consider emergency management arrangements. Although regular liaison meetings were useful and went some way to breaking down jurisdictional barriers, consistent terminology and improved access to each other's systems would build collaboration. Similarly, the effort to integrate NRT members into IMTs and FOBs highlighted ongoing issues with system logins, induction processes, and planning inconsistencies.

Public information management improved from Phase 1 to Phase 2, aided by consistent talking points and real-time media injects. However, coordination gaps persisted into Phase 2, between jurisdictions, with unaligned public warnings for border communities and minimal real-time stakeholder feedback loops. While local strengths—such as Aboriginal Cultural Heritage Officers, targeted wildlife responders, and dedicated logistics staff—enriched the exercise, a more unified approach is needed to fully integrate field and IMT activities when operating in a multi-jurisdictional environment.

Collectively, the key improvement areas specified below target the coordination challenges revealed in Phase 2 including cross-border alignment, integrated field operations, robust training, better public communication, and shared decision-logging. Addressing these gaps will further leverage the strong foundation and successes already achieved, creating a more seamless, unified, and effective response framework for future multi-jurisdictional maritime incidents.

Phase 2 showcased multiple successes, from stronger multi-jurisdictional collaboration and technology-enabled COPs to robust public information engagement. While recognised limitations (like system access, field logistics, and alignment of IMT practices specifically around intelligence sharing) remain, the identified key successes confirm that the exercise produced valuable improvements in operational readiness, structured planning, and stakeholder engagement compared to the earlier phase.

Looking ahead, resolving system-access constraints, establishing a formal cross-border coordination group or utilising National Coordination Mechanisms, standardising processes for managing field operations, and expanding multi-agency training remain priorities. Collectively, these measures will help address persistent fragmentation in cross border responses and further enhance the incident response framework.

4.2.1 Key Successes

People

- In many cases, Incident Controllers (ICs) led proactive risk discussions; functional leads similarly engaged in collaborative problem-solving, ensuring more prompt decisions.
- Leaders effectively adapted to surging staffing needs, assigning tasks to the most experienced or specialised personnel (e.g. the deployment of NRT members in critical roles).
- Media teams leveraged structured talking points, daily media schedules, and scenario-based injects to practice real-time press releases.
- Collaboration between NSW Maritime, MSQ, local councils and other relevant entities ensured consistent messaging (despite some cross-border variances).
- Engagement with local Indigenous groups, councils, and environmental stakeholders was largely successful, demonstrating more inclusive planning and that response considerations add value to response efforts.
- NRT members contributed specialised expertise, supporting local teams and filling knowledge gaps in wildlife and HNS operations.

Process

- Many participants reported effective incident management strategies, particularly in preparing sub-plans and setting up structured daily briefs.
- Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System (AIIMS) principles were generally applied, and mentors guided less-experienced members toward strong IMT collaboration.
- Certain IMTs streamlined their workflows by systematically allocating operational tasks and resources (e.g. designated sub-plans for wildlife, marine, and logistics).

Organisation

- QLD and NSW IMTs convened frequently in cross jurisdictional meeting, sharing SitReps and updates. Liaison officers embedded in each IMT assisted in maintaining communication flow and situational awareness.
- Inter-jurisdictional video or phone-based meetings improved situational awareness and allowed teams to raise issues in real time.
- Clear daily battle rhythms and “heads of function” huddles contributed to better synergy among Planning, Operations, Logistics, Safety, and Public Information teams within each jurisdiction.
- Participants credited Phase 1 lessons for stronger field coordination, integrated planning, and better use of digital data.
- Some FOBs overcame supply chain or site set-up obstacles by applying creative solutions (e.g. mentor-driven troubleshooting, local resource use).

Support

- The Incident Control Centres (ICCs) provided well-equipped spaces to coordinate large functional teams working simultaneously.

Technology

- **GIS and Digital Dashboards**
 - Real-time mapping provided valuable on-water and shoreline data, enabling visual tracking of boom deployments and affected areas.
 - Field teams' use of devices (e.g. drone footage) fed into the COP, increasing awareness of evolving site conditions.
- **Incident Management Systems**
 - Despite partial access challenges, many participants found information management systems useful for storing, sharing, and updating documents such as SitReps, sub-plans, and logs.
- **Innovative Use of Technology**
 - Drone imagery and specialised apps for the Shoreline Cleanup and Assessment Team (SCAT) offered faster, more detailed site assessments, especially once data reached the IMTs.

Training

- **Enhanced Readiness from Phase 1**
 - Extensive pre-exercise planning, along with Phase 1 lessons, helped boost Phase 2 readiness as evidenced by more structured processes at the IMT, FOB, and field levels.
 - Mentors at FOBs offered targeted, on-the-spot coaching, accelerating skill-building for teams unfamiliar with marine pollution responses.
- **Practical Exercises & Scenario Drills**
 - The “realistic” scenario reportedly helped participants refine their roles, especially in wildlife rescue and HNS handling, reinforcing the importance of sub-plans and daily briefings.

4.2.2 Key Areas for Improvement

People

- **Unified Incident Management System**
 - Numerous access barriers across multiple systems (MIMS, SharePoint, Guardian) delayed updates and complicated cross-border information sharing.
 - A single, agreed-upon platform—or robust interconnectivity across systems—would ensure everyone sees and updates the same information in real time.
- **Clearer Roles & Responsibilities**
 - Formalising cross-border procedures (e.g. the functioning of a JSCG or adopting updated National Coordination Arrangements) would solidify governance and decision-making protocols and better support collaborative decision-making supporting community focused outcomes.

Process

- **Dedicated FOB Management & Communication**
 - Field teams often bypassed their FOB or received delayed instructions. A designated FOB manager with direct IMT linkage, plus standardised briefings, would reduce confusion and ensure tasks flow efficiently.

- **Improved Logistical Planning**

- Teams reported shortages of PPE, food, and essential equipment, sometimes discovered too late. Some FOBs lacked basic infrastructure (tables, shelter, consistent access to the COP).
- A real-time resource-tracking process (pre-deployment checklists, dedicated logistics liaisons) would ensure supplies arrive before field activities begin.

Organisation

- **System Familiarisation**

- Many interagency participants struggled with the use of MIMS or Guardian; regular training and seeking ways to integrate their use into exercise activities would lessen confusion about where/how to input or retrieve and manage data.

- **Consistent Field Inductions & Safety Briefings**

- Some field teams reported potential for improvements in safety briefings and safety protocols, including presence of trained safety officers and clarification of PPE requirements.
- Making site induction protocols mandatory (supported by up-to-date safety plans) ensures all personnel understand hazards, protective measures, and communications channels.

Support

- **Aligned Public Messaging**

- A single cross-jurisdictional public messaging plan (including consistent templates and daily joint briefings) would boost clarity for the public and stakeholders impacted by cross border events.

- **Feedback Integration**

- While public information units used social media monitoring, the process to formally capture and respond to community queries was limited.
- A streamlined system to log, triage, and adjust messaging based on verified stakeholder input may improve communications.

Technology

- **Decision-Log Consistency**

- Many responders resorted to personal notes, Post-its, or ad hoc logs, creating accountability and version-control gaps.
- Adopting a single, mandatory log protocol (supported by a designated “logging officer”) ensures all decisions are traceable and easily referenced.

- **Expanded Intelligence Role**

- A dedicated and experienced Intelligence function would centralise risk data, re-check modelling (e.g. for oil or container drift), and produce timely situational updates for decision making.

Training

- **Information Management and Intelligence**

- Further training on the use of operational systems across all operational areas (IMT, FOBs, Field Teams) is needed.
- As the Intelligence Function continues to be elevated out of Planning there is a need to ensure dedicated training for personnel in this function that focuses on information collection and validation and the effective management of the COP.
- Frequent, short refresher sessions (including “onboarding” modules for NRT members or external agencies) could standardise user proficiency of jurisdictional based systems; alternatively investigate the development of a common system for National Plan responses.

4.2.3 Phase 2 Recommendations

Teams genuinely achieved strong IMT coordination in many instances. Examples of this include, applying use of technology (GIS) more effectively than during Phase 1, and improved public information handling overall.

However, the “areas for improvement” underscore that some successes were partial or limited to specific teams and contexts. Those that participated in the exercise will determine where these do and no not apply to them. For example.

- While use of GIS and MIMS was a noted success, the improvements highlight that system access and training needed to be more consistent to maximise that success across all relevant teams.
- Regular meetings and embedded liaison officers were, in fact, successes. However, these findings remind us that such efforts could be improved with a fully shared system and a formal cross-border decision-making/tracking process, such as at an JCSG level.

In other words, nothing in the recommended improvements invalidates the previously identified successes; they simply add nuance—reinforcing that certain achievements were unevenly distributed or could be pushed further to achieve greater overall effectiveness in the future.

R.6. Strengthen strategic cross-jurisdiction coordination to improve oversight and decision-making for multi-jurisdictional incident management teams.

Enhanced coordination will address the governance challenges observed during the exercise.

(Linked to Phase 2, Objective 2: Coordinate Multi-Jurisdictional Incident Management Teams)

R.7. Develop standardised procedures for establishing and managing FOBs to reduce logistical delays, establish clear leadership structures and improve operational efficiency.

Clear procedures will ensure FOBs are set up and managed effectively.

(Linked to Phase 2, Objective 3: Establish FOBs)

R.8. Enhance communication protocols for field operations to ensure consistent and reliable information flow between field teams and IMTs.

Improved communication will reduce operational inefficiencies.

(Linked to Phase 2, Objective 4: Control Field Operations Effectively)

- R.9. Standardise public information messaging, where possible noting political considerations,** to ensure consistent communication with stakeholders and the public.

Uniform messaging will minimise confusion and enhance public trust.

(Linked to Phase 2, Objective 5: Coordinate Public Information)

- R.10. Create a transparent, unified resource allocation system** to prioritise, track, and deploy assets efficiently across jurisdictions.

This system may improve timely resource deployment.

(Linked to Phase 2, Objective 6: Deploy Resources Effectively)

- R.11. Integrate the National Response Team (NRT) into operational planning** from the outset to ensure seamless collaboration during incidents. AMSA to also consider incorporating NRT member into the AMSA IMT as part of broader response capabilities.

Early integration will enhance NRT effectiveness and overall response coordination.

(Linked to Phase 2, Objective 7: Integrate the NRT)

4.3 Exercise Management - Summary Evaluation

Phase 2 built on Phase 1's groundwork but significantly amplified the exercise complexity by adding new jurisdictional layers, extended planning requirements, and a broader scope to include field operations. Phase 2 also saw a change to exercise objectives. Some KPIs relating to the functioning of the JSCG were not retained in Phase 2.

While a robust exercise planning governance structure was established, exercise planners had to reconcile multiple local add-ons—such as distinct public information frameworks and wildlife integration. Although the steering committee and planning sessions largely kept things moving, the differing scenario ownership (e.g. each jurisdiction drafting its own injects) affected momentum and limited evaluation of the development of scenario information and injects against the exercise objectives and evaluation KPIs.

During the exercise, Exercise Control established effective systems and processes to track and monitor the exercise across multiple locations. However, evaluators within one jurisdiction could not access the other jurisdiction's COP and this impacted on gathering holistic insights. Additionally, alignment between the final scenario and the original exercise objectives and KPIs could have been improved.

Phase 2 provided invaluable lessons about planning an exercise using cross-border collaboration, resource-sharing protocols, and evolving operational demands, within a cross-jurisdictional scenario rarely practiced. While exercise management structures were established there is an opportunity for greater accountability in meeting agreed outputs, streamlined planning processes (scenario development workshops), and evaluation approaches that integrate smoothly with complex, multi-phase exercise planning processes.

Collectively, these exercise management successes highlight how thoughtful governance structures, dedicated exercise planning, agile ExCon adjustments, and proactive mentorship enabled the exercise overall to maintain strategic coherence, even amid cross-jurisdictional complexity and evolving scenario demands.

Below is a set of key successes and areas for improvement focused specifically on exercise management, which have been identified through participant feedback, interview and evaluator observations. These areas highlight the need for enhanced coordination, clearer governance structures, more effective real-time adjustments, and better integration of evaluation criteria.

Addressing these areas will ensure more efficient planning and execution in future exercises, improve communication across teams, and strengthen the overall responsiveness and effectiveness of multi-jurisdictional incident management. The following sections detail the specific challenges observed and provide targeted insights for optimising exercise management practices moving forward.

Effective exercise management enables the achievement of objectives. Phase 2 built on Phase 1, but planning challenges impacted on exercise outcomes, as detailed below. Despite the challenges which come with any exercise of this scale and complexity, the exercise managers developed and executed an exercise program that largely met the expectations of participating organisations.

As the key successes and areas for improvement relate to the exercise management feedback obtained during the evaluation it is not listed against the entire P²OPST²E format. All areas identified as both success factors and areas for improvement relate to the 'E' in the P²OPST²E format.

4.3.1 Exercise Management Key Successes

Field ExCon in both Jurisdictions

- **Real-Time Adjustments:** In-the-field ExCon staff swiftly identified issues at FOBs —e.g. logistical shortfalls or scheduling slips—and collaborated with planners to fix them immediately, thus minimising friction and potential fallouts.
- **Safety & Risk Management:** Across interviews participants praised how ExCon quietly managed safety oversight in real time, addressing minor problems before they escalated.

Mentoring

- **Supportive Exercise Culture:** Senior mentors in both IMTs and field locations offered immediate guidance, especially when new staff encountered scenario complexities. This on-the-spot coaching approach bolstered learning without stalling the exercise flow.
- **Bridging Phase 1 & Phase 2:** Mentors who had observed Phase 1 effectively carried lessons forward, reinforcing continuity in exercise management practices for the second phase.

Steering Committee & Governance Value

- **High-Level Oversight:** Multiple interviewees indicated that the steering committee provided meaningful direction and resolved planning deadlocks, ensuring that multi-jurisdictional considerations remained on the agenda.
- **Maintained Momentum:** Even as separate teams worked on different scenario threads, the Exercise Manager maintained enough momentum to keep the exercise timetable achievable.

Positive Collaboration in Exercise Planning

- **Cross-Team Coordination:** Despite noted challenges, several participants described collaboration in the planning stage as “excellent,” allowing each jurisdiction to inject local details in a constructive manner.
- **Adaptive Mindset:** Exercise planners demonstrated flexibility by modifying schedules and documents during the exercise when exercise products fell short, preventing major disruptions to exercise management.

Agile Scenario Refinement

- **Adaptive Scheduling:** Interviewees noted that scenario documents generated ‘in exercise’ that were meant to carry into Phase 2 required extra detail or rework. Although this volume of re-work was not anticipated, exercise planners successfully folded these updates into final products without derailing the overall timeline.
- **Retaining Focus on Objectives:** Even with last-minute changes to the storyline or injects, exercise planners managed to keep the exercise aimed at key strategic targets.

4.3.2 Exercise Management Key Areas for Improvement

Process

Communication & Documentation Protocols

- **Integrated Pre-Exercise Briefings:** Providing short orientation modules or “mini-briefings” for the exercise participants on what is notional vs. actual would help them quickly interpret injects and schedule changes.
- **Central Repository for Exercise Records:** Some participants mentioned late or scattered planning documents. A clear project plan, accountable action lists and a unified platform (with consistent access protocols) for scenario scripts, inject timetables, and contact details can support coordination and provide clear decision points for the management of exercise planning team member contributions.

Exercise Management

Scenario Coherence and Inject Development

- **Formal Quality Assurance (QA):** There was a need for more systematic, centralised and QA controlled processes to draft, review, and finalise scenario arcs and injects, ensuring consistent realism and avoiding contradictory or stray elements. A standardised QA checkpoint could confirm that injects effectively align with overarching objectives, preventing uneven narrative threads across jurisdictions and exercise areas.
- **Strengthen Inject Writing & Review:** Multiple exercise planners noted that a central SharePoint with standardised exercise inject templates was created and regular meetings were held to track progress on scenario development. However, a more centralised and QA controlled process may have further benefited exercise planning.

Cross-Phase Continuity & Handovers

- **Clarify Phase 1-to-Phase 2 Transition:** Interviewees described extra workloads to refine scenario materials that were not fully developed in Phase 1. Employing intermediate “readiness checks” would reduce last-minute rework.
- **Documented Handover Points:** According to best practice, each phase should conclude with a formal step verifying which products (e.g. sub-plans, IAPs, wildlife approaches) are ready for the upcoming scenario and who holds responsibility for further updates. Arrangements relying on each jurisdiction to have carriage over critical scenario and inject development created unnecessary complexity, bottlenecks and uncertainty if exercise materials would be completed and appropriately align with exercise objectives by Phase 2.

Planning Timelines & Resource Realism

- **Early Alignment on Resource Deployment:** There was an underappreciation of the workloads required in supporting the development of exercise resources given the complexity of the exercise and scenario. There was also an expected level of realism from NRT members in the activities they anticipated to be undertaking in a national exercise. Misaligned assumptions around resource demands for scenario threads or NRT participation challenged scenario realism. Establishing clear performance expectations within scenarios early would better provide the assurance needed for effective exercise development and exercise participation.
- **Build in Logistic-Planning Buffers:** Some participants struggled to mobilise field assets and finalise sub-plans within short timeframes. Adding structured “buffer days” or partial schedules for logistical setup could deepen engagement and make it more effective.

Evaluation & Scenario Integration

- **Reduce “Evaluation Friction”:** Some exercise planners described ‘being forced’ to develop or adjust scenario events to match rigid evaluation checklists. Integrating the development of objectives and associated KPIs consistently from the start of the exercise planning and checking scenario development continuously against these agreed outcomes, would foster acceptance, authenticity and reduce friction.
- **Mentors vs. Evaluators:** While mentors aided field teams, confusion arose when evaluators also performed mentoring roles. Clear delineation ensures coaching and evaluation are distinct yet complementary functions. The need to ensure personnel selected for evaluation have prior training for their role will increase the likelihood that those nominated for evaluation roles clearly understand their responsibilities. Given the importance of the evaluator’s role, there is an opportunity to develop dedicated evaluation training and for this to form part of the PD training for NRT members. This would create a pool of trained personnel that could be drawn on even at the last minute, minimising the risk that evaluators are selected without the ability to effectively perform the role as expected.

Collectively, these enhancements underscore the need for robust scenario oversight, improved cross-phase continuity, and a tighter fit between evaluation goals and actual storyline flow. By refining inject processes, clarifying roles, and weaving resource planning more cohesively into the timeline, future exercises can achieve stronger alignment between high-level objectives, practical field operations, and genuine system-wide capability testing.

4.3.3 Exercise Planning and Management Recommendations

This section outlines key recommendations for improving exercise planning and management based on the evaluation of the current exercise. These recommendations are derived from an analysis of the exercise's strengths and challenges, with a focus on enhancing coordination, efficiency, and overall effectiveness in future exercises. By addressing the identified gaps and incorporating best practices, the goal is to refine the exercise planning and execution processes, ensuring stronger accountability, smoother workflows, clearer communication, and a greater level of assurance in the exercise process in supporting the National Plan.

R.12. Enforce early development of scenario tasks and injects to allow sufficient time for quality assurance and cohesive scenario design.

Early development ensures a well-tested and realistic exercise.

R.13. Implement stricter accountability measures for meeting planning timelines to prevent last-minute adjustments and ensure readiness.

Enhanced accountability will improve planning discipline and reduce delays.

R.14. Clarify governance structures for exercise planning, defining clear roles and responsibilities for scenario development, logistics, and evaluation.

A clear governance framework will streamline planning and execution.

R.15. Integrate evaluation criteria into objective setting from the beginning to align objectives with measurable outcomes.

Early integration of evaluation metrics will simplify assessment and enhance exercise effectiveness.

R.16. Ensure evaluators have real-time access to systems and data to effectively monitor and assess performance.

Immediate access will improve the accuracy and comprehensiveness of evaluations.

4.4 Conclusions

Exercise Dumaesq 2024 marked a significant step forward in Australia's commitment to strengthening national preparedness under the National Plan. As a complex, multi-jurisdictional maritime pollution response exercise, it offered an invaluable platform to explore interagency coordination, enhance operational capabilities, and evaluate national response arrangements in both strategic and operational contexts.

Delivered across two distinct phases, the exercise facilitated a wide range of learning opportunities, enabling participants to deepen their interjurisdictional understanding, practice real-world response structures, and identify clear pathways for future development.

A key success of the exercise was its ability to bring together diverse agencies and jurisdictions to collaborate on shared challenges. It also provided the opportunity for other agencies to utilise the Gold Coast Disaster and Emergency Management Centre and for NSW - to use the North Incident Control Centre in Coffs Harbour.

The two-phase structure enabled a deliberate progression from strategic planning to operational response, with each phase offering distinct but complementary benefits. The success of the Day 1 strategic panel format in Phase 1 highlighted the power of structured dialogue to build shared understanding across jurisdictions. This, in turn, helped prepare teams for the operational demands of Phase 2.

The exercise also provided a valuable reminder of the complexity involved in delivering large-scale, multi-jurisdictional exercises. While many elements were thoughtfully designed, not all were implemented as originally intended. This reflects the dynamic and adaptive nature of emergency response planning and underscores the importance of continuous improvement. The exercise environment offered a safe space to test ideas, surface inconsistencies, and refine systems. All essential features of any mature and forward-looking preparedness program.

In this context, the varied approaches and distributed ownership observed across jurisdictions are not seen as weaknesses, but rather as reflections of the real-world diversity that national responses must accommodate. By identifying where greater alignment and shared accountability can add value, Exercise Dumaesq has strengthened the foundations for future success.

One of the most valuable aspects of Exercise Dumaesq was its ability to elevate critical insights into the coordination mechanisms that underpin National Plan arrangements. The intention to establish a JSCG in Phase 1 demonstrated a strong commitment to strategic oversight. The Steering Committee agreed the JSCG would not be established for Phase 2, primarily because established doctrine was not available, and because State Marine Pollution controllers had easy access to their IMTs. This is captured at KR.2. While the JSCG was not established or continue into Phase 2 as intended, it still presented a valuable learning opportunity to further refine the structure, mandate, and continuity of such mechanisms. Strengthening the structures and mandate of such groups will support even more cohesive and unified national responses in the future.

The planning phase of the exercise delivered a comprehensive framework that guided activities across jurisdictions. The flexibility given to jurisdictions enabled local context and priorities to be reflected, which added authenticity to the scenarios. While jurisdictional implementation varied, particularly in scenario integration and inject development, this diversity highlighted the adaptive capabilities within the system. The distributed approach to scenario development and inject management highlighted the importance of building consistency in exercise planning and reaffirmed the importance of harmonised scenario development, timely distribution of materials, and robust quality assurance processes. Moving forward, these insights provide a strong basis for refining planning methodologies and enhancing cohesion in the delivery of complex national exercises.

Governance structures at the Steering and Planning Committee levels supported wide engagement and collaboration. The exercise demonstrated the value of bringing together diverse stakeholders under a shared purpose. Looking ahead, there are opportunities to further clarify roles and strengthen project management processes to ensure even greater efficiency and timely achievement of agreed outcomes in exercise planning. These enhancements will support shared ownership of decisions, clearer accountability, and more consistent implementation of planning outcomes across jurisdictions.

Logistics and resource coordination were tested under realistic conditions in Phase 2, offering practical insights into operational readiness. The setup of FOBs, integration of the NRT, deployment of Incident Management Teams and dedicated mentoring support created authentic and enriched training environments.

While some infrastructure and resource limitations were encountered, these may have been the result of the resource limitations imposed by the exercise or been indicative of the slow deployment of resources at the start of a pollution event. These findings are already informing improved planning and logistical coordination for subsequent exercises and real-world deployments.

While not all objectives were met in full, the exercise achieved its overarching aim: to enhance Australia's ability to manage a complex maritime environmental emergency. It revealed important development opportunities, validated key elements of the national response framework, and affirmed the strength of interjurisdictional collaboration.

The insights gained through both phases provide a solid foundation for future improvements. In this way, the exercise can deliver lasting benefit demonstrating that progress is not only measured by outcomes achieved, but by the quality of learning and the clarity of future direction.

Through the collaborative spirit, innovative approach, and shared commitment displayed throughout Exercise Dumaesq, Australia has taken another important step toward building a more resilient, agile, and capable national response system. The experience gained will not only inform the next iteration of National Plan exercises but will also enhance real-world readiness for complex maritime incidents.

Appendices

5. Detailed Evaluation Results on Exercise Dumaresq

5.1 Phase 1 Evaluation Findings

5.1.1 Phase 1 – Objectives and Key Performance Indicators

The following is a list of KPIs developed for Phase 1 of Exercise Dumaresq 2024.

Objective 1: Explore the response arrangements and processes in place at a State and Commonwealth level for the management of a marine pollution, HNS and maritime casualty incident that has environmental, social, and economic impacts on the Commonwealth, QLD, and NSW jurisdictions.

KPI 1.1 Each jurisdiction outlines their agency's arrangements in relation to a major marine pollution response in reference to: (Day 1, Phase 1)

References:

- International conventions
- National and State based legislation.
- National Plan for Environmental Emergencies (AMSA)
- Queensland Coastal Contingency Action Plan (Maritime Safety Queensland)
- NSW Coastal Waters Marine Pollution Plan and NSW North Coast Marine Pollution Plan.
- First strike plans i.e. Gold Coast and Queensland – New South Wales border area – First Strike Oil Spill Response Plan

KPI 1.2 An appropriate control and coordination structure is discussed and agreed, based on National Plan Guidance NP-GUI-023 *Coordination of Domestic Cross-border incidents*. (Day 1, Phase 1)

KPI 1.2.1 The agreed control and coordination structure will effectively:

- a. manage information flow between local, state and Commonwealth agencies and entities
- b. share intelligence between local, state and Commonwealth agencies and entities
- c. manage resource sharing (human, physical and financial) (Day 1, Phase 1)

KPI 1.3 The responsibilities, considerations, and key decision points in determining place of refuge requests are clarified. (Day 1, Phase 1)

Objective 2: Practice standing up incident management teams in response to a multi-jurisdictional HNS, and pollution incident.

- KPI 2.1** An appropriate incident management structure is established to manage the response to the incident. (Day 2 Phase 1 & Phase 2)
- KPI 2.2** Effective incident control is established by appointing an incident controller, deputy incident controller and appropriate liaison across Commonwealth, NSW, and QLD response efforts. (Day 2, Phase 1 & Phase 2)
- KPI 2.3** Situational awareness is established and maintained by developing and maintaining a COP and situation reports produced twice daily as the incident unfolds. (Day 2, Phase 1 & Phase 2)
- KPI 2.4** A strategic coordination structure is established for shared situational awareness, joint coordination of human, physical and financial resources and high-level briefings. (Day 2, Phase 1 & Phase 2)
- KPI 2.5** Response planning is undertaken based on analysis of current and forecast situation and in line with the adopted incident management structure.
- KPI 2.5.1 An incident Action Plan is developed and updated at least daily. (Day 2, Phase 1, Phase 2)
- KPI 2.5.2 A Communication and Stakeholder Engagement Plan is developed. (Day 2, Phase 1, Phase 2)
- KPI 2.5.3 A register of all required resources requested is developed. (Day 2, Phase 1, Phase 2)
- KPI 2.6** Specialist and technical advice is provided to the Incident Controller and Incident Management Team (IMT). (Day 2, Phase 1 & Phase 2)
- KPI 2.7** A risk management process is established to identify, analyse, evaluate, treat, and monitor and review risks to the responders, the community, and the environment. PESTLEO or similar such structure should be considered. (Day 2, Phase 1 & Phase 2)
- KPI 2.8** A system is developed to manage staffing and goods and services throughout the response. (Day 2, Phase 1 & Phase 2)
- KPI 2.9** A system for collecting and storing incident documentation is established. (Day 2 Phase 1 & Phase 2)

Objective 3: Practice shared situational awareness and strategic decision-making processes as the marine pollution response escalates (including command, control, coordination, and communication).

- KPI 3.1** A Joint Strategic Coordination Group (JSCG) is established (see National Plan Guidance Document NP-GUI-023 *Coordination of domestic cross-border incidents*) comprising senior representatives from each agency responsible for the management of the marine pollution incident. (Day 2, Phase 1)
- KPI 3.2** The terms of reference are developed, and processes put in place for the operation of the JSCG noting the key remit of the group is to manage the following: (Day 2, Phase 1)
- Strategic decision making
 - Shared situational awareness.
 - Joint human and physical resourcing.
 - High level briefing
- KPI 3.3** The JSCG establishes processes for the establishment and maintenance of joint situational awareness, resource allocation and higher-level briefings. (Day 2 Phase 1 & Phase 2)
- KPI 3.4** Agreed joint talking points are produced for the briefing of senior officials. (Day 2, Phase 1, Phase 2)

Objective 4: Explore and implement the multijurisdictional use and deployment of resources and personnel, including those for Incident Management Teams (IMTs) shoreline, marine, wildlife and HNS.

- KPI 4.1** JSCG to prioritise allocation of National Response team, National Equipment Stockpile and HNS resources to meet Commonwealth, NSW, and QLD response objectives. (Day 2, Phase 1 & Phase 2)
- KPI 4.1.1 Operational and logistical plans are provided to JSCG members two hours prior to JSCG meetings for discussion at the meetings. (Phase 2)
- KPI 4.1.2 Decisions made regarding the allocation of resources are recorded. (Day 2, Phase 2 & Phase 2)
- KPI 4.2** Risk planning is undertaken for the shared human and/or physical resourcing requirements taking account of coordination between the three jurisdictions. (Day 2, Phase 1 & Phase 2)
- KPI 4.3** National Response team members are integrated into NSW and QLD IMTs and field-based roles, and they contribute their expertise to response actions. (Phase 2)
- KPI 4.3** Establish FOBs to effectively coordinated field operations and establish communications with the IMT. (Phase 2)
- KPI 4.4** Effective response plans are developed by the IMT (Day 2, Phase 1).
- KPI 4.4.1 Effective response plans are developed by the IMT and implemented by FOB(s). (Phase 2)
- KPI 4.5** Effective two-way communication is established between the IMTs and their respective FOBs. (Phase 2)

- KPI 4.6** Establish safe field operations (marine, shoreline, wildlife, HNS, waste management and hygiene) with the FOB in a manner that meets Workplace Health & Safety (WH&S) standards and identifies and manages these risks (Phase 2).
- KPI 4.7** Staff deployed in the FOBs have the necessary knowledge of the equipment deployed, operational and safety procedures and information management systems used in field activities. (Phase 2)

5.1.2 Phase 1 - Evaluation Findings against Exercise Objectives

Objective 1: Explore the response arrangements and processes in place at a State and Commonwealth level for the management of a marine pollution, HNS, and maritime casualty incident that has environmental, social, and economic impacts on the Commonwealth, QLD, and NSW jurisdictions.

Overview:

Day 1 of Phase 1 of the exercise provided a structured platform for jurisdictions to present their response arrangements, legislative frameworks, and contingency plans. The discussion effectively highlighted the alignment of these frameworks with international conventions national legislation and policy frameworks and state legislation and plans. Participants engaged in detailed discussions on jurisdictional requirements, which provided valuable insight into the overarching emergency response structure.

However, discussions remained largely theoretical, with limited practical application to real-world multi-jurisdictional scenarios. A key component of the objective—developing a coordinated response mechanism—was not fully realised. The absence of a clearly agreed control and coordination structure hindered progress, and while place of refuge requests were discussed, no actionable consensus was reached.

Assessment: Partially Achieved

Rationale

Successes:

- Response arrangements were well-articulated, demonstrating strong knowledge of jurisdictional responsibilities and legal frameworks.
- Each jurisdiction outlined its approach to marine pollution incidents, referencing key national and international plans.
- Theoretical discussions created a strong foundation for future practical exercises.

Improvement Areas:

- Discussions were high-level and lacked practical application, thus preventing deeper exploration of integrated multi-jurisdictional response mechanisms.
- No clear control and coordination structure was agreed upon for cross-jurisdictional collaboration, thus limiting the opportunity for a unified response approach.
- The complexity of place of refuge requests was recognised, but no definitive framework was developed to address coordination issues.

- Future exercises should integrate case studies and structured discussions to shift from theoretical discussion to actionable planning.
- Consideration should be given to pre-defining control and coordination structures to facilitate more productive engagement.

Objective 2: Practise standing up incident management teams (IMTs) in response to a multi-jurisdictional HNS and pollution incident.

Overview:

The exercise successfully demonstrated the ability of NSW and QLD to establish IMTs that aligned with the needs of the evolving incident. Each jurisdiction effectively implemented its IMT structure, ensuring clear leadership, defined roles, and coordinated communication. The inclusion of liaison roles greatly contributed to the efficiency of the teams, reinforcing the importance of inter-jurisdictional collaboration.

Incident control was well-established, with IMTs developing situational awareness tools such as a COP and situation reports. These elements facilitated effective information flow and operational decision-making. However, the anticipated strategic coordination at a higher level—through the JSCG —did not materialise, leaving a gap in overarching governance.

Assessment: Achieved

Rationale

Successes:

- IMTs were effectively established, ensuring structured response efforts within respective jurisdictions.
- Incident control and leadership roles were clearly defined and effectively implemented.
- The development of COPs and regular situation reports enhanced shared situational awareness.
- Liaison roles played a critical role in ensuring coordination between IMTs.

Improvement Areas:

- While IMTs functioned effectively within their respective jurisdictions, the absence of a formal strategic coordination mechanism proposed in the form of an JSCG, limited higher-level and overarching decision-making.
- Separating each jurisdiction's IMT functions from JSCG responsibilities was noted as a potential approach to support clearer strategic oversight in future exercises.

Objective 3: Practise shared situational awareness and strategic decision-making processes as the marine pollution response escalates (including command, control, coordination, and communication).

Overview:

The exercise successfully demonstrated shared situational awareness within individual IMTs, with strong incident control and clear communication pathways. The development of a COP and coordinated talking points contributed to effective jurisdictional responses, as did direct interactions between the IMTs and exchange of information such as SitReps and IAPs. Participants engaged in decision-making processes that facilitated operational efficiency at the IMT level.

However, this objective placed particular emphasis on joint strategic coordination, which was significantly hindered by the failure to establish the JSCG or an alternate effective coordination mechanism. Without a formalised JSCG, cross-jurisdictional decision-making lacked a structured process, preventing full integration of strategic coordination efforts. While IMTs were able to function independently, the lack of an overarching governance structure impeded the establishment of a unified response strategy.

Assessment: Partially Achieved

Rationale

Successes:

- Situational awareness tools, such as COPs and shared talking points, were effectively developed and maintained.
- IMTs successfully demonstrated internal coordination and decision-making capabilities.
- Public information teams collaborated well to develop joint talking points.

Improvement Areas:

- The intended strategic coordination mechanism in the form of the JSCG was never fully implemented. This created a lost opportunity for improvements to decision-making across jurisdictions.
- While individual jurisdictions effectively managed their situational awareness, the lack of a unified strategy at the strategic level resulted in missed opportunities for enhanced coordination.
- The establishment and operationalisation of a JSCG to facilitate joint decision-making would greatly assist in future exercises.
- Clearer briefings on JSCG roles and expectations may support more structured coordination in exercise planning to ensure structured coordination.

Objective 4: Explore and implement the multi-jurisdictional use and deployment of resources and personnel, including those for Incident Management Teams (IMTs), shoreline, marine, wildlife, and HNS.

Overview:

The objective of exploring resource deployment across jurisdictions was partially addressed in Phase 1, but the full implementation was expected until Phase 2. Initial discussions on resource allocation and risk planning were conducted within IMTs, laying the groundwork for future actions. However, the absence of a functional JSCG significantly limited the ability to make joint resource allocation decisions.

Jurisdictions initiated risk planning for resource sharing, but this remained jurisdiction-specific rather than a coordinated multi-jurisdictional approach. The anticipated structured decision-making process around NRT deployment and resource prioritisation did not occur as expected. As a result, the core components of this objective were not addressed in Phase 1 but deferred to Phase 2.

Several of the KPIs could not be evaluated because certain events were not scheduled to occur till Phase 2. However, the Phase 1 objectives were subsequently revised ahead of Phase 2, which resulted in a recasting of exercise focus. There was no direct equivalence between the Phase 1 and 2 objectives, which made continuous assessment across both phases difficult. Of cautionary note, new objectives should not be introduced once an exercise has commenced as it has flow on effects for not only the participants but evaluator and the overall performance of the exercise.

Assessment: Partially Achieved

Rationale

Successes:

- Initial discussions on resource allocation and risk planning provided a foundational understanding of jurisdictional capabilities.
- IMTs demonstrated robust internal resource management processes.
- Recognition of shared resource needs among jurisdictions set the stage for more effective collaboration in Phase 2.

Improvement Areas:

- The JSCG's failure to function as a formal structure prevented coordinated decision-making on resource deployment.
- Risk planning was conducted within jurisdictions and shared to some degree with the other jurisdiction. However, because of a lack of a JSCG this was not expanded into a collective multi-jurisdictional framework.
- The exercise highlighted the value of IMTs initiating resource allocation processes independently, with escalation to higher coordination levels occurring as needed.
- Differences in risk planning mechanisms across jurisdictions were noted as influencing the effectiveness of resource-sharing strategies, suggesting that greater consistency may support improved coordination.

5.1.3 Phase 1 - Stakeholder and Participant Feedback

There were 108 participants for Phase 1 Day 1. Of these, 45 participants completed the end-of-day online survey, representing a 41% response rate.

The following are a series of comments provided via the survey that reflects the diversity of participant experience:

"Was good to have a lot of the stakeholders in the room. A lot was learned. I think there is still a lot to be resolved with outcomes and documented."

"There were some very insightful discussions throughout the day. The template of panel discussions was effective in some areas. Sizes of panels should be considered to allow more targeted discussions. Introducing presentations during the day that showcased past responses to major incidents including key learnings / improvements would have added further value to the days agenda and objective."

"I agree the panel discussions were valuable, but it was a long day of just being talked at/to. It would have been of greater benefit to engage more with the experts in the room, either via small group discussions and reporting back and/or tools to bring in comments, questions, etc such as slido."

"Panel discussions were useful to a point but did not encourage broader input. Half a day of panel discussions and some syndicate work may have helped."

"Well structured and knowledgeable panel and good interaction amongst participants."

Evaluation of Phase 1 Day 2 was based on participant feedback collected via the online survey for that day and the online observations, as well as the comments and observations collected from the Evaluation Team and post exercise interviews.

There were 120 participants for Phase 1 Day 2 and 42 participants completed the post exercise online feedback survey being a 35% response rate. The data identified that many respondents were from the QLD IMT (42%), then NSW IMT (35%), ExCon (14%) and JSCG (0.7%). The lower response rate compared to Day 1 may have reflected insufficient time allowed for the debriefing process, of which the survey was part, as the exercise was winding up.

The following are a series of comments collected during the evaluation.

"The liaison officers facilitated productive information sharing between the IMTs, ensuring coordination and situational awareness, which was crucial for the success of the exercise."

"Information sharing worked well with both Incident Controllers (ICs), and there were instances where all three ICs got together to discuss situation tactics and resources. The Queensland use of the Guardian system was effective, allowing IMT members to access and share information, including SitReps, planning documents, and logs"

"During debriefs, the IC provided positive and constructive feedback, enabling everyone to work towards team goals. Functional leaders conducted regular and succinct meetings, engaging all team members effectively"

"The JSCG failed to eventuate. The group only met at the start and a couple of times in the morning/lunchtime/early afternoon. Not all members were present after the first morning meeting. There was no strong sense that the group knew what its role was, and they had disbanded the whole idea of working together as a strategic planning group by mid to late morning."

"Response would benefit from more investment in online system capabilities that are shareable between agencies."

5.2 Phase 2 Evaluation Findings

5.2.1 Phase 2 – Evaluation Findings against Exercise Objectives

Below is a detailed evaluation analysis of Phase 2 for each of the seven objectives, followed by an assessment rating (Achieved, Partially Achieved, or Not Achieved) and rationale for each rating.

This section outlines the objectives of the exercise evaluation, which were to assess the effectiveness of planning, coordination, and operational delivery against the established objectives. The evaluation sought to identify strengths, areas for improvement, and lessons to inform future exercises and real-world responses. By systematically analysing performance across all phases of the exercise, the evaluation aimed to support continuous improvement and strengthen multi-jurisdictional incident management capabilities.

Objective 1: Develop and maintain a COP

Multiple sources confirmed that the COP existed across various platforms, including GIS dashboards, whiteboards, MIMS, Guardian, and SharePoint. Interviewees described some difficulty in updating the digital COP, with only certain individuals having the required permissions or training. While GIS data (e.g. shoreline assessments, boom deployment) significantly boosted situational awareness in some areas, many staff still relied on ad hoc paper logs and separate email threads to track key decisions.

Risk analyses (like PESTLEO) were produced but not always disseminated in a timely manner, reflecting inconsistent handover practices between intelligence, planning, and operations.

Despite these concerns, Phase 2 improved from earlier stages by introducing more robust GIS capabilities and dedicating staff to display relevant data on large screens. Several participants, especially from Queensland, praised the real-time mapping of affected coastlines as a leap forward. However, these positives did not solve the overarching problem of multiple, siloed systems.

Assessment: Partially Achieved

Table 9: Rationale for the evaluation of Objective 1

Objective 1 - Develop and maintain a common operating picture at an operational level.	
KPI 1.1: A system for identifying, collecting, storing, and displaying incident information and documentation is established and kept current.	Successes • GIS mapping and multi-format display (whiteboards, digital dashboards) increased visibility of field operations. • Some FOB managers demonstrated exceptional organisational skills and established COPs for their FOB. Improvements • Incident information was stored across multiple systems (SharePoint, MIMS, email), causing accessibility issues and no single source of truth. • GIS was effective but required dedicated personnel to translate data into actionable intelligence.
KPI 1.2: Collected data and information (including pre-plans) are analysed systematically, validated, and shared within agreed time frames to maintain shared situational awareness.	Successes • Input data that included NEBA and OSTRAM together with Traditional owner information and weather were collected, analysed by the IMT to develop strategies and timings. This data was shared within the NSW IMT and QLD IMT where appropriate. • Regular briefing schedules were established aiding the sharing of information.
KPI 1.3: Risks and opportunities that may affect incident activities and planning are analysed and shared.	Successes • A PESTLEO had been developed and shared within the IMT. This was reviewed from Phase 1 to Phase 2 and improved upon. • JSAs were undertaken and documented at FOBs on Phase 2 Day 1. • Risks were identified and managed well in some FOB and field locations. Improvements • While risks were identified within the IMTs via the use of PESTLEO they could be improved by also capturing risks and opportunities from the FOB and field teams as these will impact the achievement of objectives and planning activities.

Objective 1 - Develop and maintain a common operating picture at an operational level.

KPI 1.4:

Arrangements are made for a log and/or record of decisions to be kept and shared in a timely manner.

Successes

- Information management systems were used for logging and tracking decisions and actions.
- There were examples that handwritten logs were also able to be captured by IM systems.

Improvements

- Access to systems by all participants remained a challenge which impacted timely information sharing.
- Where access to the system was not available to all the use of ad hoc record keeping practices emerged and become a risk.

KPI 1.5:

Data security protocols are established and maintained for information sharing systems.

Successes

- Both Guardian and MIMS required individual user login, and logins are recorded within the system.
- Dedicated functional emails.
- Version control practices implemented.

Improvements

- Security protocols were in place, but their control settings hindered access for some participants causing restricted data access that reduced efficiency. Access issues created inefficiencies despite established protocols.

KPI 1.6:

Accurate situation reports are prepared to provide regular and timely updates.

Successes

- Produced during the incident and regularly maintained and distributed.

Objective 2: Coordinate multi-jurisdictional IMTs

In Phase 2, both QLD and NSW aimed to improve multi-jurisdictional coordination through scheduled daily meetings, the embedding of liaison officers, and partial document sharing (e.g. situation reports, IAPs). These measures did strengthen some communication channels, with local-level teams noting that it became easier to reach counterparts across the border than in previous exercises.

However, the absence of a fully operational JSCG left no central structure responsible for aligning strategic risks, synchronising resource decisions, or co-ordinating public messaging at a higher level. AMSA, meanwhile, chose not to stand up an IMT, instead contributing in a more limited capacity via exercise control. While AMSA's guidance on national protocols was valuable, participants indicated it did not sufficiently compel a cohesive, top-down framework. As a result, cross-border misalignments—such as QLD struggling to locate NSW SitReps or inconsistent hazard alerts—remained largely unresolved.

All three parties—the Commonwealth, NSW, and QLD—played a role in this outcome. NSW and QLD did attempt practical co-ordination but continued to operate from separate planning processes and communications systems. The decision to not have a JSCG meant jurisdictions lacked a unifying strategic mechanism for true multi-jurisdiction synergy. Consequently, while the commitment to cross-border collaboration existed, the combined lack of a robust governance body and limited integrated leadership across the three agencies prevented a fully integrated response. Thus, while multi-jurisdictional coordination improved in certain respects, the objective of having a singular, seamless approach across the Commonwealth, NSW, and QLD was ultimately not achieved.

Assessment: Not Achieved

Table 10: Rationale for the evaluation of Objective 2

Objective 2 - Coordinate multi-jurisdictional IMTs.	
KPI 2.1: An appropriate process for cross border coordination and decision-making is established and agreed to.	Successes • Meetings held as scheduled between ICs. Improvements • In joint meetings, establishing better protocols for recording discussion and agreed actions.
KPI 2.2: Communications protocols for coordinating multi-jurisdictional IMTs is established and enables clear, accurate and timely information flow.	Successes • Excellent individual and functional communications which extended at times between jurisdictions. Improvements • Sharing and considering jurisdictional strategies as part of each IMT action planning. • The sharing of information between jurisdictions could be improved with a more robust comms plan for sharing correct emails and contact details.

Objective 2 - Coordinate multi-jurisdictional IMTs.

KPI 2.3:

Liaison between IMTs and stakeholders is established and effectively supports shared situational awareness and decision making.

Successes

- Liaison Officers are in place in both IMTs enhanced information flow of operational information.
- Regular liaison with local council and local knowledge enhanced local situational awareness.

Improvements

- There was a focus on sharing functional task information, however due to a lack of a JSCG there was limited sharing of strategic or high-risk issues.

KPI 2.4:

Strategic risks are identified, communicated and managed.

Successes

- IC identified risks to the IMT and were being managed by planning and operations.

Improvements

- Although some information exchange did occur about risks, the identification of strategic risks in the IAP and at a cross-jurisdictional level could enhance broader situational awareness.

KPI 2.5:

Information systems are used to support and maintain shared situational awareness and coordinated decision making.

Successes

- MSQ system is used to task FOBs and crews. The system logs tasks, notifies individuals that they have a task outstanding, has the ability to record progress and when it is completed.

Improvements

- Consider a dedicated resource in each team to monitor MIMS.

KPI 2.6:

Strategic priorities are incorporated into response control objectives.

Successes

- Tools like PESTLEO were used to capture strategic risks.
- There was some attempt to ensure there were displayed as part of the COP.

KPI 2.7:

A system to monitor multi-jurisdictional coordination and decision-making is agreed and established.

Successes

- Some information exchange (such as IAPs and SITREPS) did occur between jurisdictions. Meetings between the IC and some functional managers were agreed. Planning had indicated at the meeting they had contacted their counterpart in NSW IMT.
- Dedicated a resource to monitor and review document management.

Objective 3: Establish FOBs to Support Field Operations

Phase 2 required setting up FOBs in key areas of NSW and QLD, enabling local staging and communication with the main IMTs. Evaluators observed that, logistically, FOBs were established quickly, and certain tasks (like capturing GIS data from the field and sending it upstream) worked well. Mentors on site also helped staff troubleshoot routine challenges (food supply, access to water, clarifications on daily briefs).

However, consistent issues emerged with communication flows: some FOBs relied almost entirely on phone or email, receiving limited updates from the IMT’s evolving COP. In some cases, field crews bypassed the FOB altogether, speaking directly to IMT leads, thus eroding the FOB’s intended central role. Another frequent complaint was that many FOBs lacked adequate infrastructure—like printers, consistent PPE supplies, or basic shelter—particularly during Day 1, leading to confusion about correct protocols.

GIS data integration stood out as a success for some, but it did not always benefit other FOBs that lacked real-time access to the same systems.

Assessment: Partially Achieved

Table 11: Rationale for the evaluation of Objective 3

Objective 3 - Establish FOB to support field operations.	
KPI 3.1: A functioning FOB is established with communication links to the IMT.	Successes - Some FOBs were effectively established and operated as planned. Improvements - The establishment and management of FOBs was not consistent and there is an opportunity for further training for FOB managers.
KPI 3.2: Communication links between FOB and field teams are established and maintained.	Successes - Some FOBs effectively adopted existing systems to ensure regular and consistent communications were established between the FOB and IMT. Improvements - Bring in experienced planners and an admin officer to handle high volumes of communication and triage tasks. - Adopt systems that enable real time sharing of situational information across all areas of the incident from the IMT to the field. - Enhance communications between the IMT and FOBs through improved training for FOB managers.

Objective 3 - Establish FOB to support field operations.

KPI 3.3:

Risk management processes and safety plans are developed for the FOBs and field teams.

Successes

- Inductions, WHS and JSA development and implementation achieved.
- Dynamic risk assessment was applied at some FOB and field locations and these were also recorded.

Improvements

- Processes to evaluate and follow up on welfare monitoring across all areas of the incident could be given greater focus.
- The timely response from IMTs to support addressing risks identified at the FOB or with field crews could be improved.

KPI 3.4:

Information displays in the FOBs, supporting the COP and situational awareness, are maintained and regularly updated.

Successes

- Field teams were providing inputs into the GIS system as to tasks and progress to date. This contained both a graphical image e.g. boom line, wildlife and a comment that had a description and date and time mark.

Improvements

- Introduce a quick alert system for major updates that need immediate team awareness.
- Develop a COP wall template for FOB Managers to hand up and complete to ensure details about the objectives, strategies and tasks are able to be displayed and visible for briefing crews. This would also provide a system for visually tracking the progress of task achievement and crew resource management.

KPI 3.5:

Appropriate logistical arrangements are in place to support the operations of the field teams.

Successes

- Notional logistical issues during the exercise were dealt with as expected.

Improvements

- Logistical arrangement largely relied on re-arranged plans undertaken in preparation for the exercise and there were challenges experienced when real logistical issues were reported from the field in determining how to resolve the issues.

Objective 4: Provide Effective Control of FOB and Field Teams

The focus here was on the IMTs properly tasking FOBs, who would then brief and deploy field teams with coherent instructions and safety guidelines. Evaluators confirm that many teams received taskings that were realistic (e.g. minor wildlife triage, SCAT surveys, setting up booms). Some field leaders demonstrated strong problem-solving, using local knowledge to navigate missing equipment or unanticipated site conditions.

Nonetheless, an area identified for improvement is consistent safety briefings and PPE instructions based on evidence from some field members not being fully briefed. Communication infrastructure remained inadequate in certain areas—personal mobile phones replaced designated radio or data systems, limiting oversight. Meanwhile, it was not always clear whether the FOB or the IMT held final authority on day-to-day field changes, leading to occasional duplication or conflicting instructions.

Assessment: Partially Achieved

Table 12: Rationale for the evaluation of Objective 4

Objective 4 - Provide effective control of FOB and field teams.	
KPI 4.1: Staff are appropriately prepared for field deployment, including site inductions, WHS and PPE briefings.	Successes • Staff generally deployed ready for getting to work and there was limited need to supply additional PPE. Improvements • Review the format and required content for safety briefing information to ensure completeness. • Ensure FOBs and field locations used for briefings and inductions are appropriate and fit for purpose with required access to facilities and equipment.
KPI 4.2: Risk management processes and safety plans are correctly applied and followed.	Successes • Risks assessments in the field were undertaken and controls actioned or issues reported back to the IMT. • Regular checking and monitoring of operational risks and treatments identified in PESTLEO analysis were a focus for the IMTs. Improvements • Consider strategic risks more effectively to ensure appointed safety officers are reviewing strategic and WHS risks with equal importance. • Opportunity to review PPE guidelines at FOBs to improve risk mitigation.

Objective 4 - Provide effective control of FOB and field teams.

KPI 4.3: IAP sub-plans for Field Teams and associated briefing documents are prepared consistent with the SMEACS format and updated daily.	Successes • Effective development and implementation of sub plans achieved. • Sub plans included information about JSAs and PPE requirements. Improvements • The translation of broad objectives into tactics and tasking for field teams that are reportable back to ensure the achievement of incident objectives can be monitored.
KPI 4.4: Field teams provide regular progress reports to their IMTs that are relevant, comprehensive and accurate.	Successes • Some field teams provided regular reports as requested. Improvements • The operations command structure from the IMT into the field was not applied consistently and there is an opportunity for further clarity in the reporting structure of the field teams and FOBs back to the IMT.
KPI 4.5: A functional structure for the FOBs and field teams is developed.	Successes • Structures for field teams were developed for some teams. Improvements • The inclusion of FOB and field team structures into the IAP is documented to ensure an effective accountability system is maintained between the IMT and FOB/field teams.
KPI 4.6: Communication plans are developed for the FOB and field teams.	Successes • Not observed. Improvements • None identified.

Objective 5: Coordinate Public Information, Community Engagement, and Public Warnings

In Phase 2, media officers integrated more sophisticated approaches to community outreach, including daily press statements, social media scanning, and scheduled stakeholder sessions. Observers credited these improvements partly to Phase 1 lessons, which emphasised the importance of real-time communications with councils, Indigenous groups, and local residents.

However, minor inconsistencies arose between NSW and QLD's messaging, revealing an opportunity for improved communication between the NSW and QLD public information teams. The small size of these Public Information teams also limited how quickly they could adjust messaging as new data arrived. Additionally, while social media feedback was tracked, there was no robust, mechanism to feed that information directly into the operational decision cycle in near-real time.

Assessment: Partially Achieved

Table 13: Rationale for the evaluation of Objective 5

Objective 5 - Coordinate public information, community engagement and public warnings.	
KPI 5.1: Jurisdictional public information teams establish and maintain effective communication and liaison.	Successes - The Public Information Unit (PIU) functions were established and working within existing systems that supported their jurisdiction. Improvements - Ensure effective and ongoing integration of PIUs with IMT.
KPI 5.2: Agreed talking points are produced for briefing senior officials.	Successes - Talking points were developed by Media Liaison and approved by the IC. Improvements - Talking point focused on each jurisdiction needs and challenges remained in developing a coordinated set of common talking points across multiple jurisdictions. - Talking points could be improved by addressing issues of importance to all key stakeholders.
KPI 5.3: A consistent public warning approach is developed and implemented.	Successes - Discussions about ensuring consistent public messaging occurred within IMTs. Improvements - The visibility of the actions taken to implement public warnings was limited and could be better represented on the COP to provide assurance this has occurred even if being managed external to the IMT.

Objective 5 - Coordinate public information, community engagement and public warnings.

KPI 5.4:

Stakeholder engagement plans are developed and executed.

Successes

- Comprehensive stakeholder engagement plans were developed in Phase 1 and refined into Phase 2.

Improvements

- In future cross jurisdictional responses, explore the opportunity to cross reference common stakeholders.

KPI 5.5:

Public and stakeholder feedback is monitored and incorporated into ongoing communication strategies.

Successes

- Stakeholder feedback from a range of sources was monitored and incorporated into plans.

Improvements

- Although this is likely to be an exercise artefact, the number of staff allocated to monitoring this in the exercise may be insufficient for an actual response.

Objective 6: Deploy Resources and Personnel for Shoreline, Marine, and Wildlife Response (HNS Pollution)

Evaluators found that both Queensland and New South Wales mobilised teams relatively quickly, directing them to relevant tasks—shoreline cleaning, marine hazard checks, or wildlife rescue. In some instances, operational sub-plans (for example, one specifically for wildlife triage) demonstrated that teams understood their responsibilities and moved promptly to the field.

Yet it emerged that no single system existed for prioritising resource allocation. Some groups complained they were waiting on equipment or competing with other sites for the same gear, while logistical staff reported it was not always clear which location was the highest priority. Staff from both jurisdictions occasionally saw resource shortfalls (PPE, special booms, or refrigeration for wildlife rescue) and lacked a transparent escalation channel. Logistical planning was, at times, finalised late, leading to confusion about arrival times or drop points. Hence, the objective was partially met, as many on-the-ground tasks succeeded, yet the broader system for resource deployment stayed ad hoc.

Assessment: Partially Achieved

Table 14: Rationale for the evaluation of Objective 6

Objective 6 - Deploy resources and personnel for shoreline response, marine response and wildlife response for oil and HNS pollution.	
KPI 6.1: Agreements are reached on prioritising the allocation of NRT resources.	Successes Planning Officers initiated and led discussions about resource allocation and prioritisation to align with developing IAPs.
KPI 6.2: Agreements are reached on prioritising the allocation of HNS resources.	Successes - Appropriate supporting agencies were identified and incorporated into the IMT to prepare for undertaking HNS operations as part of the response. Improvements - None identified.
KPI 6.3: Operational plans are provided to relevant parties before meetings.	Successes - There was some sharing of operational plans prior to cross-jurisdictional meetings which provided tactical and strategic information. Improvements - The consistent sharing of operational plans prior to meetings and discussion allows time for each function to consider the ability to support proposed plans and enables planning meeting to be more productive.
KPI 6.4: Logistical plans are provided to relevant parties before meetings.	Successes There was some sharing of logistical plans prior to meetings with some work undertaken by Logistics in anticipating the needs of Operations.
KPI 6.5: Decisions on resource allocation are documented.	Successes - A general level of resource logging and tracking was maintained to demonstrate decision making about resource allocation. Improvements - Improved access to information management systems could improve the ability to ensure all decisions about resource allocation are documented.

Objective 7: Integrate NRT Members and Other Agencies into a State-Based Response

Phase 2 included external or specialised NRT members embedded in IMTs and field roles, facilitating skill-sharing in areas like HNS, wildlife rescue, or intelligence. Many local staff welcomed this external expertise; some credited NRT input for bridging immediate knowledge gaps.

However, persistent issues such as limited system access (NRT personnel not receiving MIMS or Guardian credentials) and minimal induction processes curbed the newcomers' potential. Some NRT members noted they never fully understood the strategic aims or the daily shift briefing structure. Others found they could not see updated SitReps, forcing them to rely on second-hand updates. Observers stated that while integration improved from prior exercises, it still varied widely depending on whether the local IMT or FOB had planned in advance for the NRT's presence. Thus, while progress was clear, the overall integration remains incomplete.

Assessment: Partially Achieved

Table 15: Rationale for the evaluation of Objective 7

Objective 7 - Integrate NRT members and other agencies into a state-based response.	
KPI 7.1: NRT members receive appropriate site induction.	Successes • Induction of NRT members was generally well developed and implemented. Improvements • Processes for verifying inductions may be considered.
KPI 7.2: NRT members receive incident briefings.	Successes • Briefings were prepared in order to incorporate NRT members effectively into teams. Improvements • None identified.
KPI 7.3: NRT members are integrated into IMTs.	Successes • The integration of NRT members was in some places seamless. Improvements • Dedicated staff to receive, induct and support the integration of external agencies and NRT members would enhance their efficiency within the IMT.
KPI 7.4: NRT members are integrated into FOBs.	Successes • NRT members were generally integrated into FOBs effectively. Improvements • Information was limited for NRT at FOBs which created issues with effectively getting to work in completing tasks.

Objective 7 - Integrate NRT members and other agencies into a state-based response.

KPI 7.5:

NRT members are integrated into field operations teams.

Successes

- NRT members were generally integrated into field teams effectively.

Improvements

- Information was limited for NRT with field teams which created issues with effectively getting to work in completing tasks.

Overall Conclusion

Phase 2 succeeded in advancing from Phase 1 in areas like enhanced GIS usage, more structured daily IMT briefings, and broader stakeholder engagement. Nonetheless, persistent systemic challenges, such as unified cross-border governance, consistent resource allocation, and a cohesive approach to public messaging, highlight the need for further refinement when working in a cross jurisdictional response. Addressing these gaps will move the entire multi-jurisdictional response closer to genuine interoperability and readiness for real-world maritime environmental emergencies.

5.2.2 Phase 2 Participant Feedback

There were 122 responses to the Phase 2 Pre-exercise survey. This represents a 56% response rate of total exercise participants. It is important to note that not all participants provided feedback. Results from those that did provide feedback showed the following trends:

- Fewer respondents (23%) had prior experience in actual marine pollution events within their jurisdiction and the majority of those were only familiar with Level 1 or 2 responses.
- Few respondents (6%) had experienced an actual incident response as part of the NRT either in the field or an IMT. When comparing this percentage against all exercise participants, the experience in actual Marine Pollution Response (MPR) drops to 3%.
- More respondents (11%) had experience with other non-pollution responses.
- The majority of respondents (63%) has completed AIMS training, which is considered the baseline training for IMT participation.
- Nearly one fifth of respondents (19%) had completed Marine Pollution Response (MPR) training with AMSA, which aims to prepare participants to undertake IMT functional lead roles during a response.
- 44% of respondents have completed Shoreline training.
- 47% of respondents have completed BEO training.
- 29% of respondents have completed AEO training.

This response data suggests that the actual level of experience as a total percentage of all exercise participants could be improved. This insight could contribute to the broad range of areas needing improvement and the partial achievement of exercise objectives. If exercise participants had greater training and more response experience, there would be a greater expectation of achieving the exercise objectives. This, in turn, would provide higher level of assurance that the National Plan does support a ready-to-respond capability.

Ideally, the Pre-exercise survey would be most useful if conducted as part of a capability needs analysis by regularly surveying NRT members over time to better track how the exercise could be designed to address identified capability gaps, reinforce needed good practice or provide levels of assurance.

There were 216 participants for Phase 2, 104 participants completed the end of day feedback online survey being a 48% response rate.

As with many survey responses rating a series of questions about the effectiveness of key performance areas there was tendency for ratings to be skewed towards the positive and comments focused on the challenges experienced.

The following graphs represent the results of some of the core questions about the exercise. Participants were asked to rate agreement on a 5 factor Likert scale their level of agreement with the following areas:

Figure 1: Feedback from exercise participants on information sharing

There were 33 responses to this questions which represents 33% of exercise participants.




Figure 2: Feedback from exercise participants about strategic coordination

There were 17 responses to this question which represents 8% of exercise participants.





Figure 3: Feedback from exercise participants about communication

There were 24 responses to this question which represents 11% of exercise participants



The following are a series of comments provided via the survey that reflects the diversity of participant experience and shows comments tend more towards identified challenges from participants experiences.

“Guardian was not particularly useful in keeping you abreast of changes in the incident. The scenario information on Guardian had errors and changed too quickly which didn’t reflect how an incident would evolve.” (NSW IMT Intelligence)

“Scat team was not advised of overall situation on each day. There were no periodic briefings of the status of the incident. We were simply tasked to go and do things. We also did not have a mechanism to know if the information we submitted was received by the IMT and understood, particularly if we flagged something as high priority.” (QLD Shoreline)

“Couldn’t access the teams system to update plans. Required to email plans, download, update and email back. Tasks from field did not go through ops IMT causing double up and equipment/contractors without required licences being used.” (NSW IMT Operations)

“The Roughton park FOB had no common operating picture at all. This was due to a lack of information flow from the IMT down... No safety plan flowed down to the FOB. The fob developed its own basic site specific and general plans.” (QLD Shoreline FOB)

“We struggled to get info from field teams initially and then info mostly reported to the COP but it was hard to see the info when it came in due to lack of connectivity (difficult to interrogate info on the big screen).” (NSW IMT Planning)

“FOB lead was not adequately trained prior to taking control of 16+ responders. NRT members could be better deployed into leadership positions to make the most of their experience.” (NSW Marine)

“The exercise was really great, it helped us (Vic) understand on the states capabilities, as well as identify our own strengths/points for improvement. I have definitely identified what I need to investigate and improve upon for future incidents/exercises.” (Vic participant)

These remarks underscore recurring issues like limited system access, breakdowns in communication and tasking from IMT to field teams, inconsistent safety and risk-handling protocols, and logistical shortfalls at FOBs. Concerns were also raised about leadership readiness, with calls for better training and deployment of experienced personnel in key roles.

They also highlight the exercise’s value in revealing these gaps and helping participants pinpoint future improvements.

This also raises the issues of the purpose of exercising under the National Plan. Is exercising intended to test capability and provide a level of assurance in the National Plan as a system of capability and capacity or designed as a capability building activity. These do not need to be mutually exclusive, but the intent of the exercise has a significant impact on the design and setting of exercise objectives as well as participant expectations and needs to be further explored under the National Plan.

Despite these issues, many participants found the exercise positive and valuable for assessing their state’s response capabilities and identifying areas for improvement.

5.3 Detailed Evaluation Findings on Exercise Management

This section presents key insights into the management of the exercise, examining how governance structures, planning processes, coordination mechanisms, and real-time adjustments contributed to overall delivery. There were no specific objectives and KPIs for the exercise evaluation, but the findings were framed against general benchmarks for sound exercise management. Drawing on participant interviews and evaluator observations, the findings highlight areas of strength as well as aspects that influenced planning cohesion and execution effectiveness. These reflections provide a foundation for understanding what worked well and where future exercises may benefit from refinement in exercise management practices.

5.3.1 Exercise Governance and Planning

The exercise governance and planning arrangements for Exercise Dumaesq established a structured timeline for designing scenario content and injects, with the intention of creating a unified, multi-jurisdiction storyline. While these governance processes set clear deadlines, some participants in the planning phase did not remain fully accountable for meeting the agreed timeframes, causing portions of the scenario to be finalised later than intended.

The exercise planning tasks for Exercise Dumaesq aimed to produce a cohesive scenario, ensure timely creation of injects, and align newly introduced elements—such as hazard modules or cultural liaison activities—within a clear, multi-jurisdiction framework. However, timing issue reduced the window for collaborative review, making it more difficult for planning coordinators to refine and unify inject details across Queensland, New South Wales, and the Commonwealth.

Moving forward, it is important to ensure that all exercise planning participants adhere to set deadlines. This would allow the central planning process to conduct a structured QA review and avoid last-minute script mismatches. A core scenario and inject design team should be established with clearly defined accountability for scenario development and agreed regular check-in points. This would greatly assist with the planning process ensuring that scenarios development remains on track, coordinated and meets the necessary quality standards.

By firming up these processes—so that each jurisdiction’s planning output arrives on time and is vetted before final release—organisers could strengthen overall scenario coherence, better reflecting the National Plan’s overall aim in exercising.

5.3.2 Exercise Control and Logistics

The control and management of Exercise Dumaesq illustrated both the challenges inherent in running a large-scale multi-jurisdictional maritime pollution exercise and the adaptability required to meet these challenges. Ex-con teams and mentors effectively reacted to dynamic conditions, deploying quick communication tools and agile solutions to keep the scenario relevant. However, the absence of a unified logistic governance framework, late scenario changes, and overlapping roles revealed opportunities to refine planning processes and reduce the burden on exercise managers.

By clarifying responsibilities, solidifying logistic coordination, and consolidating communication channels, future exercises can further enhance the coherence and efficiency of the scenario, ultimately strengthening the National Plan’s readiness for maritime environmental emergencies.

Real-time adaptation was evident throughout the exercise, where exercise control displayed considerable flexibility when last-minute or revised scenario elements emerged. This helped maintain momentum and relevance in the face of schedule variations, but it also increased the workload for staff who had to solve unexpected problems on the fly rather than following a structured process.

While a single oversight function was established through the Exercise Manager role, differing levels of ownership over the exercise planning process limited the Exercise Manager's ability to effectively align evolving timelines, resource needs, and storyline developments. This made it difficult to coordinate decisions and manage conflicts when multiple elements came converged at once.

An agreed set of operating principles for exercise planning and management for future exercises may enhance the capability for exercise managers to maintain required levels of engagement, accountability and maintenance of timelines.

The overlapping duties of mentors, ex-con staff, and evaluators occasionally led to confusion about which roles were overseeing scenario continuity versus providing participant guidance versus measuring outcomes. Establishing definitive boundaries among these functions would help retain scenario integrity and prevent misunderstandings in real-time decisions.

A range of different communication tools were being used, and at times it was unclear who was receiving what information. While quick messaging tools and personal contacts facilitated agile responses, relying on several informal channels made record-keeping and oversight more difficult. Having a single, consolidated platform for logging changes and requests would simplify tracking events, ensuring a clear, accessible record of all adjustments made during the exercise planning and management process.

5.3.3 Exercise Evaluation

Exercise Dumaesq's evaluation framework served as the key mechanism to determine whether the scenario effectively tested National Plan capabilities across multiple jurisdictions. Drawing on interviews, feedback surveys, and comparative analyses, this analysis highlights how the evaluation was designed and implemented, identifies recurring challenges, and presents insights for refining evaluation methodologies in future large-scale exercises.

Despite the purpose of evaluation to capture and report on the achievement of exercise objectives there was tension between the exercise planning group and evaluation leads. The perception that evaluation was making the development of the scenario difficult and inappropriately driving exercise planning demonstrate the need to develop a clearer understanding of good practice exercise management processes. The challenge emerged as a result of the scenario being developed before consideration of the criteria needed to evaluate the objectives.

Embedding KPI development alongside Objective development enables a clear picture to be formed of how the scenario is to evolve to enable participant interaction with the exercise and the natural collection of observations of anticipated outcomes and outputs.

Exercise evaluation could further be improved by ensuring that the evaluators have full access to the systems participants will be operating in to ensure observations can be made of processes and outcomes being undertaken. Where evaluators don't have access to the systems participants are using there is opportunity that evaluators don't have visibility of actions being taken that demonstrate achievement of KPIs and objectives.

6. Exercise Details

6.1 Exercise Governance

Steering Committee

Responsible for strategic oversight and direction, including:

- Endorsement exercise concept, aim, objectives and scope.
- Approval of exercise plans, supporting documentation and exercise report.
- Oversight of evaluation outcomes, recommendations, and future actions.
- Oversight of exercise risk management.
- Budget oversight.

Exercise Planning Team and Exercise Control

Responsible for all aspects of exercise planning including:

- Exercise concept document.
- Aim and objectives.
- Scenario development and exercise inputs (exercise writing).
- Logistics plan – exercise venue and location, catering, participant onboarding, printing, name tags.
- Budget
- Risk management plan.
- Media and community engagement plan.
- Observer program.
- Exercise plan and instructions.
- Transport plan.
- Mentor coordination.
- Joining instructions.

Exercise Evaluation

Responsible for all aspects of exercise evaluation including:

- Exercise Evaluation Plan
- Evaluation Methodology
- Evaluation Criteria and Objective KPIs
- Collection and analysis of exercise observations
- Exercise Evaluation Report

6.2 Phase 1 Exercise Participants

The following agencies participated in Phase 1 of Exercise Dumaesq:

- Commonwealth agencies
 - AMSA
 - National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA)
- NSW Government agencies
 - NSW Maritime
 - Transport for NSW (TfNSW)
 - Office of the Cross Border Commissioner
 - Marine Rescue NSW
 - Port Authority of NSW
 - NSW Police
 - NSW Environment Protection Authority (EPA)
 - Fire and Rescue NSW (FRNSW)
 - NSW Rural Fire Service
 - NSW Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water (DCCEEW)
 - NSW Reconstruction Authority
- QLD Government agencies
 - Maritime Safety Queensland (MSQ)
 - Transport and Main Roads – Transport Network Safety Resilience (TNSR), Information Technology Branch (ITB)
 - Gold Coast Waterways Authority (GCWA)
 - Department of Environment, Science, and Innovation (DESI)
 - Queensland Fire Department (QFD)
 - Department of the Premier and Cabinet
 - Office of the Cross Border Commissioner (Qld)
 - Office of the Inspector-General of Emergency Management (Qld)
 - Queensland Police Service (QPS)
- Local government
 - Gold Coast City Council
 - Tweed Shire Council
- Industry representatives
 - Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre (AMOSOC)
- Non-government organisations
 - Tweed Byron Local Aboriginal Land Council Traditional owner groups

6.3 Phase 1 Exercise Approach

Phase 1 Day 1:

- **Panel Discussions:** Senior managers from the Commonwealth, NSW, and QLD would provide insights into legislative, policy and planning frameworks guiding the response to maritime pollution incidents. The discussions would focus on strategic responses informed by the National Plan.

Phase 1 Day 2:

- **Functional Exercise:** It was planned that NSW and QLD would each establish an IMT and that the Commonwealth would coordinate implementation of the JSCG. QLD and NSW would establish an IMT. The IMTs would be tasked with generating key outputs such as Incident Action Plans, Risk Management Plans, Situation Reports, and a Common Operating Picture. AMSA would simulate an IMT through ExCon and focus on establishing a JSCG.

The Exercise Plan outlined that AMSA would simulate an IMT within ExCon and focus on establishing a JSCG. Problems were presented as they would be received by the ARC. Additional information on oil spill trajectory was provided from AMSA as an exercise inject. Participants were expected to consult their own specialist technical advisors and conduct vulnerability assessments, particularly for risk information.

Customs, quarantine, and immigration elements were not included in the exercise. Field operations and pseudo-media conferences were out of scope.

Exercise Scenario

The trigger incident for Exercise Dumaesq is a container vessel losing cargo overboard in Commonwealth waters. One of the flotsam containers punctures a fuel tank, which releases around 200T of very low sulphur fuel oil (VLSFO). A trajectory model of the oil spill over a three-day period is shown in the figure below.

Phase 1

The start of the exercise commences with the following brief on Day 2 of Phase 1:

"The local time and date is 0800hrs on Tuesday 12 June 2024. The AMSA marine pollution duty officer received notification from the ARC that a vessel, located offshore at 28° 02.037' S 153° 38.774'E (approximately 10 nm northeast of Tweed River) has lost containers overboard. It appears this incident occurred due to poor lashings in bad weather. Thirty-six containers are believed to have fallen overboard at this stage.

In addition, one of the floating containers contacted the vessel, puncturing the portside forward bunker tank and resulting in approximately 200 tonnes of heavy fuel oil (HFO) releasing into the water.

At present, the vessel has continued to transit towards Brisbane and modelling indicates oil and shipping containers are likely to impact both NSW and QLD coastal waters."

Exercise outputs

For the Phase 1, Day 1 the outputs were the responses to questions posed and other comments made by both the panellists and the audience. For the functional exercise (Phase 1, Day 2) it was anticipated that the following outputs would be generated from the establishment of IMTs for Qld and NSW and establishment of a JSCG coordinated by the Commonwealth.

- Common Operating Picture for the two IMTs and the JSCG.
- Incident Action Plan and attachments i.e. Operations Sub Plan, Communication and Stakeholder Engagement Sub Plan.
- Situation Reports (2).
- Talking points/media statement.
- Resource tracking tool for any human and physical assets deployed.
- Risk management plan.
- JSCG structure and terms of reference.
- Logistics plan.

6.4 Phase 2 Exercise Participants

The following agencies participated in Phase 2 of Exercise Dumaesq:

- Commonwealth agencies
 - AMSA
- NSW Government agencies
 - NSW Maritime
 - Transport for NSW (TfNSW)
 - Port Authority of NSW
 - Marine Rescue NSW
 - Fire and Rescue NSW (FRNSW)
 - NSW Rural Fire Service
 - NSW Environmental Protection Authority (EPA)
 - NSW National Parks
 - NSW Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water (DCCEEW)
 - NSW Police
 - Tweed Byron Local Aboriginal Land Council
- Qld Government agencies
 - Maritime Safety Queensland (MSQ)
 - Transport and Main Roads – Transport Network Safety Resilience (TNSR), Information Technology Branch (ITB)
 - Department of Environment, Science, and Innovation (DESI)
 - Queensland Fire Department (QFD)
 - Office of the Cross Border Commissioner (QLD)
 - Office of the Inspector-General of Emergency Management (QLD)
 - Gold Coast waterways Authority (GCWA)

- Local government
 - Gold Coast City Council
 - Tweed Shire Council
- Industry representatives
 - Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre (AMOSC)
 - Viva Energy
- Non-government organisations
 - Tweed Byron Local Aboriginal Land Council
 - Traditional owner groups
- NRT Members, including:
 - Western Australian Department of Transport
 - Maritime Safety Queensland
 - Queensland Department of Environment, Science and Innovation
 - Gold Coast Waterways Authority
 - Ports Victoria
 - Victorian, Department of Transport and Planning
 - Safe Transport Victoria
 - Gippsland Ports
 - Department of Energy, Environment and Climate Action (VIC)
 - New South Wales Maritime
 - Port Authority of New South Wales
 - New South Wales Environment Protection Authority
 - Tasmania Environment Protection Authority
 - Tasmanian, Ports Corporation
 - Tasmanian, Department of Natural Resources and Environment
 - South Australian, Department for Infrastructure and Transport
 - Woodside Energy
 - Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre (AMOSC)

6.5 Phase 2 Exercise Scenario and Approach

Scenario

Phase 2

Phase 2 of the exercise picked up from Phase 1 Day 2 of the response with the following general scenario:

Early yesterday morning, the AMSA marine pollution duty officer received notification from the ARC that MV Atlantic II, located at 28° 02.037'S 153° 38.774'E (approximately 10 nm east-northeast of the Tweed River) has lost 36 containers overboard. One of the floating containers punctured the portside forward bunker tank releasing at least 100 tonnes of very low sulphur fuel oil (VLSFO) into the water.

The vessel pumped oil from the affected tank to stop further leakage. The Captain requested refuge in Brisbane, making their own way once the tank has been emptied. A decision on this request is still pending. Modelling indicates oil and shipping containers are likely to run ashore in NSW and QLD coastal waters.

AMSA established an Incident Management Team to support any pollution response. The ARC is managing the marine casualty, Transport for NSW and Maritime Safety Queensland were notified and both agencies established IMTs to respond to potential pollution.

The NSW and QLD IMTs have prepared an initial Incident Action Plan and SitRep.