AMSA Connect phone services may have longer wait times on Monday 1 June 2026 while we operate with reduced staffing due to the Reconciliation Day Public Holiday in Canberra. Our search and rescue team will continue to operate during this time.
On Monday 10 July 1995, the Iron Baron chartered bulk carrier grounded on Hebe Reef at the approach to the Tamar River, northern Tasmania at 7.30 pm EST.
Guidance on revalidating Australian certificates of competency and proficiency issued in compliance with the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW).
This applies to approved Registered training organisations (RTOs) delivering International Maritime Organisation’s (IMO) Standards of Training Certification and Watchkeeping training leading to a certificate of competency.
This is advice for ship owners and masters. We will undertake a focused inspection campaign (FIC) on cargo securing arrangements from 1 August to 31 October 2020. This is in response to recent events where containers have been lost into the sea off the Australian Coast.
Marine Order 52 (Yachts and training vessels) 2022 is a remake of Marine Order 52 (Yachts and training vessels) 2016. The commencement date of the remade Order is 1 January 2023.
On 30 August 1992 the fuel tank of Era was ruptured by the bow of the tug Turmoil during berthing operations at Port Bonython, South Australia, during high winds. Approximately 300 tonnes of bunker fuel was released into Spencer Gulf.
Do a lifejacket risk assessment. Your safety, and the safety of your passengers and crew, depends on it. Wearing a lifejacket can help prevent a tragic incident.
As a regulatory body, we are required to publish a range of information about our functions and how we carry them out. We do this under the information publication scheme.
A charter vessel with passengers was conducting a cruise around Sydney Harbour when it narrowly missed an unlit runabout at night. The vessel ran aground, and two attempts to tow the vessel off the sandbank were unsuccessful.
The investigation found that the master did not risk-assess the route and respective conditions. The vessel safety management system provided the master with no clear direction on safe routes to follow. The command, control, and communication with and between the crew in relation to emergency procedures and response was ineffective.
A passenger vessel collided with an unseen rock, resulting in the injury of a passenger. The master navigated the vessel into unfamiliar waters that was not a normal or planned part of the passenger tour experience, and not authorised by the tour company.
Owners and operators should ensure masters continue to conform to the planned or authorised route for the services they offer.