Standards for vessels used for special work.

Fitting out all spaces on the vessel with the right fire protection measures.

Reporting general marine pollution helps us to respond quickly to an incident to minimise damage to the environment.

On 21 August 2019, a landing barge (operated as a Class 1E and 2D) capsized while transiting from Great Mackerel Beach to Pittwater north of Sydney.

The Modernised Australian Ship Tracking and Reporting System (MASTREP) is a ship reporting system designed to contribute to safety of life at sea.

We implement the regulations under the Maritime Labour Convention 2006 in Australia via supporting legislation which applies to all commercial vessels.

Our senior management team runs the day-to-day operations and keeps our Board informed.

Latest standards for wheelhouse visibility, emergency escapes, crew and passenger accommodation, and personal safety on domestic commercial vessels. Includes updated requirements for evacuation, signage and preventing falls overboard.

All ships must follow the requirements of MARPOL Annex V when discharging cargo residue.

Serious injury to pilot on class 2 vessel in poor weather conditions

PurposeA reminder of the requirements to test and maintain fuel isolation valves for multi-engine installations.

The mooring snagged on an unseen underwater object and the chain was pulled out of the bow roller and down the side of the vessel. The vessel capsized with no resulting injuries.

A contractor working on a vessel fell into the water whilst disembarking due to the gap between the wharf and the vessel.  A safe means of access to the vessel was not provided.

Standards for maintaining buoyancy after flooding, grounding, or collision.

There are mandatory minimum requirements for your certificates under the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 1978 (STCW).

A charter vessel with passengers was conducting a cruise around Sydney Harbour when it narrowly missed an unlit runabout at night. The vessel ran aground, and two attempts to tow the vessel off the sandbank were unsuccessful. The investigation found that the master did not risk-assess the route and respective conditions. The vessel safety management system provided the master with no clear direction on safe routes to follow. The command, control, and communication with and between the crew in relation to emergency procedures and response was ineffective.

We sought feedback on proposed changes to Marine Order 53 (Vessels in polar waters) 2016 (MO53). The changes will ensure the marine order aligns with the new requirements following amendments to SOLAS and the Polar Code.