On 6 November 2021, while enroute, a passenger charter (Class 1E) vessel’s inadequately secured swim platform gate opened when a passenger and toddler leant against it causing the two passengers to fall into the water. The investigation identified that there was no locking bolt on the gate, no risk assessments and no passenger verification procedures in place. 

A summary of the effects of oil and dispersed oil on temperate sea grasses.

This marine notice outlines AMSA’s expectations for vessel owners and operators when considering appropriate crewing, maintenance of watchkeeping standards and provision of minimum hours of rest, ensuring seafarer fitness for duty. 

Rules and conditions for vessels declared to not be regulated Australian vessels.

This agreement sets out the plan for how Australia will respond to marine pollution spills in Australian waters.

A safety management system (also referred to as an SMS) is a systematic approach to managing safety.

A charter fishing vessel proceeding to a fishing spot began experiencing progressively worsening weather conditions and water ingress. Despite the owner’s warning prior to departure and passenger complaints, the master continued to the fishing destination. Strong winds and waves hampered anchoring, with water accumulating on deck through the transom door to the point of flooding. The vessel’s EPIRB was deployed, and a rescue helicopter attended, winching the master and passengers to safety.

On the morning of 24 April 2022, a fishing vessel ran aground on a reef between Bundaberg and Torres Strait. The master and two deck hands had been underway for six days prior to the grounding. The master was fatigued, having had little sleep given the watchkeeping schedule and the competency levels of the two deckhands.

We use marine orders to explain and implement the legislative requirements for the maritime industry. Find out about the conventions and standards that marine orders explain.

A summary of discharge standards under MARPOL and local regulations if you are operating your vessel in Australian waters.

On 16 March 2022, a class 2B landing barge collided with a starboard channel marker. The investigation identified that the previous swing engineer did not inform the incoming engineer that the port main engine cooling water suction valve was shut. After getting underway, the engine began to overheat. This distracted the master from monitoring the vessel’s intended track. The vessel’s safety management system did not have an appropriate engineering handover procedure.

As the national standard is updated, generic equivalent standards (GES) are being superseded.

This marine notice advises of the availability of guidance for the recording of operations in the Oil Record Book Part I – machinery space operations (all ships), prepared and issued by the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

A 2C rescue vessel was preparing to depart a river entrance bar with 11 people onboard. The observed sea state was a wave height (breaking) of 1.4 to 1.8 metres. The entrance bar had a moderate to high level of congestion of jet skis and surfboard riders positioned within the aids to navigation departure leads. The vessel came within very close proximity to surfers on 3 occasions whilst negotiating the breaking sea conditions. The vessel then broached upon a wave resulting in the vessel heeling to port and becoming unable to be controlled due to the force of the wave.

The Maritine Agencies Forum (MAF) provides a forum for collaboration on maritime safety and other issues.

These are the deficiencies for MARPOL that our inspectors have found.