The Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) is the Commonwealth statutory body with responsibility for establishing and maintaining marine aids to navigation (AtoN) pursuant to section 190 of the Navigation Act 2012 (Cth).

This page outlines the types of survey reports and details an AMSA assessor looks for when reviewing an application for approval.

Marine order 504

On 30 August 1992 the fuel tank of Era was ruptured by the bow of the tug Turmoil during berthing operations at Port Bonython, South Australia, during high winds. Approximately 300 tonnes of bunker fuel was released into Spencer Gulf.

Commonwealth, state and territory agencies responsible for responding to marine pollution incidents under the National Plan.

We provide a search and rescue (SAR) service for Australia. This allows us to quickly deploy a SAR response for anyone in distress.

Your vessel may be considered a regulated Australian vessel (RAV).

A passenger vessel collided with an unseen rock, resulting in the injury of a passenger. The master navigated the vessel into unfamiliar waters that was not a normal or planned part of the passenger tour experience, and not authorised by the tour company. Owners and operators should ensure masters continue to conform to the planned or authorised route for the services they offer.

On 16 March 2022, a class 2B landing barge collided with a starboard channel marker. The investigation identified that the previous swing engineer did not inform the incoming engineer that the port main engine cooling water suction valve was shut. After getting underway, the engine began to overheat. This distracted the master from monitoring the vessel’s intended track. The vessel’s safety management system did not have an appropriate engineering handover procedure.

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A charter vessel with passengers was conducting a cruise around Sydney Harbour when it narrowly missed an unlit runabout at night. The vessel ran aground, and two attempts to tow the vessel off the sandbank were unsuccessful. The investigation found that the master did not risk-assess the route and respective conditions. The vessel safety management system provided the master with no clear direction on safe routes to follow. The command, control, and communication with and between the crew in relation to emergency procedures and response was ineffective.

As a regulatory body, we are required to publish a range of information about our functions and how we carry them out. We do this under the information publication scheme.

A passenger ferry was returning from its scheduled service when an unanticipated wave raised its stern and caused its bow to dive under the water. Water rushed over the bow and a significant amount came through the forward portside access door and into the passenger compartment. The master immediately reduced speed, which expelled most of the water overboard. The forward portside access door had been left open by a crew member who was attempting to alleviate sea sickness among some passengers. The action of leaving the door open during the voyage was contrary to the vessel’s survey requirements. Signage requiring the door to be kept closed when underway was reportedly not seen by crew members. This resulted in water entering the vessel creating a potentially unsafe situation.

Obligations of registered agents of Australian registered ships.